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Auszug 
 
Für viele Bewertungsdimensionen (z.B. die Temperatur, der Geschmack, und 
der Nährwert einer Mahlzeit) gilt: Ein Spektrum positive Zustände ist von zwei Spektren 
negativer Zustände umgeben: zu viel und zu wenig. Diese Verteilung von Zuständen in der 
Informationsökologie resultiert in einer höheren Ähnlichkeit positiver Objekte, Personen, und 
Ereignisse im Vergleich zu negativen Stimuli. Das heißt, es gibt weniger Möglichkeiten positiv 
zu sein als negativ zu sein. Stimuli können oftmals nur auf eine einzige Art und Weise positiv 
sein (z.B. bei einer guten Mahlzeit müssen sowohl die Temperatur als auch der Geschmack und 
der Nährwert angemessen sein). Stimuli können aber in vielerlei Hinsicht negativ sein (z.B. 
eine schlechte Mahlzeit kann zu heiß oder zu kalt, zu scharf oder zu fad, oder zu fett oder zu 
karg sein). Diese höhere Ähnlichkeit von positiver verglichen zu negativer Information ist 
relevant, weil Ähnlichkeit auf nahezu allen Ebenen der Informationsverarbeitung einen großen 
Einfluss auf Schnelligkeit und Genauigkeit hat. Wenn die höhere Ähnlichkeit von positiver 
verglichen zu negativer Information also ein allgemeingültiges Phänomen ist, dann könnte 
dieses Phänomen eine Reihe von Valenzasymmetrien in der Informationsverarbeitung 
vorhersagen / erklären. Ich zeige, dass die höhere Ähnlichkeit von positiver verglichen zu 
negativer Information in der Tat ein allgemeingültiges Phänomen ist, welches auf tausende 
Wörter und Bilder zutrifft. Außerdem zeige ich, dass die höhere Ähnlichkeit von positiver 
verglichen zu negativer Information auch auf soziale Gruppen zutrifft. Gruppen, welche 
hinsichtlich Durchsetzungskraft / soziökonomischer Status (A für agency) und konservative-
progressive Überzeugungen (B für beliefs) als durchschnittlich beurteilt werden, werden 
hinsichtlich Gemeinschaftssinn (C für communion) als hoch beurteilt. Gruppen, welche 
hinsichtlich A und B als extrem beurteilt werden, werden hinsichtlich C als niedrig beurteilt. 
Da durchschnittliche Gruppen einander ähnlicher sind als extreme Gruppen, sind positive 
verglichen zu negativen Gruppen ähnlicher. Zum Abschluss diskutiere ich Implikationen dieses 
ABC-Modells von Gruppenstereotypen, wobei ich auf weiterführende 
Forschungsmöglichkeiten zum Einfluss von Stereotypen auf soziale Wahrnehmung, Kognition, 
und Verhalten hinweise.       
 
Schlagwörter: Valenzasymmetrien, mentale Repräsentation, Ähnlichkeit, natürliche 
Stimulusauswahl, räumliches Anordnen, Allgemeingültigkeit, Inhalt von Stereotypen, 
Gruppen, Durchsetzungskraft / sozioökonomischer Erfolg, konservative-progressive 
Überzeugungen, Gemeinschaftssinn, ABC-Model  
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Abstract 
 
 On most if not all evaluatively relevant dimensions such as the temperature level, 
taste intensity, and nutritional value of a meal, one range of adequate, positive states is framed 
by two ranges of inadequate, negative states, namely too much and too little. This distribution 
of positive and negative states in the information ecology results in a higher similarity of 
positive objects, people, and events to other positive stimuli as compared to the similarity of 
negative stimuli to other negative stimuli. In other words, there are fewer ways in which an 
object, a person, or an event can be positive as compared to negative. Oftentimes, there is only 
one way in which a stimulus can be positive (e.g., a good meal has to have an adequate 
temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value). In contrast, there are many different 
ways in which a stimulus can be negative (e.g., a bad meal can be too hot or too cold, too spicy 
or too bland, or too fat or too lean). This higher similarity of positive as compared to negative 
stimuli is important, as similarity greatly impacts speed and accuracy on virtually all levels of 
information processing, including attention, classification, categorization, judgment and 
decision making, and recognition and recall memory. Thus, if the difference in similarity 
between positive and negative stimuli is a general phenomenon, it predicts and may explain a 
variety of valence asymmetries in cognitive processing (e.g., positive as compared to negative 
stimuli are processed faster but less accurately). In my dissertation, I show that the similarity 
asymmetry is indeed a general phenomenon that is observed in thousands of words and pictures. 
Further, I show that the similarity asymmetry applies to social groups. Groups stereotyped as 
average on the two dimensions agency / socio-economic success (A) and conservative-
progressive beliefs (B) are stereotyped as positive or high on communion (C), while groups 
stereotyped as extreme on A and B (e.g., managers, homeless people, punks, and religious 
people) are stereotyped as negative or low on C. As average groups are more similar to one 
another than extreme groups, according to this ABC model of group stereotypes, positive 
groups are mentally represented as more similar to one another than negative groups. Finally, I 
discuss implications of the ABC model of group stereotypes, pointing to avenues for future 
research on how stereotype content shapes social perception, cognition, and behavior.  
 
 Keywords: valence asymmetries, mental representation, similarity, natural sampling, 
spatial arrangement, generality, stereotype content, groups, agency / socio-economic success, 
conservative-progressive beliefs, communion, ABC model   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Valence or the continuum from positive to negative is surely one of the most important 
dimensions of meaning (Lazarus, 1966; Lewin, 1963; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), as 
distinguishing between “good for me” and “bad for me” is key to survive and thrive. 
Accordingly, the valence literature provides a plethora of insights about how positive and 
negative information is learned, stored, retrieved, and processed. A fundamental insight is that 
there is a big difference in how people learn, store, retrieve, and process positive compared to 
negative information, a phenomenon known as valence asymmetry in cognitive processing 
(Anderson, 1965; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001; Taylor, 1991). To give a few examples, negative information binds people’s attention for 
a longer time (Pratto & John, 1991). Negative information is recognized with greater accuracy 
(Alves et al., 2015) and recalled in greater detail (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006). 
Negative information is also learned better (Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004) and weighs more in 
object and person perception (Knobe, 2003; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). However, people 
detect, classify, and process positive information faster (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, 
Neufeld, & Neel, 2012; Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008), lump positive 
information into fewer categories (Koch, Alves, Krüger, & Unkelbach, 2016), and generalize 
more between positive entities such as traits and behaviors (Gräf & Unkelbach, 2015). In sum, 
processing valence is a vital part of human cognition, and valence asymmetry occurs on 
virtually all levels of cognitive processing. Thus, to understand human cognition, it is important 
to understand how valence asymmetry in cognitive processing comes about.  
Traditionally, valence asymmetry in cognitive processing is explained by the higher 
affective and motivational potential of negative compared to positive information (“bad is 
stronger than good”; Baumeister et al., 2001, p. 323). Specifically, to initiate efforts that end or 
avoid a problematic situation, negative stimuli have a greater affective and motivational impact 
on the organism (see also Rozin & Royzman, 2001). A closely related account is that negative 
stimuli elicit a stronger affective and motivational reaction with the purpose of mobilizing 
resources to remove a present threat and to minimize its damage (Taylor, 1991). The resources 
mobilized / efforts initiated in the face of negative stimuli are increased vigilance, improved 
encoding and retrieval etc., resulting in different forms of valence asymmetry in cognitive 
processing to be explained. No such resources / efforts are required in the face of positive 
objects, people, and events. In contrast, to prolong and maximize the pleasure from hedonic 
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situations, individuals minimize the resources used / efforts expended for processing positive 
stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001), resulting in higher speed as well as increased superficiality 
(e.g., fewer categories, more generalizations) – that is, other forms of valence asymmetry in 
cognitive processing to be explained. Recently, Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) proposed an 
alternative explanation, namely that positive information is more similar to other positive 
information compared to negative information’s similarity to other negative information – that 
is, good is more alike than bad.  
Stimulus similarity greatly impacts all stages of cognitive processing (Goldstone & Son, 
2005; “sameness is […] the backbone of our thinking”, James, 1980/1950; p.459), including 
classification, categorization, generalization, judgment, recognition, and recall (Nosofsky, 
1986; Shepard, 1987). For example, facilitated processing effects are stronger for similar prime-
target pairs (Perea, Duñabeitia, & Carreiras, 2008). Exemplars are classified faster and more 
accurately if they are similar to the category’s prototype (Nosoksky, 1986; Smith & Sloman, 
1994). People are more likely to apply previous decisions in similar situations (Shepard; 1987; 
Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). Similar stimuli are more likely to be recalled (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) but also more often confused with one another (DeSoto & Roediger, 2014). 
Given that stimulus similarity influences all stages of cognitive processing, the proposed higher 
similarity of positive compared to negative information might explain valence asymmetry in 
cognitive processing (Unkelbach, 2012). 
There is evidence in support of this. Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) showed that the 
higher classification speed of positive targets is due to their higher similarity (see also 
Chapter 2, Study 1). The lower sensitivity and higher response bias for positive stimuli has been 
found to be due to their higher similarity, too (Alves et al., 2015, see also Chapter 2, Study 1). 
Also, halo effects are more likely to occur for positive traits, because positive information is 
more similar (Gräf & Unkelbach, 2016). Further, the effect of additional positive information 
during impression formation might be less strong (Knobe, 2003; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990) 
because positive information is more similar and thus more repetitive. The lower precision for 
details during recall of positive information (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006) might 
also due to that positive information is more similar and thus more easily confused. Taken 
together, valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity already explains several forms of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing (e.g., processing speed and memory accuracy), and 
there are other forms that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity might explain. 
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To count as an alternative explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing, 
valence asymmetry in similarity should at least in principle be independent of 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential. The first aim of this work is to propose 
a homeostatic model of valence in which valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity can occur 
independently of valence asymmetry affective-motivational potential. If this model is correct, 
valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity indeed qualifies as an explanation of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing that is independent of, and thus complementary to, 
the traditional explanation in terms of valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential.   
 
Valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity as a novel and independent explanation 
of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing 
 
To model that valence asymmetry in similarity is in principle independent of 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential, I extend a classical, geometric model of 
similarity. In this model, stimuli (i.e., objects, people, events etc.) are points in a metric space 
with n dimensions. Each dimension scales one stimulus feature that is evaluatively relevant 
within a given set and context of stimuli. The space equates proximity to similarity – therefore, 
stimuli that lie closer to one another are more similar to one another. I propose that on all 
dimensions, there is an ideal, maximally positive quantity (i.e., a subgoal) that is framed by 
two spectra of increasingly less positive / more negative quantities, namely quantities that are 
increasingly “too little” on one side of the subgoal and “too much” on the other side of the 
subgoal. This assumption is based on the notion of homeostasis, the idea that humans will 
survive and thrive only if they remain within a certain range of quantities on certain physical 
dimensions (e.g., light, sound, touch, smell, taste, all kinds of organ functions and blood values, 
sleep and waking, motion and rest, height, weight; Bernard, trans. 1974; Cannon, 1926). Stimuli 
that meet the subgoal on all dimensions meet the overall goal or, in other words, 
cannot get better. As illustrated in Figure 1, I model the overall goal at the sphere’s center. 
Thus, stimuli that cannot get better all lie exactly at the sphere’s center, which means that due 
to their maximal proximity their similarity is maximal, too. Importantly, stimuli can always get 
worse by deviating further from the sphere’s center, becoming less positive (green layer) to 
neutral (thin white layer) to more negative (gray layer) on one or more or even all dimensions. 
The further from the sphere’s center stimuli are located (i.e., the more negative stimuli are), the 
more dissimilar they will, on average, be, as the maximum possible distance between stimuli 
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increases as a function of their distance from the sphere’s center. In other words, higher 
similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli (Unkelbach et al., 2008; Unkelbach, 2012) 
is built into this homeostatic valence model.     
 
Figure 1 
 
Note. The homeostatic model of valence. 
  
 Figure 1 illustrates a case with three goal-relevant dimensions (X, Y, and Z) and two 
positive and two negative stimuli (P1 and P2, N1 and N2, respectively). The stimuli’s 
affective-motivational potential is given by their beeline distance to the thin white neutral layer; 
the further away stimuli are from the neutral layer, the more positive or negative they are. As 
negative compared to positive stimuli can in principle be further away from the neutral layer, 
negative stimuli will, on average, have greater affective-motivational potential (Baumeister et 
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al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991). That is, valence asymmetry in affective-
motivational potential is built into the homeostatic valence model, too. 
Can valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity occur independently of 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential in this homeostatic valence model? As 
depicted in Figure 1, P1 and P2 have the same affective potential as N1 and N2, because the 
beeline distance between these four stimuli and the neutral layer is equal. Nevertheless, the 
beeline distance between P1 and P2 is shorter than the beeline distance between N1 and N2. As 
interstimulus similarity is given by interstimulus proximity, the positive stimuli P1 and P2 are 
more similar to one another than the negative stimuli N1 and N2, even though all stimuli’s 
affective-motivational potential is equal. That is, in the homeostatic valence model 
higher similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli (Unkelbach et al., 2008) does not 
necessitate higher affective-motivational potential of negative compared to positive stimuli 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). Thus, if the homeostatic valence model is correct, valence asymmetry 
in stimulus similarity might be an explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing 
that is independent of, and thus complementary to, the traditional explanation in terms of 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential.  
Is there evidence that the homeostatic valence model is correct? The core idea of the 
homeostatic valence model is that on most if not all evaluatively relevant content dimensions 
positive, adequate quantities are framed by two ranges of negative quantities, namely 
increasing deficiency or “too little” and increasing excess or “too much”. In other words, to fail 
at falsifying the homeostatic valence model, it is crucial to show that the relation between 
evaluatively relevant content quantities and (negative to positive) evaluation is curvilinear 
in the sense that extreme and intermediate quantities are (perceived as) negative and positive, 
respectively. Facial beauty is a prominent example for the homeostatic distribution (i.e., 
too little-adequate-too much) of evaluatively relevant content quantities: unattractive faces 
have too small or too big eyes or lips, or the distance between the ears or chin and hairline is 
too small or too big, or the skin is too dry or too oily or too light or too dark. Attractive faces, 
however, have none of these: they are similarly average in a physical sense. Thus, they all 
look alike (Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Potter et al., 2007; Rhodes, 2006), representing one of 
many instances of the proposed higher similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli 
(Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2016; Koch et al., 2016a; Unkelbach et al., 2008). Likewise, 
people can be too skinny or too heavy. Some people suffer from being too small. Others have 
problems being too tall, whereas average heighted people rarely ever think about their height. 
Too low amounts of stress and adversity have a negative impact on health and well-being, but 
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the same is true for too high amounts of stress and adversity (Seery, 2011). Motivation and 
performance collapse if demand and arousal are too low, but the same is true for 
too high demand and arousal (Csikszentmihályi, 1990; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Potential 
partners, friends, and colleagues are negative if they are too conservative or too progressive, or 
too stupid or to smart, or too introverted or too extraverted (Barry & Stewart, 1997). All these 
and many other evaluatively relevant content dimensions, including openness, experience, 
complexity (Janssen, 2001; Sturman, 2003), practice, persistence, optimism, self-efficacy, self-
esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Brown 
& Marshall, 2001; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2007), generosity, empathy (Flynn, 
2003; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Windsor, Anstey, & 
Rodgers, 2008), commitment, and assertiveness (Ames & Flynn, 2007; Somers & Casal, 1994) 
feature the homeostatic distribution of quantities, namely a positive middle ground between two 
negative extremes (Grant & Schwartz, 2011). Thus, there is evidence suggesting that the 
homeostatic valence model is correct, supporting the claims that valence asymmetry in stimulus 
similarity can occur independently of valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential, 
and that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity might thus explain valence asymmetry in 
cognitive processing independently of valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential. 
Chapter 2 provides empirical evidence in support of these claims. First, Studies 1, 2, 4, 
and 6 in Chapter 2 showed valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity in the absence of 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential (see Footnote 10 in the 
General Discussion in Chapter 2; we did not measure affective-motivational potential in Studies 
3 and 5). And second, in Study 1 in Chapter 2 stimulus similarity predicted five different stages 
of cognitive processing (classification and evaluation speed, probability of being categorized, 
and recognition sensitivity and response bias; see Table 3 in Study 1 in Chapter 2) for which 
valence asymmetry has been shown before (Alves et al., 2015; Unkelbach et al., 2008). 
 
Valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity as a powerful and appealing 
explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing  
 
 According to Fiedler (2014; see also Fiedler & Wänke, 2009), intrapsychic causes such 
as stimuli’s affective-motivational impact (i.e., positive or negative affect paired with 
an intention to approach or avoid a positive or negative stimulus) are often not suitable as an 
explanation of intrapsychic effects such as different stages of cognitive processing, because 
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intrapsychic causes tend to be theoretically too proximal to intrapsychic effects. The theoretical 
proximity between a cause and an effect of interest is maximal if cause and effect are in fact 
the same construct. Obviously, in such a case the explanation is tautological or, in other words, 
has no power at all. The power and appeal of an explanation thus increases as a function of the 
theoretical distance between cause and effect. Fiedler (2014) argues that research should 
explain intrapsychic effects by means of causes that lie outside the mind. For example, 
explanations of affect, motivation, cognition, and behavior in terms of structural or functional 
aspects of the brain and body (e.g., neurotransmitter’s and hormone’s production, circulation, 
and resorption, gain and loss of neural networks, lesions, injuries, all sorts of blood values, 
organ conditions, genes etc.) are powerful and appealing, because they are theoretically distal. 
Even more theoretically distal and thus more powerful and appealing are explanations that lie 
outside the organism – that is, ecological explanations.  
Ecological explanations of intrapsychic effects are explanations that relate to the way in 
which information is distributed in, and sampled from, people’s ecology. For example, it is safe 
to assume that people encounter more information about their ingroup compared to outgroups, 
because they spend more time with ingroup compared to outgroup members. This ingroup-
outgroups difference in information sample size provides a powerful and appealing ecological 
explanation of intergroup bias (i.e., people’s tendency to favor the ingroup, and to disfavor 
outgroups). The greater the information sample size, the better ratios of positive to negative are 
learned (Fiedler, 2014). If a person encounters a ratio of hundred positive to twenty negative 
ingroup behaviors, and a ratio of only ten positive to two negative outgroup behaviors, he or 
she will learn his or her ingroup’s behavioral positivity prevalence better than his her outgroups’ 
behavioral positivity prevalence, resulting in a more favorable evaluation and treatment of the 
ingroup compared to outgroups (i.e., intergroup bias). Importantly, this intrapsychic effect 
occurs in the absence of real differences in behavioral positivity prevalence between the 
ingroup and outgroups. Even more importantly, the intrapsychic effect’s ecological explanation 
in terms of a ingroup-outgroups difference in information sample size is theoretically more 
distal and thus more powerful and appealing than the widely accepted intrapsychic explanation 
in terms of a positive distinctiveness or self-enhancement motive (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Critically speaking, this intrapsychic explanation traces people’s perception of the ingroup as 
superior to outgroups to their motive to perceive the ingroup and thus themselves as superior to 
outgroups and thus other people. That is, critically speaking this intrapsychic explanation is 
tautological / has no power.  
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Likewise, the intrapsychic explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing 
in terms of valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential is theoretically proximal and 
thus not very powerful / appealing. Specifically, valence asymmetry in affective-motivational 
potential can be paraphrased as higher organismic importance of negative compared to positive 
stimuli. Thus, this intrapsychic explanation traces higher processing accuracy (e.g., Alves et al., 
2015; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004) and lower processing speed (e.g., Unkelbach et al., 2008) 
of negative compared to positive stimuli to higher organismic importance of negative compared 
to positive stimuli – that is, a construct that is theoretically proximal and thus hardly insightful 
/ interesting as a cause. In contrast, the ecological explanation in terms of higher similarity of 
positive compared to negative stimuli is theoretically more distal and thus more insightful / 
interesting.  
But is valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity not a cognitive and thus intrapsychic, 
theoretically proximal cause, too? I propose that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity is a 
theoretically distal cause that is rooted in people’s information ecology. Ecological similarity 
is commonly measured in terms of frequency of co-occurrence in time and space (Griffiths, 
Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Jones & Mewhort, 2007). For example, two stimuli are 
ecologically the more similar the more often they co-occur on webpages accessible through 
Google Search (henceforth: Google similarity; Cilibrasi & Vitanyi, 2007), or in passages of a 
large collection of books that is representative of the general knowledge of undergraduates 
(LSA similarity; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). If valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity is 
indeed rooted in people’s information ecology, the Google and LSA similarity of 
positive compared to negative stimuli should be higher. Study 1 in Chapter 2 showed that this 
is the case for a widely investigated set of valenced words (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, 
& Kardes, 1986; Unkelbach et al., 2008). Further, if valence asymmetry in similarity is indeed 
an ecological, theoretically distal cause of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing, Google 
and LSA similarity should predict different stages of cognitive processing for which 
valence asymmetry has been shown before. Study 1 in Chapter 2 showed that this is the case 
for classification and evaluation speed as well as recognition sensitivity and response bias (see 
Table 3 in Study 1 in Chapter 2), establishing that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity is 
an ecological, theoretically distal and thus powerful and appealing explanation of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing.  
On a side note, Study 1 in Chapter 2 also showed that Google and LSA similarity (i.e., 
ecological similarity) substantially correspond to two cognitive measures of similarity (SpAM 
and Pairwise similarity), that valence asymmetry is also found for these cognitive measures, 
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and that these measures also predict the aforementioned stages of cognitive processing (see 
Tables 2 and 3 in Study 1 in Chapter 2). 
 
Valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity as a robust and general explanation of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing  
 
 Up to this point, I have argued that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity is a novel, 
independent, powerful, and appealing explanation of valence asymmetry in 
cognitive processing. However, these theoretical advantages are not of any practical use if 
valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity is not a robust and general phenomenon that thus can 
be shown reliably for large and representative sets of positive and negative stimuli. Is there 
evidence that the proposed higher similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli 
(Unkelbach et al., 2008; Unkelbach, 2012) is a robust and general phenomenon? I propose that 
this is the case. Specifically, there are several broad and relevant stimulus domains in which 
valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity has been shown: emotions, faces, persons, social 
groups (see Chapter 3), and, more generally, verbal and visual stimuli (see Chapter 2).  
Within the dominant emotion classification systems, there are less positive than negative 
emotions. In English, German, and Spanish the spectrum of words for positive emotional states 
is less diverse than the vocabulary for negative emotional states (Schrauf & Sanchez, 2004; 
Semin & Fiedler, 1992). Within the six basic emotions proposed by Ekman and Friesen, (1971), 
happiness is the only positive emotion, while on the negative side, there are anger, disgust, fear, 
and sadness. Surprise has no clear valence, but according to Noordewier and Breugelmans 
(2013), surprise is more often negative than positive. Plutchik’s (2001) classification contains 
trust and joy versus anger, disgust, fear, and sadness. And Izard’s (1971) list contains interest 
and joy versus anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, and shame. While there are appeals 
to better differentiate positive emotions (Sauter, 2010), we could not find published evidence 
for more diversity on the positive side of emotions compared to the negative side. Greater 
diversity can be taken as greater dissimilarity, as the number of categories (i.e., the diversity) 
required to organize a stimulus domain increases as a function of the dissimilarity between the 
domain’s stimuli. 
Concerning faces, averaging more and more faces results in a face that is more and more 
attractive, and individual faces with average features are also more attractive than faces with 
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features that deviate from the prototype of the population. Consequently, attractive faces all 
look alike, while there are many ways in which faces can be unattractive (Langlois & Roggman, 
1990; Rhodes, 2006). Faces with symmetrical halves are also more attractive than faces whose 
left side does not resemble the right side (Rhodes, Proffitt, Grady, & Sumich, 1998; Grammer 
& Thornhill, 1994). And indeed, if cognitive similarity is directly assessed (i.e., not in terms of 
averageness or symmetry), participants judge attractive compared to unattractive faces to be 
more similar to one another (Potter et al., 2007). Also, average / prototypical faces are also 
more trustworthy (Sofer, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Todorov, 2015). In sum, if one accepts facial 
attractiveness and trustworthiness as proxies for facial positivity, positive faces are more similar 
to one another than negative faces.  
Concerning persons, Leising, Ostrovski, and Borkenau (2012) reported that people 
describe liked persons much less differentiated compared to disliked persons. This conclusion 
was based on the higher frequency of unique terms used to describe disliked persons. The other 
way round, Bruckmüller and Abele (2013) kept the number of terms describing persons 
constant and directly assessed the cognitive similarity of these terms. Participants judged 
20 character traits related to the basic dimensions of person perception (agency / competence 
and communion / warmth), and they judged the traits’ positive versions (e.g., clever, confident, 
warm, and friendly) to be more similar to one another than the traits’ negative versions (e.g., 
cold, mean, stupid, and insecure). Also, Alves and colleagues (2016) showed in seven studies 
that people perceived people they like (e.g., friends) as more similar to one another than people 
they dislike.  
The studies reported in Chapter 3 attested that the same is true for groups (Koch, Imhoff, 
Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016). Based on either pairwise similarity ratings – the classical 
method to measure cognitive similarity – or spatially arranged similarity – a new, more efficient 
method in which people simultaneously rate the similarity of all stimuli of interest by arranging 
more similar stimuli closer to one another on the screen (for detailed discussions of this spatial 
arrangement method, see Goldstone, 2014; Hout & Goldinger, 2016; Hout, Goldinger, & 
Ferguson, 2013; Koch et al., 2016a; Verheyen, Voorspoels, Vanpaemel, & Storms, 2016) – we 
scaled well-fitting two-dimensional similarity spaces (for a review of multidimensional scaling, 
see Borg & Groenen, 2005) for three different samples of U.S. and German groups based on 
either frequency of naming (e.g., “Off the top of your head, what various types of people do 
you think today’s society categorizes into groups?”; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) or 
frequency of occurrence in contemporary mass media (Davies, 2011). Just like in the 
homeostatic valence model, in these spaces groups are points at certain locations, and 
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intergroup similarity is given by intergroup proximity. Thus, if valence asymmetry in stimulus 
similarity also applies for groups, more warm, trustworthy, and liked (i.e., more communal) 
groups should be located closer to other groups.  
 
Figure 2 
 
Note. One of the group spaces that we scaled. 
 
Figure 2 shows the group space that we scaled in Study 2 in Chapter 3. The 40 most and 
40 least communal groups are marked in red and blue, respectively. Evidently, the proximity 
of the 40 most communal groups to other groups was higher than the proximity of the 40 
least communal groups to other groups. Accordingly, more communal groups were 
more proximal and thus more similar to other groups, confirming that valence asymmetry in 
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stimulus similarity also applies for groups. In fact, this was the case for every single group space 
that we scaled in Chapter 3 (see the General Discussion in Chapter 3). 
Finally, concerning verbal stimuli, a domain that is much broader than words that denote 
only just emotions, traits, persons, or groups, Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) did a 
similarity scaling of 20 extremely positive and 20 extremely negative words of all kinds (i.e., 
objects, persons, events etc.) sampled from a widely investigated set (Fazio et al., 1986). The 
resulting space showed that the positive words were more densely clustered – that is, 
more similar to one another – than the negative words. However, 40 words are hardly enough 
to generalize valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity to all positive and negative words (Wells 
& Windschitl, 1999; Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 2015; Westfall, Kenny, & Judd, 2014). The 
stimulus sample examined by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) presumably did not exceed N 
= 40 because the people in their study judged the words’ similarity in pairs, a procedure that 
takes a lot of time and effort. To illustrate, for to obtain similarity estimates for each pair that 
can be formed with a set of 40 words, 780 judgments have to be made. Is there a more time- 
and effort-efficient measure that allows testing the robustness and generality of valence 
asymmetry in stimulus similarity with a large variety of positive and negative words? 
Recently, Hout and colleagues (2013) validated such a similarity measure: the 
spatial arrangement method (SpAM; see also Goldstone, 1994; Kriegeskorte & Mur, 2012). 
Goldstone (1994) was the first to measure perceptual similarity based on how close to 
one another stimuli were arranged on the screen. The advantage of SpAM is that arranging 
a stimulus simultaneously readjusts the proximity and thus rated similarity between 
that stimulus and all other stimuli on the screen, decreasing measurement speed and effort 
(another advantage is that all stimuli can be rearranged at all times during the task). In 
Goldstone’s study (1994), the similarity proximities between the spatially arranged stimuli (i.e., 
the capital letter A in different fonts) correlated almost perfectly their similarity judged in pairs, 
suggesting that SpAM is an effective way to measure perceptual similarity. Hout and colleagues 
(2013) generalized this from perceptual similarity within a stimulus domain (i.e., schematic 
wheels and rudimentary bugs) to conceptual similarity within a stimulus domain (i.e., animal 
names). To validate SpAM (Hout et al., 2013) as an effective method to measure the similarity 
of conceptual stimuli from different domains, Study 1 in Chapter 2 correlated the 
SpAM similarity of Unkelbach and colleagues’ (2008) 40 conceptually diverse words with their 
similarity judged in pairs (Pairwise similarity), and with their frequency of co-occurrence 
on webpages (Google similarity) and in the print media (LSA similarity; see Table 2 in Chapter 
2). Additionally, Study 1 in Chapter 2 correlated the 40 words’ SpAM, Pairwise, Google, and 
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LSA similarity with their evaluation and classification speed, recognition response bias and 
sensitivity, and probability of being categorized (see Table 3 in Chapter 2). Results showed that 
the construct and predictive validity of SpAM similarity is high, which encouraged us to use 
SpAM to test the robustness and generality of valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity with a 
large variety of positive and negative words.   
In Study 2a in Chapter 2, people first generated and then spatially arranged 20 positive 
and 20 negative words. This procedure delivered a large and representative sample of positive 
and negative stimuli (N = 1,044). To avoid retrieval biases, Study 2b had participants 
spatially arrange 20 positive and 20 negative stimuli generated by other participants in 
Study 2a. Study 3 then examined whether the proposed asymmetry in similarity holds true for 
stimuli of both consensual and idiosyncratic valence; participants generated and 
spatially arranged 40 words that are positive / negative either generally (i.e., for everybody; N = 
995) or personally (i.e., for themselves; N = 1,139). In Study 4, to take greater care of avoiding 
retrieval biases, participants spatially arranged 20 positive and 20 negative words randomly 
drawn from a pool (N = 64) to which other participants had added only one positive and only 
one negative word each. Study 5 shifted from investigating memory-based information to 
investigating experience-based information. Participants named one positive and one negative 
event of their day on seven consecutive days. Thereafter, they spatially arranged these unique 
everyday life events from their last week (N = 1,518). In all these studies, people spatially 
arranged the positive words closer to another than the negative ones, establishing that valence 
asymmetry in similarity holds true for all kinds of verbal stimuli.  
Finally, Study 6 in Chapter 2 switched from examining strongly to examining strongly, 
moderately, and mildly positive / negative words, and from examining verbal to 
examining visual stimuli. Specifically, we compared the similarity of all positive and 
negative words in the database by Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert (2013; N = 13,915), and 
all positive and negative pictures in the international affective picture system (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005; N = 956). Results confirmed that valence asymmetry in similarity holds true 
for all kinds of visual stimuli, too. An open research question is whether the phenomenon can 
be shown for auditive, olfactory, and haptic stimuli, too. 
I summarize Chapter 1 as follows: valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity can be 
taken as a novel, independent, powerful, appealing, robust, and general explanation of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing. Chapter 2 and 3 elaborate on the empirical 
robustness and generality of the theoretically predicted higher similarity of positive 
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compared to negative stimuli, showing the effect for thousands of words and pictures (Chapter 
2), and for hundreds of groups (Chapter 3). Thus, redundancy is inevitable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 – A general valence asymmetry in similarity:                   
Good is more alike than bad 
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Abstract 
 
The density hypothesis (Unkelbach et al., 2008) claims a general higher similarity of positive 
information to other positive information compared to the similarity of negative information to 
other negative information. This similarity asymmetry might explain valence asymmetries on 
all levels of cognitive processing. The available empirical evidence for this general valence 
asymmetry in similarity suffers from a lack of direct tests, low representativeness, and possible 
confounding variables (e.g., differential valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, or 
concreteness of positive and negative stimuli). To address these problems, Study 1 first 
validated the spatial arrangement method (SpAM) as a similarity measure. Using SpAM, 
studies 2-6 found the proposed valence asymmetry in large, representative samples of self- and 
other-generated words (Studies 2a/2b), for words of consensual and idiosyncratic valence 
(Study 3), for words from one and many independent information sources (Study 4), for real-life 
experiences (Study 5), and for large data sets of verbal (i.e., ~14,000 words reported by 
Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013) and visual information (i.e., ~1,000 pictures reported 
in the IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) (Study 6). Together, these data support a general 
valence asymmetry in similarity, namely that good is more alike than bad. 
 
Positively and negatively evaluated information differentially influences all stages of 
information processing; from attention (e.g., Pratto & John, 1991) to categorization (e.g., Billig 
& Tajfel, 1973) to memory (e.g., Alves et al., 2015). Traditionally, these influences are 
explained by negative information’s higher emotional and motivational significance due to 
basic survival needs (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001; Taylor, 1991). While emotional and motivational effects are uncontested, Unkelbach and 
colleagues (2008) formulated the density hypothesis as an informational explanation of valence 
asymmetries in information processing. The density hypothesis states that positive information 
is generally more similar to other positive information compared to negative information’s 
similarity to other negative information; in visualizations of mental representations, positive 
information is thus more densely clustered. In other words, they hypothesized a general valence 
asymmetry in stimulus similarity. And as inter-stimulus similarity influences numerous 
cognitive processes, such as classification, categorization, generalization, judgment, 
recognition, and recall (e.g., Hintzman, 1988; Nosofsky, 1986; 1988; Shepard, 1987), the 
hypothesized asymmetry in stimulus similarity might explain many valence asymmetries in 
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cognitive processing independently of information’s emotional and motivational potential. But 
does positive and negative information really differ in similarity? 
The present article tests the hypothesis of a general valence asymmetry in stimulus 
similarity. To do so, we first review existing valence asymmetries in cognitive processing that 
the proposed asymmetry might explain. Next, we provide a theoretical explanation for the 
density hypothesis (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach et al., 2008). Then, we review existing 
evidence for the proposed generality of higher similarity of positive compared to negative 
information, concluding that the available evidence suffers from a lack of direct tests, 
low representativeness, and possible confounding variables, namely valence intensity, 
frequency, familiarity, and concreteness. Addressing these problems, six studies provide 
converging evidence that, as predicted by the density hypothesis and its underlying theoretical 
rationale, across all kinds of positive and negative information, positive information is more 
similar compared to negative information and therefore clusters more densely in in 
visualizations of mental representations. 
 
Why we should care that positive stimuli are more similar than negative stimuli 
 
Despite the debate over the use of similarity as a construct (Goodman, 1972) and 
different models of similarity (Goldstone & Son, 2005; Hahn, Chater, & Richardson, 2003; 
Krumhansl, 1978; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993; Tversky, 1977), inter-stimulus 
similarity undoubtedly impacts learning, memory, and cognition in profound ways (“sameness 
is […] the backbone of our thinking”, James, 1980/1950; p.459). Targets are classified 
faster/easier when following similar primes (e.g., McRae & Boisvert, 1998; Perea, Duñabeitia, 
& Carreiras, 2008). Categorization is more accurate when stimuli are similar to the 
representative prototype and/or available exemplars of the target category (Nosoksky, 1986; 
1988; Smith & Sloman, 1994). Generalizations of processing strategies, judgments, and 
decisions to similar stimuli are more likely (Ames, 2004; Shepard; 1987; Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2001). Dissimilar targets are recognized with greater accuracy (DeSoto & Roediger, 
2014; Hintzman, 1988). And, similar items are more likely to be recalled (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Schwartz & Humphreys, 1973). In sum, inter-stimulus similarity plays a 
major role in how people make sense of the world (Quine, 1969).  
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If, as predicted by the density hypothesis (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach et al., 2008), 
positive stimuli are generally more similar than negative stimuli, there should be similarity-
based differences between positive and negative stimuli on all levels of information processing 
(Unkelbach, 2012). There is evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case. For example, 
positive words are classified faster (Fazio, Sabonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Klauer & 
Musch, 1999), because they are more similar to one another than negative words (Unkelbach 
et al., 2008; extremity of positive/negative word meaning and word frequency and length were 
ruled out as confounding variables). Similarly, people recognize negative information more 
accurately, because it is more dissimilar (Alves et al., 2015; word frequency and length were 
ruled out as confounding variables). Furthermore, generalizations of positive evaluations (i.e., 
halo effects; Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Langlois et al., 2000) are more likely than 
generalizations of negative evaluations (horn effects), and this has been argued to be due to that 
positive aspects of objects, people, and events are more similar and thus more relatable to one 
another than negative stimuli (Gräf & Unkelbach, 2015).  
Furthermore, negative behaviors might impact impression formation more strongly 
(Knobe, 2003; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), because such behaviors are more dissimilar to the 
behavioral norm (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). And, people might recall negative events with 
greater precision for details (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006), because they are 
more dissimilar to one another than positive events. In sum, there is evidence for 
similarity-based valence asymmetries in cognitive processing (e.g., processing speed, 
likelihood of generalization, and memory accuracy), and there are many more possible 
candidates to be explained by the assumed differential similarity of positive and negative 
information. 
 
Why positive information should be more similar than negative information 
 
There are two arguments for the proposed similarity asymmetry: stimulus range and 
frequency of stimulus co-occurrence. Both arguments are based on the structure of people’s 
information ecology, and not the biased processing of evaluative information (for reviews on 
why and how to distinguish between ecological and psychological analyses, see De Houwer, 
Gawronski, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014; Fiedler & Wänke, 2009). 
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The stimulus range argument is that on any given content dimensions, positive states 
are framed by “too much” and “too little”, resulting in a narrower multidimensional range of 
positive compared to negative states; in fact, we were not able to think of a single content 
dimension on which both “more” and “less” are better than the range in between those two 
boundaries – that is, a dimension on which negative states are framed by positive states. Thus, 
as long as there are two ways to be negative on a given dimension, the higher similarity of 
positive information follows as a necessity. For example, a dinner meal can be evaluated on 
several content dimensions (e.g., temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value). For 
each dimension, a deviation of “too much” (e.g., too hot, too spicy, and too fat) or “too little” 
(e.g., too cold, too bland, and too thin) will make the dinner negative. In contrast, positive meals 
will all have a similarly adequate temperature level, taste intensity, and nutritional value, 
making them more similar within the space constituted by the relevant content dimensions.  
The stimulus range argument thereby reflects the notion of homeostasis (“staying 
similar” in Greek), the idea that organisms are in a positive state only if they remain within 
certain boundaries on certain physical dimensions (e.g., light, sound, touch, smell, taste, all 
kinds of organ functions and blood values, sleep and waking, motion and rest, height, weight; 
Bernard, trans. 1974; Cannon, 1926). 
The frequency of stimulus co-occurrence argument is that positive compared to negative 
information is more frequent both objectively (i.e., in large text corpora; Augustine, Mehl, & 
Larsen, 2011; Rozin, Berman, & Royzman, 2010) and subjectively (Unkelbach et al., 2010). In 
their Pollyanna hypothesis Matlin and Stang (1974) argued that this positivity bias might reflect 
a basic human tendency, and it follows from many other psychological principles, such as the 
need to maintain favorable evaluations, relatedness, belonging to others (Langston, 1994; Reis 
et al., 2010), good mood, and life satisfaction (Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006). In 
addition, most people most often comply with social norms to act and interact in a positive way 
to avert reputation damage (Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014), resource deprivation (Balliet, 
Mulder, & van Lange, 2011), and ostracism (Williams, 2007). This valence asymmetry in 
frequency is further amplified by the fact that people keep positive and negative objects, people, 
and events near and at distance, respectively (Denrell, 2005; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004). 
Positive information’s higher frequency must lead to higher frequency of co-occurrence, 
which translates to higher perceived similarity, because stimuli that co-occur more often are 
more strongly associated in memory (Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013; Verhaeghen, Aikman, 
& van Gulick, 2011); frequency of co-occurrence per se is a widely accepted proxy for inter-
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stimulus similarity (e.g., Griffiths, Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Jones & Mewhort, 2007; 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997). 
Taken together, these two arguments predict a general higher similarity of positive 
compared to negative information in the ecology, because the range of positive information is 
more restricted and positive information co-occurs more frequently; a more detailed discussion 
of these two explanations is provided by Koch, Alves, and Unkelbach (2016). However, the 
main focus of the present research is the generality of the predicted valence asymmetry in 
similarity, and not the underlying theoretical explanations. Thus, we now turn to the available 
evidence. 
 
Existing evidence that positive information is more similar than 
negative information 
 
Indirect evidence. Three research areas indirectly support a general valence asymmetry 
in stimulus similarity: facial beauty, basic emotions, and vocabulary for states and traits. 
First, morphed (i.e., averaged) and naturally average faces are more attractive than 
less prototypical faces. Because average/prototypical faces are highly similar, “attractive faces 
all look alike”, while faces are unattractive in many different ways (too big or too small eyes or 
lips, or the distance between the ears or between chin and hairline is too big or too small, or the 
skin is too dry or too oily or too light or too dark; Langlois & Roggman, 1990, p. 115; Rhodes, 
2006). Potter, Corneille, Ruys, and Rhodes (2007) directly tested this prediction and found that 
in a multidimensional scaling of attractive and unattractive faces people judged attractive faces 
as more similar to one another compared to unattractive faces.  
Second, the diversity of positive “basic” emotions is lower than the diversity of their 
negative counterparts (for a critique of basic emotions, see Ortony & Turner, 1990). In the 
taxonomy of basic emotions by Ekman and Friesen (1971), there is only happiness on the 
positive side, while anger, disgust, fear, and sadness form the more diverse negative side; 
according to Noordewier and Breugelmans (2013), the valence of surprise is ambivalent but 
more often negative rather than positive. Furthermore, this higher diversity of negative 
compared to positive basic emotions is also apparent in Plutchik’s (2001; anger, disgust, fear, 
and sadness vs. trust and joy) and Izard’s (1971; anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, 
and shame vs. joy) taxonomies. There are appeals to better differentiate positive emotions 
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(Sauter, 2010); however, we could not find published evidence for a greater diversity of positive 
compared to negative emotions. 
And third, in English, German, and Spanish the spectrum of words for positive 
emotional states and character traits is less diverse than the vocabulary for negative emotional 
states and character traits (Leising, Ostrovski, & Borkenau, 2012; Schrauf & Sanchez, 2004; 
Semin & Fiedler, 1992).  
However, diversity is not a direct measure of inter-stimulus similarity, and thus studies 
that compare the diversity of positive and negative terms do not provide direct evidence that 
positive information is mentally represented as more similar to one another than negative 
information (e.g., competent and warm are less diverse but less similar than untrustworthy, 
dishonest, and insincere).  
Direct evidence. Two studies provide direct evidence: Bruckmüller and Abele (2013) 
showed that 20 character traits related to agency and communion were judged to be more similar 
to one another in their positive formulations (e.g., warm, friendly, clever, and confident) than 
their negative formulations (e.g., cold, mean, stupid, and insecure). In Unkelbach and 
colleagues’ (2008) study, participants used a ‘dissimilar-similar’ scale to judge all 780 pairs of 
words that can be formed with their set of 20 extremely positive words and 20 extremely 
negative words that refer to not just people, but also objects and events. These similarity 
judgments were averaged across participants and subjected to multidimensional scaling (MDS; 
Borg & Groenen, 2005). The MDS algorithm estimates coordinates for each word in a 
geometric space in which proximity equates to similarity. Finally, in this geometric space the 
authors compared the average proximity of the positive words to the average proximity of the 
negative ones. Consistent with their density hypothesis, the positive words were more densely 
clustered – that is, more similar to one another – compared to the negative words. 
However, these direct tests are restricted in scope. Bruckmüller and Abele (2013) only 
used 20 traits specifically describing communion or agency, and Unkelbach and colleagues 
(2008) used only the most extremely positive and negative words from a list of 92 words 
(Klauer & Musch, 1999), which was originally compiled in an arbitrary fashion (Fazio et al., 
1986). Thus, there is a chance that due to a sampling bias, this list consists of similar positive 
words and dissimilar negative words. Following the arguments by Westfall, Judd, and Kenny 
(2015), this small sample of stimuli does not provide the necessary power to generalize to the 
population of positive and negative information. Small samples of participants do not allow 
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generalizing, and small samples of stimuli do not allow this either. The following empirical 
investigation aims to fill this gap. 
 
Testing a general valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity  
 
The solution for the discussed limitations is to collect similarity data for large samples 
of freely selected positive and negative stimuli. However, the standard procedure, pairwise 
similarity judgments to feed an MDS algorithm, prohibits large stimulus samples due to high 
numbers of repetitive trials. For example, scaling 40 stimuli requires 780 similarity comparisons 
– if one, for example, wants pairwise similarity judgments for 20 samples of 40 words, 15,600 
pairwise similarity judgments must be made. Thus, testing a general valence asymmetry in 
stimulus similarity and its possible predictive power for cognitive processes necessitates 
another method of measuring inter-stimulus similarity.  
An early alternative to avoid the efforts of pairwise judgment was that participants sort 
similar and different stimuli into same and different piles, respectively (e.g., Forgas, 1976; 
Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968, Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987). 
Sorting is more efficient than pairwise judgment, because each stimulus is sorted into only one 
pile, whereas in the pairwise method each stimulus is judged in conjunction with each other 
stimulus. However, sorting is disadvantaged in terms of precision of measurement, because 
responses between similar (same pile) and different (different piles) are not admitted.  
Recently, Hout, Goldinger, and Ferguson (2013) validated a new similarity 
measurement method. This spatial arrangement method (SpAM; Hout, Goldinger, & Ferguson, 
2013; Goldstone, 1994; Kriegeskorte & Mur, 2012) provides a psychometrically effective and 
highly efficient method to measure the similarity of large samples of stimuli. Goldstone (1994) 
was the first to measure perceptual stimulus similarity based on how close to one another stimuli 
were arranged on a computer screen. The averaged proximities between the spatially arranged 
stimuli (i.e., the capital letter “A” in different fonts) correlated highly with averaged pairwise 
similarity judgments, r(62) = .93, suggesting that SpAM might be an effective way to measure 
perceptual similarity. Hout and colleagues (2013) generalized this from perceptual similarity 
within a stimulus domain (i.e., schematic wheels and rudimentary bugs) to conceptual similarity 
within a stimulus domain (i.e., animal names, r(23) = .81 for the animals examined by 
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Hornberger, Bell, Graham, & Rogers, 2009; r(23) = .61 for the animals examined by Henley, 
1969).  
 
Overview of the studies 
 
To validate SpAM (Hout et al., 2013) as an effective method to measure the similarity 
of conceptual stimuli from different domains, Study 1 compared the SpAM similarity of 
20 positive and 20 negative conceptually diverse stimulus words (see Unkelbach et al., 2008) 
with their similarity judged in pairs (Pairwise similarity), and with their frequency of 
co-occurrence in the internet (Google similarity) and the print media (LSA similarity). 
Additionally, Study 1 compared the predictive power of SpAM, Pairwise, Google, and LSA 
similarity by correlating the obtained similarities with stimuli’s evaluation speed, classification 
speed, recognition response bias and sensitivity, and probability of being subsumed under a 
category. 
Having validated SpAM, Study 2a instructed participants to generate and spatially 
arrange 20 positive and 20 negative words. This procedure should deliver a large and 
representative sample of positive and negative stimuli. To avoid retrieval biases, Study 2b had 
participants spatially arrange 20 positive and 20 negative stimuli generated by other participants 
in Study 2a. Study 3 then examined whether the similarity asymmetry holds true for stimuli of 
both consensual and idiosyncratic valence; participants named and spatially arranged 40 words 
that are positive/negative either generally (i.e., for everybody) or personally (i.e., for 
themselves). In Study 4, to avoid processing and retrieval biases, participants spatially arranged 
20 positive and 20 negative words randomly drawn from a pool to which other participants had 
added only one positive and only one negative word each. Study 5 shifted from investigating 
memory-based information to investigating experience-based information. Participants named 
one positive and one negative event of their day on seven consecutive days. Thereafter, they 
spatially arranged these unique everyday life events from their last week. Finally, Study 6 
switched both from strongly to strongly, moderately, and mildly positive/negative stimuli and 
from verbal to visual stimuli by comparing the similarity of all positive and negative words in 
the database by Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert (WKB; 2013; ~14,000 words), and all 
positive and negative pictures in the international affective picture system (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005; ~1000 pictures). 
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In addition to corroborating that the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity is a 
general phenomenon, Studies 1 and 4 corroborated that the asymmetry is actually due to 
valence, as the positive stimuli were seen as more similar to one another than the negative 
stimuli even when controlling for their valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and 
concreteness.  
Throughout these studies, we report all manipulations, measures, and data exclusions. 
The reported studies represent the full set we conducted for the present research question. We 
based our sample sizes on the effect sizes reported by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008). 
 
Study 1 
 
Participants spatially arranged the 20 positive and 20 negative words investigated by 
Unkelbach and colleagues (2008) and then divided these words into between 2 and 7 unlabeled 
categories. With these 40 stimulus words, we validated how well SpAM and classical pairwise 
judgment measure the same aspects of conceptual similarity. Up to this point, the validity of 
SpAM similarity has only been confirmed for perceptual/conceptually simple stimulus sets such 
as color patches, letters, letter-like forms, schematic wheels, rudimentary bugs, and animal 
names (see Goldstone, 1994; Hout et al., 2013; Kriegeskorte & Mur, 2012). To further test and 
compare the validity of SpAM similarity, we correlated SpAM similarity and similarity judged 
in pairs with two ecological indicators of the 40 words’ inter-stimulus similarity, namely their 
frequency of pairwise co-occurrence on webpages (as indicated by the most widely used search 
engine: Google Search; Cilibrasi & Vitanyi, 2007) and in a large collection of book passages 
that is representative of the literature read by US college students (Latent Semantic Analysis; 
see Landauer & Dumais, 1999).  Finally, to test and compare the predictive strength of 
SpAM similarity and Pairwise similarity, we correlated these measures with basic aspects of 
cognitive processing, including the 40 words’ evaluation speed (based on data from Klauer & 
Musch, 1999), their classification speed (based on data from Unkelbach et al., 2008), their 
probability of being falsely recognized (based on data from Alves et al., 2015), and their 
probability of being subsumed under a category (present study). As participants spatially 
arranged the 40 words right before they sorted them into the same or different categories, in 
contrast to prior research we did not operationalize this sorting into categories as a separate 
similarity measure, but rather as a possible effect of similarity measured with SpAM. 
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Method 
 Participants, design, and stimuli. 55 students (40 women, 15 men; 52 native German 
speakers) participated for course credit. We used the 20 positive and 20 negative words 
investigated by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008; see Appendix A). These 40 words were first 
used by Fazio and colleagues (1986), and were translated into German by Klauer & Musch 
(1999). Stimulus valence varied within-participants. 
Procedure. Upon arriving, participants read an informed consent form. If they agreed 
to participate, experimenters lead them to computer-equipped cubicles and started a Visual 
Basic program that presented German instructions (translated into English here) and stimuli, 
and recorded dependent variables. The first screen informed participants that "Your task is to 
sort 40 words based on how similar/dissimilar they are. The words will appear in the middle of 
the screen one at a time, and you can drag-and-drop them at any time to change their position 
on the screen. Please sort the words in such a way that more similar words are more close to 
one another, while more dissimilar words are further away from one another. That is, your task 
is to use the 40 words to draw a map in which greater proximity indicates greater similarity, 
and in which greater distance indicates greater dissimilarity”. 
The instruction did not mention the evaluative connotation of the stimuli. After clicking 
on an “I understand” button, the background color of the screen (1920 x 1080 pixels) changed 
to gray, and a word randomly drawn from the set of 20 positive and 20 negative words appeared 
in the middle of screen in black font in a white label (100 x 22 pixels) with a black margin. 
Once participants dragged this word to another location on the screen, a “Next word” button 
appeared at the bottom of the screen. A click on the button presented the next randomly drawn 
word in the middle of the screen. At the same time, the button disappeared. Participants repeated 
this procedure for all 40 words. All words already on the screen could be dragged to another 
location at all times during the spatial arrangement task. After participants arranged the fortieth 
word on the stimulus map, an “I have finished” button appeared. With a click, participants 
ended the spatial arrangement. Figure 1 presents an example for such a stimulus map. The 
arrows in Figure 1 show the pixel proximities of the stimuli “flowers” and “toothache” to all 
other stimuli of the same valence. For each of the 40 words, the program computed the average 
pixel proximity to all same-valence words in relation to the length of the screen diagonal (i.e. 
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the lowest possible proximity). We termed this indicator SpAM similarity1 (lower values 
indicate higher similarity). This indicator is identical to the density computation used by 
Unkelbach and colleagues (2008). The screen diagonal serves as a fixed calibration divisor.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Note. Example of distances in a possible SpAM solution. The 20 positive target words are 
clustered on the left side and the 20 negative target words are clustered on the right side. Here, 
the proximity, and thus similarity, between “flowers” and the other 19 positive words is greater 
than the proximity/similarity between “toothache” and the other 19 negative concepts. 
 
The final stimulus map was compressed to fit into the upper two thirds of the screen, 
making space for seven equal and unlabeled boxes that appeared side by side in the lower third 
of the screen. Participants read “Your next task is to divide the 40 words that you have sorted 
into between two and seven categories. To assign a word to a category, please drag-and-drop it 
                                       
1 We calculated the target concepts’ within-valence similarity, and not between-valence or 
overall similarity, to allow a comparison between our data and the data reported by Unkelbach 
and colleagues (2008). 
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into one of the category boxes that just appeared in the lower third of the screen; to reassign 
that word, simply drag-and-drop it from its current category box to another category box”. Once 
all 40 words were categorized, participants could finalize the categorization phase. For all 
categorized words, the program recorded how many of the other same-valence words (i.e., X 
out of 19) had been assigned to the same category. On average, spatially arranging the 40 words 
took less than 10 minutes, and sorting them into between 2 and 7 categories took less than 5 
minutes. 
Results 
For reasons of direct comparability, we report all inferential tests as F-tests. Participants 
clearly distinguished between the 20 positive and the 20 negative words, as the spatially 
arranged between-category distance (i.e., the average distance of positive to negative words and 
negative to positive words) was more than twice as large as the spatially arranged within-
category distance (i.e., the average distance of positive to positive words and negative to 
negative words), M = 2.58, SD = 1.06. 
More importantly, in line with a general valence asymmetry in similarity, participants 
spatially arranged the 20 positive words more closely to one another than the 20 negative ones 
(Mpos = 14.49% of the screen diagonal, SD = 5.42; Mneg = 19.07%, SD = 7.50), F(1, 54) = 25.79, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .32, 90% CI [.16, .46]. A comparison of the number of category boxes that 
contained positive and negative words at the end of the categorization phase revealed that 
participants also assigned the 20 positive words to fewer categories than the 20 negative words 
(Mpos = 3.41 out of 7, SD = 0.86; Mneg = 4.05, SD = 1.00), F(1, 54) = 14.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, 
90% CI [.07, .35]. 
These measures of similarity correlated positively across participants, r(53) = .27, 
p < .05. The fewer boxes participants used to categorize positive compared to negative words, 
the more densely did participants spatially arrange positive compared to negative words. These 
results are based on a participant-level analysis. Next, we tested whether these findings are also 
obtained on an item-level analysis; that is, for each positive/negative word, we aggregated 
similarity across participants. 
Similar to the participant-level analysis, on the stimulus-level of analysis the spatially 
arranged between-category dissimilarity distance was more than twice as large as the 
within-category dissimilarity distance, M = 2.44, SD = 0.49. 
More importantly, the difference in spatially arranged proximity/similarity between the 
20 positive and 20 negative words (Mpos = 14.49%, SD = 1.46 vs. Mneg = 19.07%, SD = 3.04) 
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was again significant, F(1, 38) = 36.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, 90% CI [.29, .62]. This effect was 
larger than the effect reported by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008), F(1, 38) = 17.02, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .31, 90% CI [.12, .47], who analyzed pairwise similarity judgments for the same 40 words. 
Further, on the item-level of analysis, the positive compared to negative words were also 
assigned to categories together with more same-valence words (Mpos = 7.50 out of 19, SD = 
0.61; Mneg = 6.93, SD = 1.36), but this effect was not significant, F(1, 38) = 2.80, p = .10, ηp2 = 
.07, 90% CI [.00, .22].  
The observed valence asymmetry in spatially arranged proximity/similarity might be 
due to other factors that might be confounded with valence; for example, the positive words 
(e.g., love and baby) might be more intensely positive compared to the intensity of the negative 
words (e.g., litter and cockroach). To exclude such alternative explanations, we predicted the 
stimuli’s spatially arranged proximity/similarity from the stimuli’s effect-coded valence, and 
their interval-scaled valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness in a multiple 
linear regression2. Table 1 presents the results; the only two significant predictors of similarity 
were valence intensity and valence. The 20 positive words were more proximal/similar than the 
20 negative words even when simultaneously controlling for valence intensity, frequency, 
familiarity, and concreteness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1       
                                       
2 We measured the 40 words’ valence intensity in terms of the absolute difference between the 
40 words’ mean rating on a 0-10 negative-positive scale and 5, the affectively neutral midpoint 
of that scale (Klauer & Musch, 1999). We measured the 40 words’ frequency of occurrence in 
the vast Corpus of Contemporary American English (~450 million words spoken or written 
between 1990 and 2012; Davies, 2011). Finally, we offered 26 students of the University of 
Cologne (14 women and 12 men; 26 native German speakers) a pack of gummi bears to rate 
the 40 words in a random order on a 1-10 either unusual-familiar (“ungewohnt-vertraut” in 
German) or abstract-concrete (in German “abstract-concrete”) scale. We calculated the 
40 words’ familiarity and concreteness means. 
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Results of a multiple regression analysis predicting mean spatially arranged 
proximity/similarity from valence, valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness 
across the 40 German words examined in Study 1  
Predictors ß t p r pr² VIF 
Valence  .71 4.02 < .001 .70 .57 3.04 
Valence intensity .37 3.26 < .01 .25 .49 1.27 
Frequency .01 0.04 .97 .24 .01 1.37 
Familiarity .12 0.78 .44 .65 .13 2.62 
Concreteness -.10 -0.81 .42 .17 -.14 1.37 
 
Note. r, pr², and VIF denote zero order and partial correlation, and variance inflation factor, 
respectively. 
 
To validate the SpAM version3 used here, we correlated the 40 words’ within-valence 
SpAM similarity with their within-valence Pairwise similarity judged on a “similar-dissimilar” 
scale, which is arguably the gold standard of similarity measurement. Supporting the validity 
of SpAM, the correlation between the 40 words’ SpAM similarity and Pairwise similarity 
(reported by Unkelbach et al., 2008) was very high, r(38) = .84, p < .0014.  
                                       
3 The difference between our spatial arrangement version and the version used by Hout and 
colleagues (2013) is that in our version the stimuli appeared one after another in the middle of 
the screen, while in their version the stimuli appeared all at once in random locations on the 
screen. Thus, in our (their) version participants eventually (instantly) calibrated to the full set 
of stimuli. 
 
4 Individuals’ agreement about the intra-category similarity of the 40 words was high when 
intra-category similarity was measured based on scaled pairwise judgments (the technique used 
by Unkelbach et al., 2008), mean r(38) = .87, SD = .17, moderate when it was measured based 
on unscaled pairwise judgments, mean r(38) = .52, SD = .19, and low when it was measured 
based on spatial arrangement, mean r(53) = .24, SD = .31. This difference in inter-rater 
agreement for Pairwise and SpAM intra-category similarity is presumably due the number of 
trials across which it is measured. In the paper by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008), participants 
on average made approximately ten pairwise intra-category similarity judgments per word, 
whereas in Study 1, participants made only one spatial intra-category similarity arrangement 
per word, as rearranging a word simultaneously readjusted all similarities between that word 
and all other words of the same category. This is precisely the efficiency advantage of SpAM 
over the Pairwise method to measure intra-category similarity. This advantage comes at the cost 
of low inter-rater agreement about intra-category similarity. 
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To further explore the correlations between these psychological (i.e. subjective) 
measures and two ecological (i.e. more objective) measures of word similarity, we calculated 
how often the 40 words co-occur in two real-life word environments: the internet (Google 
similarity; Cilibrasi & Vitanyi, 2007), and a collection of books that is representative of the 
literature read by US college students (LSA similarity; Landauer & Dumais, 1999). As 
frequency of co-occurrence in space and time is a widely accepted proxy for inter-stimulus 
similarity (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2007; Jones & Mewhort, 2007), these correlations provided 
further insights into the validity of SpAM similarity. 
Correspondence between SpAM similarity and Google similarity. In February 2013, 
we entered all 780 word pairs that can be formed with the 40 words into the search bar of the 
most widely used search engine (Google Search5), and we recorded the amount of search 
“results” (hits). More precisely, we searched for both orders of each pair (e.g., “party friends” 
and “friends party”), and for each pair, we averaged hits across order, resulting in 780 pairwise 
hits. In Google Search, a pairwise hit approximates the total number of webpages on which two 
words co-occur. Next, to model the 40 words as points in a geometric space in which their 
similarity can be reliably compared, we subjected the multiplicative inverses (i.e., 1/X) of the 
780 pairwise hits to a multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS; e.g., Borg & Groenen, 2005). 
Using the ALSCAL procedure (Young, Takane, & Lewyckyj, 1978) provided by the SAS 
system, we assumed an ordinal scale and estimated coordinates for each word in ten spaces. 
The 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, 6D, 7D, 8D, 9D, and 10D coordinates of the 40 words retained 
R² = 0.70, 0.73, 0.76, 0.79, 0.83, 0.85, 0.87, 0.88, 0.90, and 0.91 (stress = 0.44, 0.31, 0.23, 0.19, 
0.15, 0.13, 0.11, 0.10, 0.09, and 0.08; the lower the stress the higher the scaling fit of the 
respective space) of the original variance of the 780 pairwise hits, respectively.  
There was no elbow in the stress scree plot. Thus, we resorted to the stress interpretation 
guideline by Kruskal and Wish (1978), according to which stress <= .20, <= .15, <= .10, <=.05 
and <= .025 may be interpreted as poor, sufficient, satisfactory, good, and excellent, 
                                       
On a side note, for the 40 positive/negative words both SpAM (M = 2.44, SD = 0.48) 
and the Pairwise method (M = 2.30, SD = 0.42) produced more than twice as much between-
compared to within-category dissimilarity variance. Thus, given a stimulus set composed of 
two obvious main categories, SpAM and the Pairwise method clearly capture the categories, 
and they do so to a comparable extent. 
5 We used www.google.de instead of www.google.com, as the words are German rather than 
English. A test with some of the target word pairs revealed that www.google.de and 
www.google.com return the same amount of search results. Thus, we speculate that Google 
returns the same amount of results when searched from different countries. 
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respectively. We proceeded with the 6D space, because the 6D space is the first that achieved 
a sufficient scaling fit (stress <= .15; to balance scaling fit and parsimony, in MDS as many as 
necessary and as few as possible dimensions are extracted; Jaworska & 
Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). Following Unkelbach and colleagues (2008), we calculated 
the average Euclidean proximity of each word to all other same-valence words in the respective 
6D space. This index (Google similarity) correlated highly with the 40 words’ SpAM similarity, 
r(38) = .56, p < .001, and with their average pairwise similarity, r(38) = .56, p < .001. In 
addition, the 20 positive words are also more similar to one another than the 20 negative words 
in terms of how often they co-occur on webpages accessible through Google Search, F(1, 38) 
= 21.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, 90% CI [.16, .51]. 
Correspondence between SpAM similarity and LSA similarity. In November 2014, 
we entered the 40 words into the ”Matrix Comparison” application of the Latent Semantic 
Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1999) online tool provided by the University of Colorado 
at Boulder, US (lsa.colorado.edu). This application returned the similarity of each of the 780 
word pairs that can be formed with the 40 words as the cosine of the angle between the vectors 
of the words in a pair in a high-dimensional semantic space derived from the frequency of co-
occurrence of all 104852 words in all 942425 passages in a collection of 738 books that is 
representative of the literature read by US college students. We selected the topic “General 
Reading up to 1st Year College (300 factors)” and the comparison “Term to Term”, and we left 
“Numbers of Factors to Use” blank to receive the 780 cosine similarities in the highest-
dimensional semantic space available for this topic (i.e., 338D). Next, we calculated the average 
cosine similarity of each of the 40 positive/negative words to all other same-valence words 
(LSA similarity). The 40 words’ LSA similarity correlated strongly with their SpAM similarity, 
r(38) = .64, p < .001, with their similarity judged in pairs (reported by Unkelbach et al., 2008), 
r(38) = .73, p < .001, and with their Google similarity, r(38) = .38, p < .05. Also, the positive 
words were more similar to one another than the negative words in terms of how often they co-
occur in paragraphs in the collection of books that is representative of the literature read by US 
college students, F(1, 38) = 19.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .34, 90% CI [.14, .50]. Table 2 summarizes 
the correlations of SpAM, Pairwise (reported by Unkelbach et al., 2008), Google, and LSA 
similarity; these correlations indicated a high construct validity of the spatial arrangement 
method (SpAM; e.g., Hout et al., 2013) as a measure of similarity. 
 
Table 2 
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Correlations between the SpAM, Pairwise, Google, and LSA measures of similarity  
 Pairwise Google LSA 
SpAM .84*** .56*** .64*** 
Pairwise  .56*** .73*** 
Google   .38* 
 
Note. Correlations between the psychological and ecological measures of word similarity 
examined in this article: the spatial arrangement method (SpAM), classical pairwise judgment 
on a “similar-dissimilar” scale, and frequency of co-occurrence on webpages accessible through 
Google Search (Google) and in passages in a collection of books that is representative of the 
literature read by US college students (LSA). * p =< .05, ** p =< .01, *** p =< .001. 
 
Predictive strength of SpAM similarity for cognitive processing. Next, we compared 
how well these four measures of word similarity predicted five basic aspects of cognitive 
processing. First and second, words that are more similar to other words are evaluated faster on 
a “negative-positive” scale (Klauer & Musch, 1999) and classified faster as “negative” or 
“positive” (Unkelbach et al., 2008), presumably because they co-activate a more comprehensive 
pattern of related words in the associative memory network, speeding up word recognition 
(Unkelbach, 2012). Third and fourth, as more similar words are co-activated more often and 
more strongly, they are later more likely to be mistaken as having been present (e.g., in a 
previous phase in a study on recognition memory), resulting in more erroneous judgments about 
whether they are “old” or “new” (Alves et al., 2015). And, fifth, words that are more similar to 
other words are more likely to be subsumed under a category (Shepard, 1987), possibly also 
because they are more strongly associated to one another in the associative memory network 
(De Deyne, Peirsman, & Storms, 2009). 
We obtained the data on how fast the 40 words are evaluated on a “negative-positive” 
scale (Klauer & Musch, 1999), how fast they are classified as “negative” or “positive” 
(Unkelbach et al., 2008), how likely they are to be falsely recognized as present before when 
they were in fact absent (in terms of signal detection theory: their sensitivity and response bias; 
Alves et al., 2015), and how likely they are to be subsumed under a category (measured in the 
present study). Across the 40 words, we correlated these five aspects of cognitive processing 
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with each of the four measures of similarity discussed above. Table 3 shows the respective 20 
correlations. 
 
Table 3 
Predictive strength of the SpAM, Pairwise, Google, and LSA measures of Similarity  
 Evaluation 
speed 
Classification 
speed 
Recognition 
response bias 
Recognition 
sensitivity 
Categorization 
probability 
SpAM -.62*** -.58*** -.50** -.33* .51** 
Pairwise -.57*** -.68*** -.60*** -.47** .31* 
Google -.41** -.53*** -.18 -.25 .24 
LSA -.44** -.54*** -.53** -.46** .21 
 
Note. Predicting the 40 words’ evaluation speed, classification speed, response bias (greater 
and lower values indicate a tendency toward “no” and “yes”, respectively) / sensitivity in 
recognition memory, and probability of being subsumed under a category based on their 
similarity as measured with spatial arrangement (SpAM), pairwise judgment on a “similar-
dissimilar” scale (Pairwise) and frequency of co-occurrence on webpages accessible through 
Google Search (Google) and in passages in a collection of books that is representative of the 
literature read by US college students (LSA). * p =< .05, ** p =< .01, *** p =< .001.  
 
First, across the four measures, similarity substantially predicts all five aspects of 
cognitive processing. Second, the SpAM similarity measure significantly predicts all five 
aspects to an extent that is comparable to the similarity measure derived from pairwise 
judgment. Third, our Google similarity index only predicted evaluation and classification 
speed, but not recognition sensitivity, response bias, and categorization probability. The LSA 
similarity index did not predict categorization probability. In conclusion, SpAM similarity is an 
index with high construct and substantial predictive validity that is comparable to the standard 
measure of similarity. 
Discussion 
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Study 1 provided two important insights. First, spatial arrangement (SpAM; e.g., 
Goldstone, 1994; Hout et al., 2013) is a valid method to measure word similarity. 
Word similarity measured with SpAM correlated highly with word similarity judged in pairs, 
and with two ecological (rather than psychological) measures of word similarity, namely 
frequency of co-occurrence on webpages and in book passages. Importantly, word similarity 
measured with SpAM also correlated with performance in a variety of basic cognitive tasks 
(evaluation, classification, recognition, and categorization), which confirmed that spatially 
arranged similarity is relevant for cognitive processing (for further demonstrations of the 
relevance of SpAM for cognitive processing, see Berman et al., 2014; Hout & Goldinger, 2015; 
Hout, Goldinger, & Brady, 2014).   
Second, using SpAM we re-examined the similarity of the 40 words examined by 
Unkelbach and colleagues (2008; see also Klauer & Musch, 1999) in a more efficient way. We 
replicated that the 20 extremely positive words are seen as more similar to one another than the 
20 extremely negative words (we observed a large effect, ηp2 = .32), even when controlling for 
the valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness of the words. Thus, for the 
present sample of stimuli, Study 1 confirmed the valence asymmetry in similarity derived from 
the range and frequency of co-occurrence arguments presented above.   
However, generalizing across similarity measurement methods does not help with 
generalizing across the population of positive and negative stimuli (Wells & Windschitl, 1999; 
Westfall et al., 2014; 2015). Yet, the cost- and time-effective SpAM method allows testing the 
generality of the proposed higher similarity of positive compared to negative information with 
a large variety of stimulus samples.  
 
Studies 2a and 2b 
 
To provide a strong test for the proposed generality of valence asymmetry in similarity, 
we aimed to sample stimuli that are representative of positive and negative from the perspective 
of our participants (i.e., stimuli that come to their mind as examples of the categories “positive” 
and “negative”). In Study 2a, retriever participants first freely sampled words from memory 
that they themselves evaluated as positive and negative and then spatially arranged these words. 
In Study 2b, receiver participants first evaluated the words selected as positive and negative by 
another randomly selected participant and then spatially arranged these words. If the similarity 
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asymmetry is a general phenomenon, both retrievers and receivers should spatially arrange the 
positive words closer to one another, expressing that they seem more similar to one another 
than the negative words. 
Method 
Participants, design, and stimuli. We advertised an online study on Amazon’s 
crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. In Study 2a, 46 MTurkers (24 women and 22 men; 
45 native English speakers) took part for $1.5, and in Study 2b, 43 MTurkers (21 women and 
22 men; 41 native English speakers) took part for $1. In both studies, participants spatially 
arranged 20 positive words and 20 negative words. All words were generated by participants in 
Study 2a. 
Procedure. Both studies were fully computerized. In Study 2a, the first screen slide 
instructed participants to generate 20 positive words (“Please enter 20 different positive nouns 
into the 20 text boxes displayed below”) and 20 negative words (“… 20 different negative nouns 
…”) by typing them into groups of text boxes on the left and right of the screen (or vice versa), 
respectively. Then, participants completed the same SpAM procedure for the 40 self-generated 
words as in Study 1.  
In Study 2b, participants did not generate words, but first rated each word (on a 7-point 
“negative-positive” scale, in random order) from one randomly selected set of 40 stimuli 
generated by another participant in Study 2a. Then, participants spatially arranged the 
respective 40 words. Both studies lasted between 10 and 20 minutes.  
Results 
Two participants were excluded from the analyses in Study 2a, because they took 
excessively long to complete the task (29.63 and 30.22 minutes; M = 8.08, SD = 5.52). This 
exclusion of participants did not affect any statistical inferences. 
Study 2a. Participants generated 1044 unique words divided into 44 unique samples of 
40 words. For each participant, we averaged spatially arranged within-valence distance across 
the 20 self-generated positive words, and across the 20 self-generated negative words. In line 
with a general valence asymmetry in similarity, retrievers spatially arranged their self-generated 
positive words closer to one another (Mpos = 15.77% of the screen diagonal, SD = 5.43) than 
their self-generated negative words (Mneg = 16.82%, SD = 6.20), F(1, 43) = 4.28, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.09, 90% CI [>.00, .24]. 
35 
 
Study 2b. Receivers almost always agreed with retrievers about the valence of the 
words. Specifically, on the 7-point “negative-positive” scale, receivers assigned a positive 
rating (5, 6, or 7) to words that had been retrieved as negative in only 2.09% of all cases, and 
assigned a negative rating (1, 2, or 3) to words that had been retrieved as positive in only 1.27% 
of all cases. Receivers rated the words retrieved as positive as more positive than the words 
retrieved as negative (Mpos = 6.04, SD = 0.35; Mneg = 1.96, SD = 0.32), F(1, 42) = 2189.32, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .98, 90% CI [.97, .99]. 
More importantly, receivers also spatially arranged the 20 positive words closer to one 
another (Mpos = 16.32% of the screen diagonal, SD = 4.61) than the 20 negative words 
(Mneg = 18.46%, SD = 6.50), F(1, 42) = 5.11, p < .05, ηp2 = .11, 90% CI [.01, .26]. That is, they 
also saw the retrievers’ positive words as more similar to one another than the retrievers’ 
negative words. Further, higher SpAM similarity of positive compared to negative words on 
the retrievers’ side correlated with higher SpAM similarity of positive compared to negative 
words on the receivers’ side, r(41) = .29, p = .06. 
Discussion 
Studies 2a and 2b used the efficiency advantage of the spatial arrangement method 
(SpAM; Hout et al., 2013) to measure the similarity of a large sample of words (i.e., 1044); we 
believe this high number of freely selected stimuli constituted a large and arguably 
representative sample of what people consider as positive and negative words. Thus, consistent 
with the notion of representative design (Brunswik, 1955; 1956; Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 
2004), we can generalize our results to what people consider as positive and negative words. 
Study 2a confirmed that self-selected positive words were represented as more similar 
than self-selected negative words. Moreover, Study 2b showed that words that were positive 
for an unknown person were also, on average, seen as more similar than words that were 
negative for that person. However, these effects were only medium-sized (Mηp2 = .10) and thus 
much smaller than the large positive-negative difference in word similarity observed in Study 
1 (ηp2 = .32). 
There are obvious explanations for this decrease in effect size: a) the 40 words in Study 
1 were biased in favor of the hypothesis, b) free sampling increased error variance, and c) the 
online workers put less time and effort into completing the task. None of these reasons 
jeopardizes the support for the proposed generally higher similarity of positive compared to 
negative information.  
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A possible caveat for the generality might result from the high agreement between 
retrievers and receivers on the valence of the words. The high agreement might suggest that the 
word generation task communicated that participants should retrieve positive and negative 
words on whose valence participants and researchers should agree. Therefore, the higher 
similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli might be restricted to words of consensual 
valence. Study 3 therefore investigated whether the similarity asymmetry also holds for 
idiosyncratic valence, that is, for stimuli that only some individuals evaluate as positive and 
negative.  
 
Study 3 
 
Stimuli that are good/bad only for a given individual provide a particularly strong test 
of the generality of the predicted similarity asymmetry. Personal interests, preferences, and 
liking often result in repeated exposure, keen exploration, and thus motivated differentiation on 
the positive side (Smallman, Becker, & Roese, 2014; Smallman & Roese, 2008). For example, 
fans of ball sports might argue that football, basketball, and baseball and so forth “are all 
different”. Thus, stimulus words referring to concepts someone personally likes might actually 
appear more differentiated. Quite to the contrary, personal disinterest and disliking often result 
in avoidance and thus motivated summarization on the negative side (Fazio et al., 2004; Denrell, 
2005). For example, people who do not like ball sports might argue that football, basketball, 
and baseball “are all the same”. Thus, stimulus words referring to concepts someone personally 
dislikes might actually appear more similar. Together, it is possible that words referring to 
idiosyncratically positive stimuli might be seen as less similar to one another than words that 
refer to idiosyncratically negative stimuli. Study 3 therefore investigated whether idiosyncrasy 
versus consensus moderates valence asymmetry in perceived similarity. 
 Participants self-selected words that are positive and negative either idiosyncratically 
(i.e., “for you personally”), or consensually (i.e., “for all people”). Then, as in Study 2a, 
participants spatially arranged the sampled words. If idiosyncratic valence leads to greater 
differentiation on the positive side, and to greater summarization on the negative side, we would 
expect an interaction of generation task (idiosyncratic vs. consensual) and stimulus valence. 
Method 
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Participants, design, and stimuli. 110 students (86 women and 24 men; 102 native 
German speakers) were paid €2 to take part in the study. Similar to Study 2a, participants 
spatially arranged self-generated positive and negative words. We randomly assigned 
participants either to an idiosyncratic or a consensual valence condition. Given this sample size 
and an observed correlation of r = 0.70, p < .001, between the repeated measures, the statistical 
power to detect a small interaction effect (ηp2 = .02) was > .95 (G*Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009).  
Procedure. Procedural details were highly similar to Study 1 with small variations. 
Participants in the idiosyncratic valence condition read (translated from German) “We are 
interested in finding out the things that you personally find positive and negative. Please enter 
20 positive and 20 negative words that you personally find positive and negative into the text 
boxes on the left and right of the screen. It is important that you type in different words that you 
personally find positive and negative. Please type in single words only.” The program 
counterbalanced whether participants entered positive (negative) information on the right or left 
side of the screen. Participants in the consensual valence condition read the same instructions, 
except that “you personally” was exchanged with “all people”. 
Then, participants in both conditions spatially arranged the self-generated stimuli. 
Different from the previous studies, the 40 words appeared all together (en bloc in five columns 
and eight rows in the middle of the screen) instead of one after another. Thus, participants 
always had an overview of the 40 words while spatially arranging them. Sessions lasted 
between 10 and 20 minutes.  
Results  
Participants in the idiosyncrasy condition took an equal amount of time to generate the 
20 positive and 20 negative words (M = 490s; SD = 188s) as those in the consensus condition 
(M = 499s; SD = 197s), F(1, 108) = 0.05, p = .83, ηp2 = .00, 90% CI [.00, .02].  
Manipulation check. Participants in the idiosyncrasy condition should generate more 
diverse stimuli than participants in the consensus condition. Indeed, participants in the 
idiosyncrasy condition generated more diverse stimuli (1139 unique stimuli out of the 
55 participants * 40 stimuli = 2200 generated stimuli) than participants in the 
consensus condition (995 unique out of 2200 generated stimuli). This difference was 
significant, Χ2(1) = 9.71, p < .01. 
Frequency of unique words. Independent of the idiosyncrasy versus consensus 
manipulation, participants generated less unique stimuli for the category “positive” (946 out of 
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2200) compared to the category “negative” (1180 out of 2200), Χ 2(1) = 27.44, p < .001. This 
smaller diversity was apparent in both the idiosyncratic valence condition (511 unique positive 
words vs. 628 unique negative words), Χ 2(1) = 12.01, p < .001, and in the consensual valence 
condition (435 unique positive words vs. 560 unique negative words), Χ 2(1) = 15.70, p < .001.  
SpAM Similarity. Table 4 displays participants’ mean SpAM similarity and standard 
deviations by experimental conditions. We analyzed these data with a 2 (generation task: 
idiosyncrasy vs. consensus) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the latter factor. The analysis showed main effects of the generation task, F(1, 108) 
= 5.12, p < .05, ηp2 = .05, 90% CI [>.00, .12], and valence, F(1, 108) = 37.74, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.26, 90% CI [.15, .36], but the interaction term was not significant, F(1, 108) = 0.47, p = .49, 
ηp2 = .00, 90% CI [.00, .05]. Participants spatially arranged positive words closer to one another 
than negative words, regardless of their idiosyncratic or consensual valence. Participants also 
arranged the 40 words closer to one another in the consensual valence condition than in the 
idiosyncratic valence condition, again reflecting the manipulation’s success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Similarity means and F-tests for positive and negative stimuli in study 3’s idiosyncratic and 
consensual conditions (standard deviations in parentheses) 
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Positive  
valence 
Negative  
valence 
F p ηp2 90% 
CI 
LB 
90% 
CI 
UB 
Idiosyncratic valence 15.39 (6.74) 18.75 (7.91) 20.84 < .001 .28 .12 .42 
Consensual valence 13.22 (4.07) 15.91 (6.02) 16.90 < .001 .24 .09 .38 
 
Note. Values reflect the spatially arranged average pixel distance between all positive stimuli 
(20) or all negative stimuli (20) in relation to the diagonal of the screen.  
 
Discussion 
 Participants adhered to the instructions and generated more diverse stimuli in the 
idiosyncratic compared to consensual valence condition. Results nevertheless showed the 
proposed greater similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli in both conditions, again 
supporting a general valence asymmetry in similarity. Although participants should know more 
about and differentiate more between what they personally like compared to dislike (Smallman, 
Becker, & Roese, 2014; Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2016), they spatially arranged positive 
idiosyncratic stimuli more densely to one another than negative idiosyncratic stimuli. This 
valence asymmetry was as pronounced (ηp2 = .28) as in the consensual valence condition (ηp2 
= .24). 
 The effect sizes (Mηp2 = .26) are close to Study 1 (ηp2 = .32), suggesting that mainly the 
error variance introduced by recruiting participants online was responsible for the lower effect 
sizes in Studies 2a and 2b (Mηp2 = .10). Alternatively, giving participants an outright rather than 
gradually increasing overview of the 40 words to be spatially arranged might have decreased 
error variance. Of note, Study 3’s spatial arrangement design follows the procedures by Hout 
and colleagues (2013) more closely. 
Different from Studies 2a/2b, Study 3’s participants (university students) sampled 
German rather than English words. Therefore, Study 3 additionally showed that the 
hypothesized valence asymmetry in similarity holds true also across different languages and 
different participant pools.  
Studies 2a, 2b and 3 examined a large variety of stimulus words freely sampled by 
participants, thereby avoiding researcher-selected stimulus samples biased in favor of their 
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hypothesis (Fiedler, 2011) and allowing generalization across the population of stimuli (Wells 
& Windschitl, 1999; Westfall et al., 2014; 2015). However, the free sampling process provides 
another alternative explanation; the observed valence asymmetry in similarity might be due to 
the process of selecting positive and negative words – that is, a valence-specific sampling bias 
– and less due to actual similarity differences of the retrieved stimuli (i.e., assuming a 
representative sample). Study 4 addressed this concern. 
 
Study 4 
 
Study 4 sought to rule out that the valence asymmetry in similarity observed in Studies 2 
and 3 was only due to biased retrieval processes. It could be that positive and negative 
information are factually equal in similarity, but participants retrieved positive stimuli that are 
more similar to one another compared to the negative stimuli that they retrieved. For example, 
retrieving positive and negative words may have induced positive and negative affect 
(Topolinski & Deutsch, 2012; 2013), which might have modulated inclusive and exclusive 
thinking (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 2013) resulting in a tendency to select similar and 
dissimilar words, respectively. Or, as Fazio and colleagues (2004) suggested, positive stimuli 
invite exploration, while negative stimuli are abandoned. 
To illustrate these principles, participants doing the positive-happy-inclusive-similar 
half of the word selection process might have selected “friends”, then “family”, then “partner”, 
then “love” and so on, exploring neighboring positive stimuli. In the negative-sad-exclusive-
dissimilar half, participant might have selected “bombs”, then “lie” (rather than “war”), then 
“junk” (rather than “guilt”), then “depression” (rather than “germs”) and so forth, abandoning 
each negative stimulus without exploring the mental neighborhood further. Such an explanation 
would be interesting per se, but provides a clear alternative for the proposed general valence 
asymmetry in stimulus similarity. 
To exclude the possibility of such valence-biased stimulus retrieval, Study 4 restricted 
the stimulus generation process to one positive and one negative stimulus per participant, 
thereby excluding possible explanations in terms of stimulus retrieval processes. Specifically, 
participants in one of two random samples were instructed to generate only one positive and 
only one negative word. The non-redundant positive words generated in this way were 
combined to form a multi-source (i.e., many participants as the source) pool of positive words 
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whose selection was completely independent of one another, as they had been generated by as 
many participants as there were positive words in the pool (one positive word per participant). 
The non-redundant negative words were combined in the same way. Out of these two 
multi-source pools, different participants received 20 positive and 20 negative randomly drawn 
words, and then spatially arranged these. This procedure precluded explanations in terms of 
valence influences during retrieval or, in other words, the processing rather than meaning of 
positive/negative words. 
Additionally, in Study 4 we wanted to exclude explanations in terms of the valence 
intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness of positive/negative words in the same way 
as in Study 1 – that is, by an item-level multiple linear regression analysis. Please note that this 
was not possible in Studies 2 and 3; there, each participant generated/received a new set of 
stimuli, prohibiting such item-based analyses. Study 4 will thereby show that valence predicts 
spatially arranged proximity/similarity beyond alternative item characteristics in a sample of 
English rather than German words. 
Method 
Participants, design, and stimuli. 40 MTurkers were paid $0.1 to retrieve one positive 
and one negative word. Another 54 MTurkers (23 women and 31 men; 54 native English 
speakers) received a random sub-selection of 40 of the words retrieved in this way (20 out of 
29 non-redundant positive words, e.g., “courage”, “happy”, “awesome” etc.; and 20 out of 
35 non-redundant negative words, e.g., “boring”, “afraid”, “fat” etc.; see Appendix B), and 
were paid $0.8 to spatially arrange these.  
Procedure. The study was fully computerized. The first 40 participants generated one 
positive and one negative word. Then, after filtering redundant stimuli, the second random 
sample of 54 participants completed the same spatial arrangement task as in Studies 1 and 2. 
They spatially arranged 20 positive words, randomly selected from the 29 non-redundant 
positive words, and 20 negative words, randomly selected from the 35 non-redundant 
positive words; again, these 29 positive and 35 negative words were independently generated 
by the 40 participants in the first sample. As in Studies 1 and 2, the 40 words appeared 
sequentially in the middle of the sorting screen. For the participants who generated the words, 
Study 4 took less than a minute. For those who spatially arranged the words, Study 4 took 
between 5 and 15 minutes. 
Results 
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Supporting a general valence asymmetry in similarity, participants arranged the 
20 randomly selected positive words more densely (Mpos = 16.93% of the screen diagonal, 
SD = 6.86) compared to 20 randomly selected negative words (Mneg = 19.09%, SD = 6.28), F(1, 
53) = 7.40, p < .01, ηp2 = .12, 90% CI [.02, .26]. 
As the number of positive (29) and negative (35) stimuli was fixed, we could test 
whether the observed asymmetry was actually due to valence. For each positive/negative word, 
we aggregated spatially arranged proximity/similarity across participants. On this item-level of 
analysis, the difference in spatially arranged proximity/similarity between the 29 positive and 
35 negative words (Mpos = 16.39%, SD = 1.48 vs. Mneg = 19.09%, SD = 2.56) was again 
significant, F(1, 62) = 17.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, 90% CI [.08, .35].  
Similar to Study 1, we predicted the 64 words’ spatially arranged similarity from their 
effect-coded valence, and their interval-scaled valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and 
concreteness in a multiple linear regression6. Table 5 shows the results. Similar to Study 1 and 
the data in Table 1, the regression confirmed that the 29 positive words were more similar than 
the 35 negative words even when controlling for valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and 
concreteness7. As in Study 1, the only other significant predictor of similarity was valence 
intensity. 
 
                                       
6 The analysis actually included only 63 of the 64 words, because we could not obtain a valence 
intensity rating for the word “myopic”. We measured valence intensity in terms of the absolute 
difference between the 63 words’ mean rating on a 1-9 “negative-positive” scale and 5, the 
affectively neutral midpoint of that scale (Warriner, Kuperman and Brysbaert, 2013). We 
measured the 64 words’ frequency of occurrence in the vast and representative Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (~450 million words spoken or written between 1990 and 
2012; Davies, 2011). Finally, we paid 50 MTurkers (22 women and 28 men; 50 native English 
speakers) $0.5 to rate the 64 words in a random order on a 1-10 either “unusual-familiar” or 
“abstract-concrete” scale. We calculated the 64 words’ familiarity and concreteness means. 
 
7 To rule out multicollinearity between valence and familiarity, we computed the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for all predictors in the multiple linear regression in Studies 1 and 4 (see 
Tables 1 and 5). According to Menard (1995), multicollinearity is a concern with VIFs greater 
than 5; according to Hair and colleagues (1995) and Mason and colleagues (1989), 
multicollinearity is a concern with VIFs greater than 10. None of our predictors had a VIF 
greater than 5.  
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Table 5 
 
      
Results of a multiple regression analysis predicting mean spatially arranged 
proximity/similarity from valence, valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness 
across the 64 English words examined in Study 4 
Predictors ß t p r pr² VIF 
Valence  .58 2.66 .01 .46 .33 4.27 
Valence intensity .38 3.43 .001 .45 .41 1.08 
Frequency .03 0.28 .78 .13 .04 1.10 
Familiarity -.18 -0.86 .39 .35 -.11 3.88 
Concreteness .05 0.42 .68 -.12 .06 1.35 
 
Note. r, pr², and VIF denote zero order and partial correlation, and variance inflation factor, 
respectively. 
 
Discussion 
Study 4 used stimuli randomly selected from a pool to which each participant had 
contributed only one positive and one negative word. This independent word generation 
precluded valence asymmetries in similarity due to retrieval processes, such as selecting similar 
and dissimilar words due to inclusive and exclusive thinking (Forgas, 2013), or more 
exploratory sampling for positive compared to negative stimuli (Fazio et al., 2004). Participants 
nevertheless spatially arranged positive compared to negative words more densely to one 
another. 
Further, valence significantly predicted spatially arranged proximity/similarity even 
when the valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness of the words was controlled 
for, which suggests that the spatially arranged difference in proximity/similarity between the 
positive and negative words was actually due to their valence, and not due to other features that 
might be confounded with valence. 
The present data does not preclude that the aforementioned alternative explanations 
contribute to the effect in general (i.e., valence influence during stimulus retrieval). However, 
in the present study and in the original study by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008; Experiment 2) 
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they could not contribute, which shows that the asymmetry persists independent of these 
possible contributions.  
 The effect (ηp2 = .12) was about the same size as the effects observed in Studies 2a/2b 
(Mηp2 = .10), suggesting that using SpAM with online participants increases error variance. 
Alternatively, the mode of stimulus presentation (simultaneously vs. serially) might have 
influenced the effect size. In any case, the asymmetry emerged for both presentation modes and 
for online and laboratory participants.  
 
Study 5 
 
The previous studies compared the similarity of words that come to mind as exemplars 
of the categories positive and negative. However, these words may only represent imagined, 
possible concepts, which are not representative of real-life experiences. People receive and thus 
retrieve all kind of positive and negative information that they have not experienced directly 
(e.g., being elected as president, winning the jackpot, staying healthy for 100 years, suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease, losing a child, causing a car accident, etc.). The number of such 
second-hand information by far exceeds the number and variety of self-experienced (positive 
and negative) information. Thus, it could be that the greater similarity of positive compared to 
negative stimuli observed in Studies 1-4 may be true for imagined, possible objects, people, 
and events, but does not hold for self-experienced stimuli; again, this might be because people 
purposefully accumulate more self-experienced stimuli on the positive side (Fazio et al., 2004; 
Denrell, 2005), which should lead to more differentiation and thus less similar mental 
representations compared to the negative side. Study 5 investigated whether positive self-
experiences are seen as more similar than negative self-experiences, too. 
Study 5 employed an event-sampling design; across seven consecutive days, 
participants named one positive and one negative “event of the day” and then – on day eight, 
nine, or ten – spatially arranged these real-life events. If there is a general valence asymmetry 
in similarity, participants should arrange their positive everyday experiences as more similar to 
one another than their negative everyday experiences, thereby generalizing our findings from 
the semantic denotations of words to connotative real-life experiences.  
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Method 
Participants, design, and stimuli. We recruited participants via the mailing list of 
psychology students at a large German university, and online, via large open access Facebook 
groups, for example: NETT-WERK KÖLN (115,000+ members) and Neu in Köln (15,000+ 
members). We offered €15 for taking part in a week-long event-sampling study (Reis, Gable, 
& Maniaci, 2014) on work-life balance8. On 7 consecutive days, participants received a text 
message at nighttime (9PM ± 30 minutes). The links in these text messages redirected 
participants to the survey website on which the study was hosted. On this website, above a blank 
text box, participants read: “Please describe one positive event of your day using no more than 
three words. Your description of this positive event should be precise, so that you can recognize 
it at the end of the study week”; above another blank text box, they read: “Please describe one 
negative event of your day …” (the order of these two instructions plus text box was random).  
On day 8, 168 participants who had described a positive and a negative everyday event 
on at least 5 out of the 7 study days received an email with instructions on how to complete the 
final task (see below) within 3 days. 124 participants (95 women, 29 men; 119 native German 
speakers) completed the final task. 
Procedure. The final task was a fully computerized SpAM study. Participants first read 
the same SpAM instructions as in Studies 2a, 2b and 3, except that there was no mention of 
positive/negative, and except that “words” was replaced with “events of the day” (all Study 5 
instructions presented here are English translations of the German instructions provided to 
participants). The next slide provided an overview of the positive and negative everyday events 
(arranged in two columns and 5-7 rows, and in random order) that they had experienced and 
described over the course of their last week. Finally, they spatially arranged the positive and 
negative everyday events. The stimuli appeared on-demand, in random order.  
Results 
A 3 (response rate: on 5 days vs. on 6 days vs. on 7 days; between participants) x 2 
(everyday event valence: positive vs. negative; within participants) mixed ANOVA of everyday 
event similarity revealed no main effect of response rate, F(2, 121) = 0.47, p = .63, ηp2 = .01, 
90% CI [.00, .04], but a main effect of everyday event valence, F(1, 121) = 3.92, p = .05, 
ηp2 = .03, 90% CI [>.00, .10]. As expected, participants spatially arranged the positive everyday 
events of their last week closer to one another (Mpos = 19.75% of the screen diagonal, SD = 
                                       
8 Study 5 was part of a larger investigation of work – life tradeoffs in everyday life (Rom & 
Hofmann, 2015). 
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9.67; Mneg = 21.44%, SD = 10.21). The interaction was not significant, F(2, 123) = 0.53, p = 
.59, ηp2 = .01, 90% CI [.00, .04]. 
We repeated this analysis with the 92 most conscientious participants who described a 
positive and a negative everyday event on 6 or 7 of 7 study days (71 women, 21 men), revealing 
the very same results: no main effect of response rate, F(1, 90) = 0.10, p = .75, ηp2 = .00, 90% 
CI [.00, .01], but a main effect of everyday event valence, F(1, 90) = 5.72, p < .05, ηp2 = .06, 
90% CI [>.00, .12]. The interaction was again not significant, F(1, 90) = 0.04, p = .85, ηp2 = 
.01, 90% CI [.00, .01]. 
Discussion 
Study 5 showed that the proposed valence asymmetry in perceived similarity generalizes 
from the semantic meaning of positive and negative words to experience-sampled positive and 
negative real-life events. Participants’ spatial arrangements showed that the positive everyday 
events of their last week were significantly more similar to one another than the negative 
everyday events of their last week, indicating that despite the hedonic principle (pleasures are 
sought and pains are avoided), pleasures are more similar than pains.  
While the effect sizes (ηp2 = .03-.06) were much smaller than the effect sizes obtained 
in Studies 2a/2b, 3 and 4 (Mηp2 = .15), the possible high variety of events across seven days and 
the lack of experimental control might fully account for this decrease. In addition, multi-word 
experiences might be less easy to spatially arrange than single-word concepts, increasing error 
variance in SpAM similarity. Nevertheless, the results still supported the proposed similarity 
asymmetry. 
 
Study 6 
 
Studies 2-5 tested the generality of the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity in 
large, representative samples of words retrieved as exemplars of “positive” and “negative”, and 
everyday life events retrieved as “positive” and “negative”. However, the ratings from Study 2 
locate both the negative stimuli (M = 1.95) and the positive stimuli (M = 6.04) on the extremes 
of a 7-point valence scale. Similarly, Study 1’s 40 stimuli are the 20 most extremely positive 
and 20 most extremely negative stimuli from the 92 stimulus words set by Fazio and colleagues 
(1986). We thus cannot be reasonably sure that the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity 
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holds true across the across the entire spectrum of valence intensity ranging from mildly to 
moderately to extremely positive/negative.  
To explore if this is the case, and to explore if the proposed valence asymmetry in 
similarity generalizes from verbal to visual stimuli, Study 6 examined two large databases of 
extremely, moderately, and mildly valenced words and images: the ~14,000 word database by 
Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013; WKB) and the international affective picture system 
with 956 pictures (IAPS; Lang et al., 2005). We expected the positive WKB words and IAPS 
pictures to be more similar to one another than negative WKB words and IAPS pictures, 
respectively.  
Method 
Participants, design, and stimuli. We re-analyzed data on all 13,915 words that 
together form the WKB; these words had been selected “to collect affective ratings for a 
majority of well-known English content words” (Warriner et al., 2013, p. 1192). Each word had 
been rated by approximately 25 MTurkers. Each MTurker had used a 9-point scale to assess 
one of the three arguably most relevant aspects of affective impression: valence, arousal, and 
potency (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). 
Further, we re-analyzed data on all 956 pictures that together form the IAPS in its 
version from 2005; these color pictures had been selected with the aim to create a “broad sample 
of contents across the entire affective space” (Lang et al., 2005, p.3). Each IAPS picture had 
been rated by approximately 100 students of the University of Florida. These participants had 
also used 9-point scales to assess valence, arousal, or dominance. 
We divided the words and pictures into a positive and a negative half (median-split) 
according to their mean valence ratings. We then computed the average absolute rating 
difference of each word to all other same-valence words, and of each picture to all other same-
valence pictures. Separately for the words and the pictures, we computed this absolute rating 
difference across the three rating dimensions (i.e., valence, arousal, and dominance), and also 
separately for each rating dimension. Operationalizing absolute rating difference as a 
dissimilarity measure (e.g., the valence rating of the two IAPS pictures 428 and 927 are 6.89 
and 6.98; thus, these two pictures have a similarly positive valence rating), for each of the 
13,915 WKB words and 956 IAPS pictures, we obtained an overall similarity index, a valence 
similarity index, an arousal similarity index, and a dominance similarity index. Lower values 
on these four indices indicate higher similarity. 
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Results 
Given the nature of the data, we conducted the relevant analysis on the level of stimuli. 
Table 6 summarizes the results. As expected, the overall similarity of the positive words and 
pictures was greater than the overall similarity of the negative words and pictures, respectively. 
The same was true for the valence, arousal, and dominance similarity indices.  
The three WKB/IAPS rating dimensions correlated with one another (WKB: valence 
and arousal, r(13913) = -.19, p < .001, valence and dominance, r(13913) = .71, p < .001, and 
arousal and dominance, r(13913) = -.18, p < .001; IAPS: valence and arousal, r(954) = -.28, 
p < .001, valence and dominance, r(954) = .84, p < .001, and arousal and dominance, 
r(954) = -.59, p < .001). To test if the positive compared to negative WKB words and 
IAPS pictures are seen as more similar to one another in terms of valence independent of 
arousal and dominance, in terms of arousal independent of valence and dominance, and in 
terms of dominance independent of arousal and dominance, we repeated the single-dimension 
analyses reported above, but with the unstandardized residuals of a dimension regressed on the 
other two dimensions. The pattern remained unchanged with one exception. The valence and 
dominance residual similarity of the positive words/pictures was also higher than the valence 
and dominance residual similarity of the negative words/pictures, respectively, but the arousal 
residual similarity of the positive compared to negative words/pictures was not higher (see 
Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Similarity means and F-tests for different indices of WKB word and IAPS picture similarity in 
Study 6 (standard deviations in parentheses). 
Similarity Positive  
 
Negative  
 
F p ηp2 90% 
CI 
LB 
90% 
CI 
UB 
Words         
     Overall  0.59 (0.28) 0.72 (0.33) 620.32 < .001 .04 .04 .05 
     Valence 0.54 (0.37) 0.74 (0.46) 848.04 < .001 .06 .05 .06 
     Arousal 0.69 (0.53) 0.73 (0.54) 18.68 < .001 .00 .00 .00 
     Dominance 0.55 (0.42) 0.70 (0.50) 340.30 < .001 .02 .02 .03 
     Valence residuals -0.08 (0.37) 0.08 (0.44) 603.74 < .001 .04 .04 .05 
     Arousal residuals 0 (0.53) 0 (0.53) 0.14 .71 .00 .00 .00 
     Dominance residuals  -0.04 (0.42) 0.04 (0.48) 121.09 < .001 .01 .01 .01 
Images        
     Overall  0.88 (0.19) 1.30 (0.29) 702.29 < .001 .42 .39 .46 
     Valence 0.87 (0.23) 1.28 (0.27) 610.23 < .001 .39 .35 .43 
     Arousal 1.19 (0.38) 1.46 (0.43) 106.30 < .001 .10 .07 .13 
     Dominance 0.59 (0.26) 1.17 (0.33) 910.11 < .001 .49 .45 .52 
     Valence residuals -0.06 (0.26) 0.06 (0.23) 49.41 < .001 .05 .03 .07 
     Arousal residuals 0.03 (0.39) -0.03 (0.32) 5.96 < .05 .01 .00 .02 
     Dominance residuals  -0.11 (0.30) 0.11 (0.21) 159.82 < .001 .14 .11 .18 
 
Note. Values reflect the average absolute rating difference (on a 9-point scale) between 
all 6958/478 positive WKB words/IAPS pictures and all 6958/478 negative WKB words/IAPS 
pictures. Lower values indicate higher inter-stimulus similarity.   
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In sum, based on the available ratings, the positive half of the ~14,000 WKB words are 
more similar to one another than the negative half of all WKB words both overall and on two 
of three independent (i.e., residualized) rating dimensions, and the same results were obtained 
for the ~1,000 IAPS pictures. 
Discussion 
 Study 6 generalized the proposed asymmetry in similarity from participant-generated 
words that are representative of extreme positivity and negativity to researcher-selected words 
that are representative of the entire spectrum of valence intensity ranging from mildly to 
moderately to extremely positive/negative. The ~7,000 positive WKB words were more similar 
to one another than the ~7,000 negative WKB words. This effect was found overall, across all 
rating dimensions (ηp2 = .04), and separately for the valence ratings/residuals (ηp2 = .06/.04) and 
dominance ratings/residuals (ηp2 = .02/.01), but not for the arousal ratings/residuals (ηp2 = 
.00/.00).  
These effect sizes reveal that the valence asymmetry in similarity observed in Study 6 
was less pronounced than the asymmetries observed in the previous studies, possibly because 
the difference in similarity between moderately and weakly positive and negative words is still 
present but not as marked as in strongly positive and negative words. 
Study 6 also generalized the proposed asymmetry in similarity from words to pictures 
that are representative of the entire valence spectrum. The ~500 positive IAPS pictures were 
more similar to one another than the ~500 negative IAPS pictures, an effect that was also found 
across all rating dimensions (ηp2 = .34), and separately for the valence ratings/residuals (ηp2 = 
.39/.05), dominance ratings/residuals (ηp2 = .49/.15), and arousal ratings (ηp2 = .10), but not for 
the arousal residuals (ηp2 = .01). 
These effect sizes suggest that the difference in similarity between positive and negative 
pictures is as marked as in strongly positive and negative words. To explore reasons for the 
more pronounced valence asymmetry in similarity in pictures compared to words, for each 
WKB word and IAPS picture, we calculated the absolute rating difference between its valence 
and the mean valence of all WKB words and IAPS pictures, respectively. The valence rating 
scales of these words and pictures are identical (1-9 “unhappy-happy”) and thus comparable. 
The mean valence deviation of the IAPS pictures from the midpoint of the scale (M = 1.54, SD 
= 0.94) is stronger than the mean valence deviation of the WKB words from the midpoint of 
the scale (M = 1.03, SD = 0.76), F(1, 14869) = 394.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .03, 90% CI [.02, .03]. 
Thus, it could be that we observed greater valence asymmetry in similarity in the IAPS pictures 
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compared to the WKB words because the pictures are more strongly positive and negative than 
the words. This conclusion is further supported by the valence asymmetries in similarity 
observed in Studies 1-4 in which we examined mostly strongly positive and negative words 
(mean deviation from the midpoint of the 1-9 scale: M = 2.49, SD = 0.619). The effect sizes in 
these studies are consistently higher than the WKB word and everyday event effect sizes in 
Studies 6 and 5 (experienced real-life events should be less strongly positive and negative than 
imagined, possible objects, people, and events, see Studies 1-4), respectively. In sum, in 
combination with the previous studies Study 6 suggests that valence intensity is a moderator of 
valence asymmetry in similarity.  
Moreover, Study 6 shows that the higher overall similarity of positive compared to 
negative WKB words and IAPS pictures cannot be reduced to the positivity variance of the 
positive words and pictures being smaller than the negativity variance of the negative words 
and pictures, respectively. Instead, Study 6 shows that impressions of positive pictures are also 
more similar to one another than impressions of negative pictures in other relevant respects than 
valence, namely dominance, a finding that is consistent with the notion that there are more 
negative than positive basic emotions (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971). 
 
General Discussion 
 
We started the present investigation with the density hypothesis in mind; this hypothesis 
states that “positive information is more similar to other positive information, in comparison 
with the similarity of negative information to other negative information” and “let us assume a 
hypothetical space in which proximity signifies similarity. Within such a spatial model, greater 
similarity of positive compared to negative information implies a higher density (or closeness) 
                                       
9 Based on the WKB database (Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013), we recorded the 
valence of the words examined in Study 4 on a 1-9 scale. We contracted the 0-10 valence scale 
used in Study 1 to a 1-9 scale to enable comparisons between Studies 1, 4, and 6 (we did not 
collect valence ratings for the thousands of words examined in Studies 2, 3, and 5, because this 
would have taken a great deal of time; however, the instructions under which participants 
named words in Studies 2 and 3 were the same as in Studies 1 and 4, and thus the valence 
intensity of the words examined in Studies 1-4 is presumably the same). The mean valence 
deviation of the Study 1 and 4 words from 5, the midpoint of the 1-9 WKB scale (i.e., valence 
intensity) was M = 2.77, SD = 0.44, and M = 2.32, SD = 0.64, respectively. Across Studies 1 
and 4, the mean valence intensity was M = 2.49 and SD = 0.61, and thus greater than the mean 
WKB words and the mean IAPS pictures valence intensity in Study 6. 
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on average.” (Unkelbach et al., 2008, p. 30). We argued that the available evidence for a general 
valence asymmetry in similarity is not convincing, because it has been directly shown only two 
times (Bruckmüller & Abele, 2013; Unkelbach et al., 2008), because the researcher-selected 
positive and negative words examined in these studies may have been biased samples (i.e., 
possibly not representative of positive and negative as seen from the perspective of participants; 
Fiedler, 2011), and because the observed asymmetry in similarity may have been due to 
differences in the valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and / or concreteness of these 
positive/negative words rather than due to their valence. The aim of this paper was to solve 
these problems by repeatedly showing that the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity 
generalizes across large, representative samples of positive and negative stimuli, and by 
showing that the effect is found even when controlling for stimulus valence intensity, 
frequency, familiarity, and concreteness. 
Testing the generality of valence asymmetry in similarity necessitated a new measure 
that is more efficient than pairwise judgment. Study 1 further validated such an efficient 
similarity measure: the spatial arrangement method (SpAM; Goldstone, 1994; Hout et al., 2013; 
Kriegeskorte & Mur, 2012) in which participant’s task was to drag-and-drop similar and 
dissimilar stimuli closer together and further apart on the computer screen, respectively. Study 
1 showed that SpAM similarity correlated strongly, r = .84, with similarity judged in pairs, and 
moderately, r = .56 and .64, with co-occurrence on webpages and in book passages (see Table 
2), respectively. Thus, Study 1 generalized the construct validity of SpAM from visual and 
conceptually uniform verbal stimuli (see Hout et al., 2013) to conceptually diverse verbal 
stimuli. Further, Study 1 revealed that the predictive validity of SpAM and Pairwise similarity 
is comparably substantial, as both measures correlated with basic aspects of cognitive 
processing (i.e., evaluation speed, classification speed, and sensitivity and response bias in 
recognition memory; SpAM: r = |.32|-|.62|; Pairwise: r = |.31|-|.68|, Table 3). 
Studies 2-5 then employed the efficiency advantage of SpAM (Hout et al., 2013) to test 
the generality of the proposed higher similarity of positive compared to negative stimuli in 
large, representative samples of participant-generated rather than researcher-selected words 
(see Figure 2). Study 2 generalized the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity from 
self-generated, retrieved to other-generated, received words, and showed that the receivers 
agreed with the retrievers on the valence of the positive and negative words that they had 
generated in > 98% of all cases. Thus, Study 2 examined words of consensual valence. Study 3 
investigated whether people differentiate idiosyncratically positive stimuli while summarizing 
idiosyncratically negative stimuli (Denrell, 2005; Fazio et al., 2004; Smallman et al., 2014; 
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Smallman & Roese, 2008), which might result in a reversal of the valence asymmetry in 
similarity found for consensually positive and negative stimuli in Study 2. However, this 
reversal was not found. Instead, Study 3 generalized the proposed valence asymmetry in 
similarity from consensually to idiosyncratically positive and negative words. Study 4 
generalized the valence asymmetry from words generated by one other individual to words 
generated by many other people. This result increases the range of validity of the asymmetry, 
as individuals receive positive and negative information from many independent rather than 
just one source. Further extending the validity of the asymmetry, Study 5 used a 
smartphone-based event-sampling method to show that it generalizes to self-experienced 
positive and negative everyday events. 
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Figure 2 
 
Note. Spatially arranged distance of positive to other positive words and negative to other negative words in percentage of the screen diagonal, and 
effect sizes in Studies 1-5. Participants freely sampled positive and negative stimuli and spatially arranged them on a blank screen. Participants 
arranged positive words more densely (i.e. more similar) to one another than the negative words.  
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Finally, Study 6 operationalized dissimilarity in terms of absolute rating difference 
across three relevant aspects of affective impression (valence, arousal, and potency; see 
Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), and compared the similarity of all positive and negative 
words in the WKB database (~14,000 items) by Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013), 
and all positive and negative pictures in the IAPS database (~1,000 items) by Lang, Bradley, 
and Cuthbert (2005). In contrast to Studies 2-4, these words and pictures are mainly of moderate 
and weak valence. Results nevertheless showed the proposed valence asymmetry in similarity. 
In sum, these six studies strongly supported the proposed general valence asymmetry in 
stimulus similarity. 
 
Valence asymmetry in similarity is not a spurious effect  
 
Affective and/or motivational influences during retrieval and spatial arrangement 
provide alternative explanations of the observed similarity asymmetries, which would then not 
be based on the factual difference in similarity between positive and negative information, but 
rather on psychological processes due to the information’s affective/motivational potential. 
Across the studies, we believe there is good evidence that the similarity asymmetry exists 
independent of such affective and/or motivational influences. 
Study 4 ruled out alternative explanations due to inclusive and exclusive sampling 
elicited by positive and negative affect elicited by the process of selecting several 
positive/negative stimuli, respectively (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 2013), as participants 
spatially arranged stimuli selected by as many retrievers as there were positive/negative words 
to be spatially arranged for similarity.  
Moreover, the effect is unlikely to be based on an inclusive/exclusive style of spatially 
arranging positive/negative stimuli due to positive/negative affect. Participants in Studies 2-5 
spatially arranged the positive and negative stimuli in a simultaneous fashion. With both 
positive and negative stimuli simultaneously in sight, rapid changes between cognitive styles 
(Topolinski & Deutsch, 2012; 2013) does not seem a likely explanation.  
 Importantly, the effect is not due to a motivation to move the aversively negative stimuli 
away from the attentional center and keep the pleasant positive stimuli in the center. This would 
create the observed pattern, as towards the edges of the screen, stimuli are, on average, further 
apart, and thus will be recorded as less similar to one another compared to the center of the 
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screen. To test this possible alternative explanation, we computed the average distance of the 
Study 1-5 positive and negative stimuli to the center of the screen; Table 7 shows the results. 
As can be seen, across all SpAM studies and in each single SpAM study, participants spatially 
arranged the positive and negative words at equal distance to the center of the SpAM board. 
Participants did not position the positive information closer to the center, but positioned it closer 
together. In addition, Study 6 was not a SpAM study, but the higher similarity of positive 
compared to negative information was nevertheless found; and, as Study 1 showed, SpAM 
similarity correlates highly with other similarity measures, which should not be the case if our 
results are an artefact of the spatial arrangement method. 
 
Table 7 
Average distance of positive vs. negative stimuli from the midpoint of the spatial arrangement 
board in Studies 1-5 (standard deviations in parentheses). 
 
Positive 
valence 
Negative   
valence 
F p ηp2 90% 
CI 
LB 
90% 
CI 
UB 
Overall 24.00 
(7.62) 
24.09 
(7.57) 
0.48 .83 .00 .00 ,01 
Study 1: Unkelbach et al., 
2008 
23.12 
(7.45) 
25.83 
(7.61) 
3.67 .06 .06 .00 .10 
Study 2: self-generated stimuli 26.26 
(8.88) 
25.23 
(6.73) 
0.61 .44 .01 .00 .12 
Study 2: other-generated 
stimuli 
25.27 
(5.97) 
27.75 
(6.78) 
3.66 .06 .08 .00 .23 
Study 3: consensual stimuli 27.03 
(7.36) 
25.54 
(8.12) 
1.97 .17 .04 .00 .10 
Study 3: idiosyncratic stimuli 26.57 
(7.36) 
25.60 
(6.55) 
0.62 .43 .01 .00 .12 
Study 4: independent stimuli 25.99 
(6.82) 
24.57 
(6.83) 
1.24 .27 .02 .00 .03 
Study 5: real-life stimuli 19.81 
(6.47) 
20.13 
(7.13) 
0.25 .62 .00 .00 .01 
 
Note. Values reflect the average distance of the positive or negative stimuli from the midpoint 
of the spatial arrangement board in relation to the screen diagonal, overall and separately for 
Studies 1 – 5. This positive-negative difference never reached statistical significance.    
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The affective and motivational potential of positive and negative stimuli has received 
much attention: negative stimuli are stronger (Baumeister et al., 2001), more 
dominant/contagious (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), and more mobilizing (Taylor, 1991) than 
positive stimuli. The observed valence asymmetry in similarity is not necessarily related to this 
valence asymmetry in affective potential. In fact, we found empirical evidence for this 
theoretical independence of valence asymmetry in similarity and affective potential: Studies 1, 
2, 4, and 6 showed presence of valence asymmetry in similarity in the absence of valence 
asymmetry in rated affective potential10 (we did not measure the valence intensity of the positive 
and negative stimuli examined in Studies 3 and 5). In any case, exploring the relation of 
similarity and affective potential is a fascinating topic for further research. 
Finally, in Studies 1 and 4 we ran a regression analysis with the positive/negative words’ 
within-valence similarity as the criterion and the positive/negative words’ effect-coded valence, 
and their interval-scaled valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness as 
predictors. In both Studies 1 and 4, results showed that valence predicted similarity even when 
simultaneously controlling for valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, and concreteness. 
These results suggest that the asymmetries in similarity observed in Studies 1-6 were actually 
due to valence, and not due to these factors possibly confounded with valence. 
These alternative variables largely relate to the affective and motivational potential of 
evaluative information; that is, these variables should affect the processing of positive and 
                                       
10 First, the positive and negative words examined in Study 1 were found to be equally distant 
from the midpoint (5) of a 0-10 “negative-positive” scale (Mpos = 3.36 > 5, SD = 0.60; 
Mneg = 3.56 < 5, SD = 0.52; F(1, 38) = 1.33, p = .26, ηp2 = .03, CI 90% [.00, .16]; Klauer & 
Musch, 1999). Second, in Study 2b, before spatially arranging the positive and negative words 
generated by another participant, receiver participants evaluated the words on a 1-7 
“negative-positive” scale with the midpoint (4) labeled as “neutral”. Participants provided equal 
distances from this midpoint for positive words (Mpos = 2.04 > 4, SD = 0.35) and negative words 
(Mneg = 2.05 < 4, SD = 0.35), F(1, 42) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 = .00, CI 90% [.00, .01]. Further, 
across participants valence asymmetry in distance from the neutral midpoint did not correlate 
with valence asymmetry in SpAM similarity, r(41) = .16, p = .29. Third, using the database 
proved by Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013) we compared the valence of the positive 
and negative words examined in Study 4 (we omitted “myopic”, because the WKB database 
does not contain this negative word). Again, the positive and negative words were found to be 
equally distant from the midpoint (5) of a 1-9 “unhappy-happy” scale (Mpos = 2.41 > 5, SD = 
0.54; Mneg = 2.24 < 5, SD = 0.71; F(1, 61) = 1.14, p = .29, ηp2 = .02, CI 90% [.00, .10]). And 
fourth, in Study 6 the positive and negative words were found to be equally distant from the 
midpoint (5) of the same 1-9 “unhappy-happy” scale (Mpos = 1.07 > 5, SD = 0.65; 
Mneg = 0.98 < 5, SD = 0.84; F(1, 13913) = 62.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .00, CI 90% [>.00, .01]). The 
same was true for the positive and negative pictures examined in Study 6 (Mpos = 1.59 > 5, SD 
= 0.76; Mneg = 1.48 < 5, SD = 1.08; F(1, 954) = 3.24, p = .07, ηp2 = .00, CI 90% [.00, .01]). 
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negative information. Showing that valence asymmetry in similarity exists independent of these 
influences increases our confidence in the two ecological rather than psychological 
explanations we proposed in the introduction. Again, we assumed that positive information is 
more similar to other positive information compared to negative information’s similarity to 
other negative information, because (1) on most evaluatively relevant content dimensions 
positive, adequate states are flanked by both too little- and too much-negative states and thus 
are quantitatively more similar than negative states. Second, (2) positive information occurs 
more frequently (“positive events are more common (more tokens), but negative events are 
more differentiated (more types)”, Rozin et al., 2010, p.536) and thus co-occurs more frequently 
compared to negative information. This ecologically higher frequency of co-occurrence leads 
to psychologically higher similarity via stronger association in memory. Having established 
that the proposed asymmetry is a general phenomenon, future research must directly test these 
two explanations. 
 
Implications for cognitive processing 
 
Similarity impacts learning, memory, and cognition in profound ways. For example, as 
shown in Study 1, stimuli that are more similar to one another are classified and evaluated 
faster, are more likely to be subsumed under a category, are more often confused with one 
another and thus harder to recognize (see Table 3). Also, as discussed, similar prime-target are 
processed faster/easier (e.g., McRae & Boisvert, 1998; Perea, Duñabeitia, & Carreiras, 2008). 
Prototypical stimuli (i.e., exemplars that are more similar to other exemplars of a category) are 
categorized more accurately (Nosoksky, 1986; 1988; Smith & Sloman, 1994), and 
generalizations of processing strategies, judgments and decisions to similar stimuli are more 
likely (Ames, 2004; Gräf & Unkelbach, 2015; Shepard; 1987; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001).  
The present studies showed that positive stimuli are generally more similar to 
one another than negative stimuli. Thus, given the broadness of similarity effects, this valence 
asymmetry in similarity should lead to valence asymmetries on a variety of levels of 
information processing, including evaluation, classification, categorization, judgment and 
decision making, prediction, recognition, and recall, and might provide a unitary explanation 
for a host of previous findings that are commonly explained in terms of the affective and 
motivational potential of evaluative information. And indeed, there is already evidence for 
valence asymmetries in cognitive processing caused by evaluative information’s differential 
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similarity (e.g., processing speed, likelihood of generalization, and memory accuracy; Alves et 
al., 2015; Gräf & Unkelbach, 2015; Unkelbach et al., 2008). A promising path of future research 
is thus to explore and reveal further valence asymmetries in cognitive processing that are due 
to the general valence asymmetry in similarity found here. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The density hypothesis (Unkelbach et al., 2008) claimed that positive information is 
mentally represented as more similar to one another than negative information. We investigated 
whether this proposed valence asymmetry in similarity is a general phenomenon. The present 
research provides a clear empirical answer: The proposed valence asymmetry in similarity is a 
general phenomenon that is reliably found for both self-generated, retrieved and 
other-generated, received information, for information of both consensual and idiosyncratic 
valence, for information received from both one and many sources, for both words and 
experienced everyday events, and for both verbal and visual information of strong, moderate, 
and weak valence. This difference in similarity is due to the valence, and not the valence 
intensity, frequency, familiarity, or concreteness of positive and negative stimuli. And, finally, 
the observed valence asymmetry in similarity may explain downstream valence asymmetries 
on many levels of cognitive processing. 
60 
 
Appendix A 
German stimuli used in Study 1 with English translations 
Study 1 
original stimuli 
Study 1 
translations 
Study 1 
original stimuli 
Study 1 
translations 
Positive Positive Negative Negative 
1. Baby 
2. 
1. Baby 
2. 
1. Alkoholismus 
2. 
1. Alcoholism 
2. Geburtstag 
3. 
 
Birthday 
3. 
 
Bomben 
3. 
 
Bombs 
3. 
 
Schmetterling 
4. 
Butterfly 
4. 
Krebs 
4. 
Cancer 
4. Kuchen 
3. 
 
Cake 
3. 
 
Kakerlake 
3. 
 
Cockroach 
3. 
 
5 Schokolade 
2. 
5 Chocolate 
2. 
5 Verbrechen 
2. 
5 Crime 
2. 6 Blumen 
3. 
 
6 Flowers 
3. 
 
6 Tod 
3. 
 
6 Death 
3. 
 
7 Essen 
2. 
7 Food 
2. 
7 Krankheit 
2. 
7 Disease 
2. 8 Freund 
3. 
 
8 Friend 
3. 
 
8 Scheidung 
3. 
 
8 Divorce 
3. 
 
9 Geschenk 
2. 
9 Gift 
2. 
9 Beerdigung 
2. 
9 Funeral 
2. 10. Hawaii 
3. 
 
10. Hawaii 
3. 
 
10. Müll 
3. 
 
10. Garbage 
3. 
 
11. Urlaub 
2. 
11. Holiday 
2. 
11. Gewehre 
2. 
11. Guns 
2. 12. Eiscreme 
3. 
 
12. Ice cream 
3. 
 
12. Hass 
3. 
 
12. Hate 
3. 
 
13. Kätzchen 
2. 
13. Kitten 
2. 
13. Hölle 
2. 
13. Hell 
2. 14. Kino 
3. 
 
14. Movies 
3. 
 
14. Hitler 
3. 
 
14. Hitler 
3. 
 
15. Musik 
2. 
15. Music 
2. 
15. Abfall 
2. 
15. Litter 
2. 16. Party 
3. 
 
16. Party 
3. 
 
16. Rezession 
3. 
 
16. Recession 
3. 
 
17. Pizza 
2. 
17. Pizza 
2. 
17. Steuern 
2. 
17. Taxes 
2. 18. Erdbeere 
3. 
 
18. Strawberry 
3. 
 
18. Zahnschmerzen 
3. 
 
18. Toothache 
3. 
 
19. Sommer 
2. 
19. Summer 
2. 
19. Virus 
2. 
19. Virus 
2. 0. Sonnenschein 
3. 
 
0. Sunshine 
3. 
 
0. Krieg 
3. 
 
0. War 
3. 
 
 
Note. Same stimuli as used by Unkelbach and colleagues (2008). 
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Appendix B 
English stimuli used in Study 4 with German translations 
Study 4 
original stimuli 
Study 4 
translations 
Study 4 
original stimuli 
Study 4 
translations 
Positive Positive Negative Negative 
1. Awesome 
2. 
1. Fantastisch 
2. 
1. Afraid 
2. 
1. Ängstlich 
2. Beautiful 
3. 
 
Schön 
3. 
 
Anger 
3. 
 
Zorn 
3. 
 
Beneficial Vorteilhaft 
4. 
Angry 
4. 
Verärgert 
4. 4. Brilliant 
4. 
Großartig 
3. 
 
Blacklisted 
3. 
 
Schwarzgelistet 
3. 
 
5 Courage 
3. 
 
5 Mut 
2. 
5 Boring 
2. 
5 Langweilig 
2. 6 Creation 
2. 
6 Schöpfung 
3. 
 
6 Capitalism 
3. 
 
6 Kapitalismus 
3. 
 
7 Ecstatic 
3. 
 
7 Begeistert 
2. 
7 Crazy 
2. 
7 Verrückt 
2. 8 Energetic 
2. 
8 Energetisch 
3. 
 
8 Depressed 
3. 
 
8 Depressiv 
3. 
 
9 Enhanced 
3. 
 
9 Verbessert 
2. 
9 Depression 
2. 
9 Depression 
2. 10. Excitement 
2. 
10. Spannung 
3. 
 
10. Destruction 
3. 
 
10. Zerstörung 
3. 
 
11. Exciting 
3. 
 
11. Spannend 
2. 
11. Disgusting 
2. 
11. Ekelhaft 
2. 12. Fabulous 
2. 
12. Fabelhaft 
3. 
 
12. Dishonest 
3. 
 
12. Unehrlich 
3. 
 
13. Funny 
3. 
 
13. Witzig 
2. 
13. Fat 
2. 
13. Fett 
2. 14. Generous 
2. 
14. Großzügig 
3. 
 
14. Harmful 
3. 
 
14. Schädlich 
3. 
 
15. Great 
3. 
 
15. Toll 
2. 
15. Hate 
2. 
15. Hass 
2. 16. Happy 
2. 
16. Glücklich 
3. 
 
16. Horrible 
3. 
 
16. Schrecklich 
3. 
 
17. Healthy 
3. 
 
17. Gesund 
2. 
17. Hurt 
2. 
17. Schmerz 
2. 18. Helpful 
2. 
18. Hilfreich 
3. 
 
18. Inefficient 
3. 
 
18. Ineffizient 
3. 
 
19. Hero 
3. 
 
19. Held 
2. 
19. Jerk 
2. 
19. Trottel 
2. 20. Honest 
2. 
0. Ehrlich 
3. 
 
0. Junk 
3. 
 
0. Schrott 
3. 
 
1. Hope 
3. 
 
21. Hoffnung 
2. 
21. Lie 
2. 
21. Lüge 
2. 22. Inspire 
2. 
2. Inspirieren 
3. 
 
2. Mean 
3. 
 
2. Geheim 
3. 
 
3. Love 
3. 
 
23. Liebe 
2. 
23. Murder 
2. 
23. Mord 
2. 24. Morality 
2. 
4. Moral 
3. 
 
4. Mutilate 
3. 
 
4. Verstümmeln 
3. 
 
5. Motivated 
3. 
 
25. Motiviert 
2. 
25. Myopic 
2. 
25. Kurzsichtig 
2. 26. Optimism 
2. 
6. Optimismus 
3. 
 
6. Obnoxious 
3. 
 
6. Unausstehlich 
3. 
 
7. Promising 
3. 
 
27. Vielversprechend 
2. 
27. Poor 
2. 
27. Arm 
2. 28. Smile 
2. 
8. Lächeln 
3. 
 
8. Quit 
3. 
 
8. Aufgeben 
3. 
 
9. Wonderful 
3. 
 
29. Wunderbar 
2. 
29. Rude 
2. 
29. Unhöflich 
2.  30. Shallow 
3. 
 
30. Oberflächlich 
3. 
 
 1. Sickness 1. Krankheit 
  32. Ugly 32. Hässlich 
  33. Unpleasant 33. Unangenehm 
  34. Wound 34. Wunde 
  35. Wretched 35. Erbärmlich 
 
Note. New stimuli generated by participants in Study 4. Redundant stimuli are not displayed.  
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Chapter 3 – The ABC of stereotype about groups: Agency/socio-
economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion 
 
Abstract 
 
Previous research argued that stereotypes differ primarily on the two dimensions of warmth / 
communion and competence / agency. We identify an empirical gap in support for this notion. 
The theoretical model constrains stereotypes a priori to these two dimensions; without this 
constraint, participants might spontaneously employ other relevant dimensions. We fill this gap 
by complementing the existing theory-driven approaches with a data-driven approach that 
allows an estimation of the spontaneously employed dimensions of stereotyping. Seven studies 
(total N = 4451) show that people organize social groups primarily based on their agency / 
socio-economic success (A), and as a second dimension, based on their conservative-
progressive beliefs (B). Communion (C) is not found as a dimension by its own, but rather as 
an emergent quality in the two-dimensional space of A and B, resulting in a two-dimensional 
ABC model of stereotype content about social groups. 
 
Stereotypes are everywhere. To navigate their social world, people quickly group 
individuals in meaningful social categories based on their age, gender, ethnic origin, 
occupation, or interest (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Tajfel, 1969). Knowledge about 
these categories includes what typical members of this category are like, think, feel and do, and 
the schematic application of this knowledge provides an economical alternative to effortful 
individuation (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Milne, & 
Bodenhausen, 1994). And stereotypes matter. They allow people to go beyond the information 
given (Bruner, 1957), make predictions about the future behavior of individuals based on their 
sheer category membership (Hamilton, Sherman & Ruvolo, 1990), and they influence people’s 
judgments, decisions and behavior in a stereotype-consistent way (Wheeler & Petty, 2001), 
even without being aware of this (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).  
Each stereotype consists of a more or less unique set of attributes associated with the 
social group: White, Black, Latino, Middle Eastern, and Asian men are “rich”, “athletic”, 
“macho”, “bearded”, and “intelligent”, respectively. White, Black, Latino, Middle Eastern, and 
Asian women are “arrogant”, “have an attitude”, are “feisty”, “quiet”, and “intelligent”, 
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respectively (Ghavami & Peplau, 2012, pp. 118-120). Librarians are shy, hairdressers are 
flamboyant, and stock-traders are greedy. Some attributes, however, may be of greater 
importance for effectively coordinating social behavior than others and thus are likely to serve 
as content of stereotypes about many, if not all, groups. That is, some attributes may serve as 
fundamental dimensions of stereotype content that stretch out people’s social maps on which 
groups can be located as a function of scoring low or high on the respective dimensions.  
 
Warmth and competence are meaningful stereotype content dimensions  
 
According to the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), 
the most relevant criteria in intergroup interaction are the social groups members’ intentions 
and their ability to carry out their plans. The central question is whether a group has goals 
compatible with the perceiver and is thus likely to help him or her, or whether it has antagonistic 
goals and thus might harm him or her (Fiske et al., 2002). Knowing this (i.e., a group’s warmth, 
Fiske et al., 2002; communion, Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; morality, Wojciszke, 1994; other-
profitableness, Peeters, 1983; trustworthiness, Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008), the second most 
relevant question has been theorized to be a group’s ability to carry out their intentions (i.e., 
competence, Fiske et al. 2002; agency, Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Wojciszke, 1994; 
self-profitableness, Peeters, 1983; instrumentality, Parson & Bales, 1955).  
More than a decade of research on these two dimensions of the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) 
suggests that whether a group is perceived as warm and / or competent has implications for 
emotional reactions to the group (Cikara & Fiske, 2012; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), 
neurological responses to the group (Harris & Fiske, 2006), people’s perception of what typical 
group members look like (Imhoff, Woelki, Hanke, & Dotsch, 2013), as well as behavioral 
intentions of harming and helping (Becker & Asbrock, 2012; Cuddy et al., 2007) like invitations 
to a job interview (Agerström, Björklund, Carlsson, & Rooth, 2012), or support for immigration 
politics (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013). Even beyond groups, the two SCM dimensions 
have been employed to assess people’s perceptions of brands (Aaker, Garbinsky, & Vohs, 2012; 
Kervyn, Chan, Malone, Korpusik, & Ybarra, 2014), exonerees (Clow & Leach, 2015), and 
individuals in pain (Ashton-James, Richardson, Williams, Bianchi-Berthouze, & Dekker, 
2014). 
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Some of these studies adopt what we would call a relational approach and aim to explore 
how individuals determine their concrete behavior toward an individual from a group based on 
their assumptions about this group’s warmth and competence (e.g., Kervyn, Dolderer, Mahieu, 
& Yzerbyt, 2010). Others have adopted what might be framed as a lay sociologist perspective, 
that is: on which dimensions do people identify the most relevant differences between social 
groups (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Imhoff et al., 2013). The present research 
addresses particularly the latter perspective. 
 
Warmth and competence may not be the dimensions that people     spontaneously 
use 
 
Within the lay sociologist perspective we argue that although warmth and competence 
are meaningful dimensions of stereotype content, we currently lack empirical support for the 
notion that these are indeed the dimensions that individuals spontaneously employ when 
making sense of social groups. Spontaneously employed dimensions are the ones that come to 
people’s mind without theoretical constraints made by the researchers. Most studies on 
stereotype content constrain participants to the two theoretically derived dimensions, because 
in most cases only these two dimensions are rated (e.g., “participants rated the 15 groups on 
scales of warmth, competence, status, and competition”, Cuddy et al., 2009, p. 12; “participants 
rated the 53 categories on either competence or warmth”, Durante, Volpato, & Fiske, 2010, p. 
473; “participants rated the groups on scales reflecting warmth, competence, perceived status, 
and perceived competition”, Fiske et al, 2002, p. 884; “participants rated the extent to which 
each group appeared warm (friendly, cold (reversed), likable […]) and competent (capable, 
incompetent (reversed), smart […])”, Bergsieker, Leslie, Constantine, & Fiske, 2012, p. 1229). 
For participants, it is thus impossible to employ any other stereotype content dimensions.  
Another source of constraints is the selection of groups to be rated. Although some 
studies sampled groups spontaneously named by participants, the instructions prompted race, 
gender, occupation and so forth as criteria of what constitutes groups, thereby biasing the 
likelihood of certain categories to be named (e.g., ‘Blacks’, ‘women’, and ’professionals’, see 
“off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think today’s society categorizes 
into groups (i.e., based on ethnicity, race, gender, occupation, ability, etc.)?”, Fiske et al., 2002, 
p. 883; see also Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2013, p. 676). It is conceivable and highly likely 
that a biased sample of certain social groups will make certain stereotype dimensions more 
65 
 
salient than others (e.g., prompting race and gender will make dimensions associated with race 
and gender more salient).  
To give another example, Imhoff and colleagues (2013) showed that visual facial 
representations of typical exemplars of two social groups pretested as differing on warmth and 
competence were judged by other raters as differing on both warmth and competence. While 
this finding supports that people are able to associate warmth and competence with facial 
features, it does not rule out that the space of group stereotypes also includes one, two, or more 
additional – and potentially more fundamental – dimensions that were not visually encoded in 
the faces because the two pretested groups (managers and kindergartners) were not different on 
them, and / or that were not decoded from the faces because the researchers never asked for 
ratings other than warmth and competence. 
Thus, the above-mentioned studies lack representative design (Brunswik, 1955; 1956). 
To illustrate this important aspect, imagine one wants to find out the fundamental dimensions 
people spontaneously use to compare cars. A non-representative sample of cars of the same 
price, size, and fuel efficiency, but in different colors will probably prompt the result that the 
most fundamental dimension on which people spontaneously distinguish cars is their color. 
While that might very well be the case, the biased sampling prevented other dimensions from 
being detected because there was no meaningful variance on these other dimensions. Likewise, 
even if there is a representative sample of cars, but participants rate them only on the number 
of airbags and the maximum speed, this will give us a two-dimensional space on which all cars 
can be positioned, with one dimension being number of airbags, and the other being maximum 
speed. Crucially, though, we have no empirical base to judge whether these two dimensions are 
indeed the fundamental dimensions that individuals spontaneously employ when comparing 
cars even if we replicate the rating multiple times in many different environments. Without a 
more representative sampling approach, one cannot rule out that empirical findings are 
influenced by sampling biases (Fiedler, 2011). As much as we ideally draw representative 
participant samples from the population we aim to generalize to, a representative design also 
calls for an unbiased sampling of stimuli (to be able to generalize to the universe of stimuli) as 
well as dimensions (to generalize to the universe of attributes; see Wells & Windschitl, 1999; 
Westfall et al., 2014; for a more elaborate discussion of the problems of stimulus sampling and 
generalization). 
In summary, we believe the available evidence for the nature of stereotype content 
dimensions about social groups suffers from a) a non-representative sampling of social groups, 
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which prevents generalization to the population of groups, and b) a non-representative sampling 
of rated attributes, which prevents generalization to the population of all conceivable attributes.  
 
How to explore the nature of spontaneous stereotype content about groups 
 
To gain insights into the fundamental, spontaneously employed dimensions of 
stereotypes about groups, one thus needs a different approach that more closely follows the 
ideal of a representative design (Brunswik, 1955, 1956). In such a design, a sample of 
participants organizes a random (i.e., without any theoretical constraints) sample of stimuli on 
dimensions without being constrained in what these dimensions are. Sampling of groups can 
be achieved by asking people to name groups and selecting the most frequently named ones. In 
doing so, we avoid theory-driven a priori assumptions about the most relevant criteria for 
segmenting society into groups, such as age, sex, race, occupation, ability etc. 
Assessing fundamental dimensions on which people align social groups without 
influencing participants by naming theoretically derived candidate dimensions requires more 
effort. Here, we rely on a data-driven strategy; such data-driven methods have proven to be 
extremely successful tools to identify fundamental dimensions of social perception with as little 
bias as possible in areas like face and gender perception (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, 
Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Ghavami & Peplau, 2012; Todorov, 
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Said, 2011; Williams & Best, 1990).  
One well-established data-driven method is multidimensional scaling based on global 
dissimilarity estimates (Nosofsky, 1992; Schiffman, Reynolds, & Young, 1981). In this 
approach, participants merely provide estimates of the similarity / dissimilarity between social 
groups. Importantly, they are free to rely on any dimension that spontaneously comes to their 
mind and seems most diagnostic to them for that decision. When judging for instance the 
similarity between lawyers, nurses, and maids, individuals could resort to relatively consensual 
impressions of warmth and thus see lawyers and maids as similar (cold), but both different from 
nurses who are seen as warm (see Fiske & Dupree, 2014). If competence, however, is the most 
salient and subjectively diagnostic dimension, participants should see lawyers and nurses as 
similar compared to the dissimilar (relatively incompetent) maids. Finally, it is conceivable that 
people make use of completely different characteristics and see assumed gender as more central, 
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with nurses and maids as occupations typically perceived to be female-dominated compared to 
lawyers evoking associations with men. 
Exploring the dimensionality of stimulus spaces in this way is well established in the 
social psychology of personality impressions (good-bad x hard-soft; Rosenberg, Nelson, & 
Vivekananthan, 1968), emotions (valence x intensity; Russell, 1980; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, 
& O’Connor, 1987), animals (size x ferocity; Henley, 1969), power strategies (rationality x 
directness; Falbo, 1977), and responses to dissatisfaction in the job and one’s relationship 
(active-passive x constructive-destructive; Farrell, 1983; Rusbult & Zembrodt, 1983). More 
relevant to the focus of the present paper, Pattyn, Rosseel, and van Hiel (2013) recently asked 
participants to complete a hierarchical sorting task to estimate dissimilarities between 
individuals who belonged to predefined social groups. Across three studies they reported 
converging support for five to six meaningful dimensions of the social group space 
(conventional vs. alternative, old vs. young, male vs. female, cognitive vs. physical, deviant vs. 
non-deviant, and to a lesser extent: cold vs. warm).  
Although these results are thought-provoking as they suggest very different dimensions 
than the well-received stereotype content model, a closer look at their stimulus sampling 
procedure indicates that, as in all previous work, biased sampling might have again played a 
major role in producing these findings (for another example of the large impact of stimulus 
sampling on results see Frable, 1993; Jones & Ashmore, 1973). Specifically, the researchers 
searched for pictures of (male and female) individuals who belonged to a predefined set of 
social groups, among them ‘punk’, ‘hippie’, ‘yuppie’, ‘typical woman’, and ‘senior citizen’. 
Accordingly, two of the central dimensions turned out to be conventional (typical woman) 
versus alternative (punks, hippies) as well as old versus young and a similar argument can be 
made for the other dimensions. This study thus illustrates how stimulus sampling may influence 
the inferred underlying dimensions.  
 
The present research 
 
This paper aims to investigate the fundamental, spontaneously employed dimensions of 
stereotype content about social groups. To achieve this aim, we followed the proposed 
data-driven research strategy. We asked participants in two cultural contexts (U.S.-based 
MTurkers and German students) to name examples of what constitutes groups without biasing 
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the selection by any examples or criteria. The groups that were most frequently named and 
appeared most often in contemporary mass media were then judged on dissimilarity to one 
another in order to compute stereotype maps of groups with multidimensional scaling. The 
dimensions of the emerging scaling solutions were then interpreted via property fitting analyses 
(Chang & Carroll, 1969) with a variety of candidate stereotype content dimensions on which 
the groups had been judged by independent raters. As these candidate dimensions may 
constitute an experimenter influence, we finally asked participants to label all rotated content 
dimensions that run through the origin of the groups’ stereotype maps. Other independent raters 
confirmed that these labels did not reflect a dimension that was not included in our selection of 
candidate stereotype content dimensions. We believe this strategy avoided biases due to 
selective sampling of stimuli and / or dimensions and allowed participants to spontaneously 
employ any dimension they saw as important to distinguish between the groups that they saw 
as important to distinguish. In a total of seven studies with 4451 participants, we found, 
confirmed, and generalized what we refer to as the 2D ABC model of spontaneous stereotypes 
about groups. According to the data, people distinguish groups based on differences in agency 
/ socio-economic success (A; ‘powerless-powerful’, ‘poor-wealthy’, ‘low status-high status’, 
‘dominated-dominating’, ‘unconfident-confident’, and ‘unassertive-competitive’) and 
conservative-progressive beliefs (B; ‘traditional-modern’, ‘religious-science-oriented’, 
‘conventional-alternative’, and ‘conservative-liberal’). Further, the groups’ communion / 
warmth (C; ‘cold-warm’, ‘untrustworthy-trustworthy’, ‘dishonest-sincere’, ‘repellent-likable’, 
‘threatening-benevolent’, and ‘egoistic-altruistic’) emerges as a function of centrality in the 
stereotype map spanned by A and B. That is, groups that appear average on both dimensions 
appear to be warm, trustworthy, sincere, likable, benevolent, and altruistic. Just like the 
stereotype content model by Fiske and colleagues (2002; see also Cuddy et al., 2007), the 2D 
ABC model addresses consensual rather than idiosyncratic group stereotypes. 
We conducted five more studies within this project that we do not report for reasons of 
brevity. All studies consistently supported the pattern of results reported in this manuscript. 
These twelve studies represent the full set of all studies we have conducted up to this point to 
explore the number and nature of the stereotype content dimensions that people spontaneously 
employ to distinguish large sets of social groups sampled without bias in favor of a specific 
stereotype content model. 
Study 1 
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We first generated a large sample of social groups by asking people to name groups and 
then selected the most frequently named ones (consensus > 10%). Then, new participants 
judged the dissimilarity between each group and each other group, allowing participants to 
spontaneously choose dimensions on which they base their judgment (Forgas, 1976; Rosenberg 
et al., 1968). Dissimilarity per se is unspecific and open to idiosyncratic interpretation – that is, 
it needs to be construed in one or another respect (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). The 
chosen dimensions might be different for each participant, but highly idiosyncratic approaches 
will be filtered out by aggregation across individuals so that the average pairwise estimates of 
the dissimilarities between the groups will reflect a consensual view. The dimensions might be 
different for each pairwise comparison and each dissimilarity rating might be a judgment based 
on the integration of many dimensions. However, as long as all participants employ more or 
less identical dimensions in making the dissimilarity judgments, the multidimensional scaling 
(MDS; for a review, see Borg & Groenen, 2005) algorithm will compute a multidimensional 
social space in which the groups’ coordinates retain almost all the variance contained in the 
original dissimilarity judgments. 
If there are fundamental stereotype content dimensions, then the next question is their 
nature, which can be addressed with a property fitting analysis (ProFit, Chang & Carroll, 1969; 
e.g., Pattyn et al., 2013) during which rating dimensions are sought that can be best predicted 
by the social groups’ MDS coordinates. This approach is ideal to "help systematize data in areas 
where organizing concepts and underlying dimensions are not well‐developed” (Schiffman, 
Reynolds & Young, 1981, p. 3, see also Giguère, 2006). The properties to be fitted were 24 trait 
dimensions (‘unfriendly-friendly’, ‘incompetent-competent’, etc.) that were identified as 
possible candidates of being fundamental to stereotype content, both in light of the data as well 
as established theories. While we diverge here from a purely data-driven approach, 24 
dimensions present a much larger sample of possible candidates than in previous studies on the 
dimensionality and nature of spontaneous stereotype content about groups (e.g., Fiske et al., 
2002). Studies 5 and 6 will solve this deviation from a purely data-driven approach and show 
that our selection of candidates included all stereotype content dimensions that participants 
employed to distinguish between groups. At this point we refrained from making predictions 
regarding the existence, number, and nature of the fundamental stereotype content dimensions 
for groups.  
Methods and results 
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To avoid having an overly homogenous sample of undergraduate students, we recruited 
a more diverse sample in terms of educational and professional background as well as age, via 
Amazon’s crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk.  
Study 1a: Naming social groups. We paid 213 people (101 women, 112 men; 
M = 34.41 years, SD = 11.02) $1.5 to “name 40 social groups”. Importantly, we refrained from 
recommending sampling strategies to get at people’s naive understanding of groups (for a 
different approach, see Fiske et al., 2002). In the upper half of the screen, people read "Dear 
participant, each society is not only made up by the individuals that live in the society, but these 
individuals also constitute what we call ‘social groups’. People belong to social groups either 
because they have a specific characteristic that is seen as typical for a social group or because 
they have chosen to become part of a social group. Thus, some social groups are based on how 
people are, while others are based on how people behave or see the world. (These groups do 
not have to be mutually exclusive in the sense that being part of one social group means one 
cannot also be part of another social group.) Although this definition may sound very abstract 
to you, you probably have examples of social groups in your mind. We ask you to name 40 
social groups that spontaneously come to your mind. Just think for a moment of the groups that 
structure society and name 40 of them.” In the bottom half, people entered 40 groups into 40 
text boxes.  
Table 1 shows all 80 social groups named by more than 10% of people in Study 1a. 
Apparently people selected groups based on race or ethnicity (Whites, Blacks, Asians), social 
class (Poor, Middle class, Rich), and political or religious beliefs (Democrats, Atheists, 
Republicans, Christians). The combination of these 80 groups results in 3160 possible pairs for 
which we collected dissimilarity judgments in Study 1b. 
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Table 1 
Most Frequently Named Social Groups in the U.S. (Consensus > 10%) in Study 1a. 
1st - 20th  
most frequent 
21st - 40th  
most frequent 
41st - 60th  
most frequent 
61st - 80th  
most frequent 
Whites (66%) Teenagers (28%) Buddhists (19%) Upper class (14%) 
Democrats (51%) Muslims (27%) Working class (19%) Military (14%) 
Blacks (48%) Politicians (27%) Young (19%) Religious (14%) 
Poor (47%) Catholics (26%) Elderly (18%) Techies (14%) 
Middle class (45%) Gays (26%) Hipsters (18%) Sports fans (13%) 
Asians (45%) Men (25%) Actors (18%) Heterosexuals (13%) 
Rich (44%) Teachers (25%) Homeless (17%) Lower class (13%) 
Atheists (42%) Children (25%) Libertarians (17%) Drug users (12%) 
Republicans (41%) Goths (24%) Independents (17%) Employed (12%) 
Christians (37%) Jocks (22%) Mexicans (17%) Hindu (12%) 
Liberals (36%) Parents (22%) Businesspeople 
(16%) 
Lawyers (12%) 
Conservatives (35%) Hippies (22%) Educated (16%) Straight (12%) 
Nerds (34%) Doctors (21%) White collar (16%) Families (12%) 
Students (33%) Adults (21%) Indians (16%) Lesbians (12%) 
Athletes (31%) Blue collar (21%) Old (16%) Skaters (12%) 
Jews (30%) Geeks (21%) Bisexuals (14%) Stoners (12%) 
Hispanics (30%) Preps (21%) Criminals (14%) Agnostics (11%) 
Women (30%) Scientists (20%) Homosexuals (14%) Latinos (11%) 
Artists (29%) Americans (19%) Immigrants (14%) Rednecks (11%) 
Musicians (29%) Gamers (19%) Unemployed (14%) Tea Party (11%) 
 
Note. Percentage in parentheses is proportion of participants who spontaneously named this 
group as a social group that is representative of the structure of U.S. society. 
 
Study 1b: Multidimensional scaling of 80 groups. We paid 843 other people 
(420 women, 423 men; M = 36.33 years, SD = 12.65) $0.6 to “rate the similarity-dissimilarity 
of 80 pairs of social groups”. Multidimensional scaling operates on the stimulus level (here: 
groups); as it was not feasible to do all pairwise dissimilarity comparisons, we presented each 
participant with 80 randomly selected pairs of stimuli out of the full 3160 pairs of stimuli and 
averaged the ratings on the stimulus level. On the first screen slide, they read “Dear participant, 
please rate the similarity-dissimilarity of these two social groups”. Below, they used a 9-point 
‘very similar-very dissimilar’ scale to rate the two randomly selected groups. On the next 
screens, people rated 79 other randomly selected pairs of groups.  
On average, each of the 3160 dissimilarities was judged by M = 20.94 participants, 
SD = 4.77. We subjected the full matrix of 3160 mean pairwise dissimilarities to 
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multidimensional scaling (MDS; for a review, see Borg & Groenen, 2005). We used the 
ALSCAL procedure (Young, Takane, & Lewyckyj, 1978); assuming an interval scale, we 
estimated coordinates for the 80 social groups in dissimilarity spaces in which Euclidean 
distances can be interpreted as dissimilarity. The further apart two groups are in these spaces, 
the more dissimilar people judged them to be. We estimated coordinates for six MDS solutions, 
varying from a one-dimensional to a six-dimensional dissimilarity space. 
There are two indicators of goodness of scaling fit: scaling stress (S; should be 
preferably low) and the proportion of original dissimilarity variance accounted for by the 
scaling solution (R²; should be preferably high). Table 2 shows S and R² for the six scaling 
solutions (1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, and 6D). Balancing goodness of scaling fit and ease of 
interpretation (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009), we proceeded with the 
social groups’ 1D, 2D, and 3D dissimilarity spaces. The scree plots of S and 1-R² showed that 
extracting a fourth, fifth, and sixth dimension only slightly improved S and R². Next, we 
inspected the corresponding scatter plots, searching for and selecting a number of candidate 
stereotype content dimensions deemed suitable to interpret the 1D, 2D, and 3D space. These 
data-driven candidates were augmented with candidate dimensions derived from the main 
theories of stereotype content (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002). Appendix A shows all 24 candidate 
dimensions. 
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Table 2 
Goodness of 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, and 6D Scaling Fit in Studies 1-6 
 Method People Groups 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 6D 
Study 1 sequential 
dissimilarity 
judgment 
U.S. 80 .23 
0.57 
.19 
0.73 
.16 
0.81 
.15 
0.84 
.14 
0.86 
.13 
0.88 
Study 2 simultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
U.S. 
 
 
 
80 .16 
0.62 
.13 
0.78 
.11 
0.85 
.10 
0.89 
.09 
0.91 
.08 
0.92 
Study 3 simultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
German 76 .16 
0.75 
.12 
0.87 
.10 
0.91 
.09 
0.93 
.08 
0.95 
.07 
0.96 
Study 4 simultaneous 
rating on pre-
specified 
scales 
U.S. 
 
 
 
80 .14 
0.72 
.13 
0.80 
.12 
0.84 
.11 
0.86 
.10 
0.88 
.10 
0.89 
Study 5 imultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
U.S. 42 
minimal. 
.12 
0.75 
.09 
0.87 
.07 
0.93 
.06 
0.95 
.04 
0.97 
.04 
0.98 
Study 5 simultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
U.S. 
 
 
 
61 
natural. 
.13 
0.70 
.09 
0.86 
.08 
0.91 
.06 
0.94 
.06 
0.95 
.05 
0.96 
Study 6 simultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
U.S. 42 
minimal. 
.14 
0.85 
.10 
0.93 
.08 
0.95 
.07 
0.97 
.06 
0.98 
.05 
0.98 
Study 6 simultaneous 
dissimilarity 
arrangement 
U.S. 
 
 
 
61 
natural. 
.16 
0.71 
.13 
0.82 
.10 
0.88 
.09 
0.90 
.09 
0.92 
.08 
0.93 
 
Note. Upper values indicate scaling stress (for a review, see Borg & Groenen, 2005). Lower 
values indicate percent of original variance retained in the scaling solution. According to 
Kruskal and Wish (1978), stress <= .20, <= .15, <= .10, <=.05 and <= .025 may be interpreted 
as poor, sufficient, satisfactory, good and excellent, respectively. Bold values are stress =< .15, 
which are sufficient. In all studies except Study 1, the 2D scaling solution achieved a sufficient 
low stress. 
 
Study 1c: Disambiguating the dissimilarity ratings. Finally, 620 people (275 women, 
336 men and 9 unassigned; M = 34.94 years, SD = 12.17) were paid $1 to “rate 80 social groups 
on a stereotype dimension” (e.g., ‘unfriendly-friendly’). On the first screen slide, they read 
“Dear participant, some kind of people in our society are [friendly], while other kind of people 
in our society are [the opposite stereotype; unfriendly]. Please rate the following 80 social 
groups according to how [friendly] or [unfriendly] they are”. People then 
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used 0-100 slider scales to rate the groups in a random order, one below the other on the same 
screen slide. There were between 22 and 27 raters per candidate stereotype content dimension. 
Raters’ agreement about the groups was very high, ICC(2,k) >= .84, for all 24 candidate 
stereotype content dimensions (McGraw & Wong, 1996; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). 
To facilitate the interpretation of the social groups’ 1D, 2D, and 3D dissimilarity space, 
we ran principal component analyses (PCA; Jolliffe, 2002) on the 24 candidate stereotype 
content dimensions, using varimax rotation. First, we determined the number of components to 
be extracted. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth component explained 35%, 28%, 
15%, 5%, 4%, and 3% of the total variance, respectively. Based on the scree plot, we proceeded 
with the extraction of three components. Aiming for simple structure, we omitted all eight 
candidate stereotype content dimensions that had no primary factor loading of ≥ .75 and / or a 
cross-loading of ≥ .45 on any of the three components. The eight omitted dimensions were: 
‘incompetent-competent’, ‘unintelligent-smart’, ‘masculine-feminine’, ‘communal-
individualistic’, ‘typical (in the U.S.)-unusual (in the U.S.)’, ‘unfriendly-friendly’, ‘intolerant-
tolerant’, and ‘unable-skillful’. The third step validated the simple structure and no more 
omissions of candidate stereotype content dimensions were necessary.  
Table 3 shows the varimax rotated component loadings of the 16 candidate stereotype 
content dimensions retained in this solution. Based on these component loadings, we composed 
the three combined candidate stereotype content dimensions agency / socio-economic success 
(A; ‘powerless-powerful’, ‘poor-wealthy’, ‘low status-high status’, ‘dominated-dominating’, 
‘unconfident-confident’, and ‘unassertive-competitive’; α = .955), conservative-progressive 
beliefs (B; ‘traditional-modern’, ‘religious-science-oriented’, ‘conventional-alternative’, and 
‘conservative-liberal’; α = .900), and communion (C; ‘cold-warm’, ‘untrustworthy-
trustworthy’, ‘dishonest-sincere’, ‘repellent-likable’, ‘threatening-benevolent’, and ‘egoistic-
altruistic’; α = .953)1. For short, the analysis yielded the dimensions A, B, and C. A and B were 
                                       
1 Each subdimension of our 3 combined candidate stereotype content dimensions was rated by 
different people. It might be argued that valid estimates of the social groups’ A, B, and C 
requires judging the groups on all subcomponents of A, B, and C at once, as the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts. To address this possibility, 79 MTurkers (36 women, 43 men; M = 
32.46 years, SD = 10.04) were paid 1$ to rate the 80 groups on compound items of A, n = 25, 
ICC(2,k) = .96, B, n = 27, ICC(2,k)  = .95, or C, n = 27, ICC(2,k) = .92. Each of the 
corresponding 0-100 slider scale items was anchored with a meaning cloud of all sub-
dimensions that are included in the combined items. All compound items showed very high 
convergence with the combined items, rs  .97, ps < .001, and all analyses reported below led 
to identical conclusions if compound rather than combined items were used. 
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almost but not entirely orthogonal, r = -.29, p < .01; A and C were orthogonal, r = .07, p = .55; 
B and C were orthogonal, r = -.01, p = .90. 
 
Table 3 
Factor Loadings and Interpretation of the 16 Retained Dimensions in Study 1c 
Candidate  
stereotype content dimension 
1st component:  
Agency (A) 
2rd component: 
Beliefs (B) 
3nd component: 
Communion (C) 
Powerless-Powerful .940 -.097 .102 
Dominated-Dominating .928 -.205 -.150 
Low status-High status .924 -.097 .284 
Poor-Wealthy .905 -.015 .019 
Unconfident-Confident .873 -.174 .034 
Unassertive-Competitive .808 .032 -.247 
Traditional-Modern -.124 .964 .143 
Religious-Science-oriented  .313 .855 .044 
Conventional-Alternative  -.417 .819 -.234 
Conservative-Liberal  -.445 .815 .141 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy .081 -.014 .953 
Dishonest-Sincere -.022 .025 .936 
Repellent-Likable .226 .033 .913 
Threatening-Benevolent .167 .103 .910 
Cold-Warm -.178 .068 .909 
Egoistic-Altruistic -.417 -.067 .790 
 
Note. Bold factor loadings are significant at p =< .001. 
 
To compare the suitability of A, B, and C for interpreting the social groups’ 1D, 2D, 
and 3D dissimilarity space, we carried out a series of nine multiple linear regressions with the 
groups’ mean A, B, and C as criterion and their x-, x- / y-, and x- / y- / z-coordinates in the 1D, 
2D, and 3D space as predictors, respectively (Forgas, 1976; Rosenberg et al., 1968; Shaver et 
al., 1987). Figuratively speaking, each of these nine property fitting analyses (ProFit; Chang & 
Carroll, 1969; e.g., Pattyn et al., 2013) finds out how much the location of groups in the 1D, 
2D, or 3D dissimilarity spaces can be mapped onto either A, B, or C by means of rotating the 
dissimilarity spaces. Ideally, in the 1D group space, consisting of one axis, the groups’ 
coordinates (consisting of scores on the single axis) correlate as high as R(1D axis) = 1 with 
only A, B, or C. For example, if R(1D axis) = 1 for A, but R(1D axis) = 0 for B and C, then A 
is maximally suitable as an axial interpretation of the groups’ 1D space, accounting for 100% 
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of the dissimilarity variance in this space. To account for 100% of the dissimilarity variance in 
the groups’ 2D space, consisting of two axes, two orthogonal candidate stereotype content 
dimensions with R(2D axis) = 1 need to be fitted, because each axis should map onto one of the 
two stereotype content dimension. If so, these two can be interpreted as the two primary 
independent stereotype content dimensions on which people spontaneously judged the 
dissimilarities between the 80 social groups. This reasoning can be generalized to higher 
dimensions (e.g., 3 axes). 
Table 4 shows the results2. The higher a multiple correlation R(1D axis), R(2D axis), 
and R(3D axis), the more suitable was the corresponding candidate stereotype content 
dimension as an axial interpretation of the 1D, 2D, and 3D social group space, respectively. In 
Study 1, A, R(2D axis) = .72, p < .001, and B, R(2D axis) = .91, p < .001, were almost 
maximally suitable axial interpretations of the 2D group space (see also Figure 1), whereas C 
was not suitable as an axial interpretation of the 2D space, R(2D axis) = .23, p = .13. 
                                       
2 The results of (24 * 3 =) 72 multiple linear regressions with the social groups’ means on each 
of the 24 candidate stereotype content dimensions as the criterion and the groups’ coordinates 
in their 1D, 2D and 3D dissimilarity spaces as predictors are shown in Appendix A, and are 
consistent with Table 4. 
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Table 4 
 
      
Property Fitting Results for Studies 1-4 
 Group  
sample 
Stereotype  
content 
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Study 
1 
80 U.S. Agency (A) .615 .715 .842 .419 .456 .426 
  Beliefs (B) .677 .904 .935 -.116 -.060 -.037 
  Communion (C) .162 .229 .468 .358 .406 .415 
         
Study 
2 
80 U.S. Agency (A) .766 .812 .898 .069 .183 .234 
  Beliefs (B) .720 .812 .954 -.035 .076 .017 
  Communion (C) .071 .175 .236 .562 .580 .581 
         
Study 
3 
76 German Agency (A) .821 .903 .909 .283 .272 .334 
  Beliefs (B) .257 .857 .831 -.372 -.187 -.174 
  Communion (C) .502 .464 .479 .783 .745 .727 
         
Study 
4 
80 U.S. Agency (A) .856 .893 .893 .221 .208 .222 
  Beliefs (B) .339 .848 .890 .015 .009 .010 
  Communion (C) .205 .375 .622 .482 .506 .477 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 80/76 U.S./German social 
groups’ agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion 
ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 1D, 2D, and 3D 
dissimilarity space in Studies 1-4; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the groups’ A, B, 
and C ratings and their proximity to the origin of these spaces. Bold correlations are significant 
at p =< .001. 
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Figure 1 
 
Note. Study 1 (U.S. participants and target social groups): This 2D space of 80 representatively 
sampled social groups was computed based on pairwise dissimilarity ratings, and can be 
interpreted by agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs. 
Communion emerges within these two dimensions. Groups that are average on A and B are 
perceived as more communal (the 40 most communal social groups are bold), whereas groups 
that are extreme on A and B are perceived as less communal (the 40 least communal social 
groups are not bold). 
 
Table 4 also shows the correlations r(1D pole), r(2D pole) and r(3D pole), the extent to 
which the 80 social groups’ proximity to the origin of their 1D, 2D and 3D space related to their 
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score on A, B, and C, respectively. The closer to the origin a group is positioned, the higher 
that group scores on the respective dimension, resulting in a positive correlation. In the 2D 
space, to some extent this was the case for A and C, but not for B. Especially C was interesting, 
because it was not a maximally suitable axial interpretation of the 2D space. So, to some extent 
C was suitable as a polar interpretation of the 2D space, r(2D pole) = .41, p < .001, emerging 
from the two axes that represent A and B. That is, the more average a group on A and B, the 
more communal it was stereotyped to be; the more extreme a group on A and B, the less 
communal it was stereotyped to be. 
Discussion 
We refrained from pre-selecting candidate stereotype content dimensions as well as 
social groups because we wanted to identify the dimensions that people spontaneously use to 
distinguish between groups sampled without bias. The results showed that the first two of these 
spontaneously used stereotype content dimensions can be interpreted as 
agency / socio-economic success (A) and conservative-progressive beliefs (B), because the 
statistical fit of A and B modelled as axes of the 2D group space was almost maximal and far 
better than the statistical fit of C as an axis, and A, B and C as poles at the origin of the 2D 
space. Unexpectedly, this data-driven A and B space (see Figure 1) was different from the 
warmth and competence space (Fiske et al., 2002).  
Although one of the identified principal components, which we labeled agency / 
socio-economic success, seemed to align somewhat with the competence dimension in the SCM 
(Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), we decided against labelling it that way. Recent research 
suggested that stereotypic competence and stereotypic agency are distinct, and that agency is 
more related to socio-economic success than to competence in the sense of ability (Carrier, 
Louvet, Chauvin, & Rohmer, 2013). Indeed, the items that loaded on the principal component 
in question (i.e., power, dominance, status, wealth, confidence, and competiveness) seemed to 
reflect agency better than competence. The items that reflected competence in the sense of 
ability (i.e., smartness, skill, and competence) either did not load strongly on this component or 
showed substantial cross-loadings on other components and were thus excluded. In other words, 
a janitor might be very smart and highly skilled, but would lack status and wealth. Conversely, 
a manager has high status and wealth, but might not be smart and skilled. 
This alone, of course, can be an artefact of the item list we started from. However, a 
property fitting analysis with the 24 single items also suggested that wealth, power, dominance, 
and status are statistically better fitting single candidate stereotype content dimensions than 
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smartness, skill, and competence, and that confidence and competitiveness are statistically 
better fitting candidate stereotype content dimensions than skill and competence (see Appendix 
A). Based on these results we propose agency / socio-economic success and not competence as 
one of the fundamental stereotype content dimensions on which people distinguish social 
groups.  
We labeled the second dimension conservative-progressive beliefs. Judgments of how 
traditional versus modern, how conventional versus alternative, how conservative versus 
liberal, and how religious versus science-oriented the groups are loaded high on this dimension; 
we thus concluded that it captures socially shared convictions about groups’ conservative-
progressive beliefs. The discovery of this dimension underlines the usefulness and necessity of 
data-driven approaches because few theories have previously addressed what a group believes 
in as relevant for stereotyping. Participants seem to systematically differentiate groups on the 
basis of them either striving to keep up traditions / preserving the status quo (e.g., conservatives, 
religious, Republicans) or striving to overcome traditions / altering the status quo (e.g., gays, 
atheists, liberals). In a sense, much like warmth in the stereotype content model is 
conceptualized as informative of mainstream society’s views about a group’s intention to help 
/ care versus harm / neglect, conservative-progressive beliefs are informative of mainstream 
society’s views about a group’s intention to preserve versus change the status quo.  
This finding is in line with Jones and Ashmore (1973) and Pattyn and colleagues (2013), 
who found a similar dimensions (modern – backward and alternative – conventional, 
respectively) using a theory-driven selection of stimuli (e.g., an image of a punk and an elderly 
person). Our findings are thus the first to establish the centrality of this dimension for 
distinguishing between representatively sampled social groups. 
The dimension of conservative-progressive beliefs is also compatible with fundamental 
dimensions from other areas of psychology. On the level of personality traits, the Big 5 factor 
openness to experience (McCrae & Costa, 1987; McCrae & John, 1992) taps into a similar 
construct, and this personality trait has been identified as one of the central predictors of 
political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Moreover, one of the two 
central dimensions on which human values can be positioned is openness to change (self-
direction, stimulation) vs. conservation (security, conformity, tradition; Schwartz, 1994; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990). In U.S. society this dimension has received increasing 
attention over the recent years, leading some scholars to speak of a divide or even polarization 
between liberal and conservative camps (Brewer, 2005; Haidt, 2012).  
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Of the three combined candidate stereotype content dimensions that we composed, 
communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; highly akin to the dimension warmth in the SCM; Fiske 
et al., 2007) did not appear to be one of the two stereotype content dimensions that participants 
most often used to judge the dissimilarities between the 80 social groups. Importantly, this was 
not due to the fact that the groups’ C (trustworthiness, sincerity, warmth, benevolence, 
likeability, and altruism) ratings were unreliable. In fact, the reliability was very high for all 
sub-dimensions of stereotypic C, ICC(2,k) >= .84 (McGraw & Wong, 1996; Shrout & Fleiss, 
1979). This contrasts with the pivotal role of communion/warmth  in existing theories of 
stereotype content (Fiske et al., 2002, Cuddy et al., 2007), and also in theories of social 
perception in general (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014).  
Despite this lack of support for C as one of the first two spontaneously employed 
stereotype content dimensions, we found support for C as emerging from the first two 
spontaneously employed stereotype content dimensions. Specifically, groups positioned closer 
to the origin of the 2D A and B space were judged as relatively more communal. Therefore, 
highly communal groups were seen as neither too rich, nor too poor, as well as neither too 
conservative, nor too progressive. Less communal groups were peripheral (see groups marked 
in blue in Figure 1), whereas more communal groups were central (see groups marked in red in 
Figure 1). This finding reconciles our 2D solution with existing models that consider communal 
attributes to be fundamental to stereotype content: Study 1 suggests that communion is encoded 
by the two stereotype content dimensions that we refer to as A and B in a non-linear way.  
In sum, Study 1 suggests that fundamental stereotype content about social groups can 
be described by a two-dimensional space spanned by A and B from which communion emerges 
as a function of centrality within that space (see Figure 1). At this point, we cannot be certain 
that this 2D ABC (agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and 
communion) stereotype content model provides a full description of the dimensions that people 
spontaneously used for judging the dissimilarities between the representatively sampled groups. 
Most problematically, the goodness of scaling fit of the groups’ 3D coordinates was more than 
slightly better than the scaling fit of the groups’ 2D coordinates, suggesting that the 2D ABC 
model misses a third spontaneously used stereotype content dimension. Based on that C was a 
moderately suitable axial interpretation of the social groups’ 3D space, this third dimension 
could be C (note that C can at the same time be a third independent dimension and emerge from 
centrality on the first two). Further, according to Kruskal and Wish (1978), a scaling fit of S <= 
.20, <= .15, <= .10, <= .05 and <= .025 is poor, sufficient, satisfactory, good and excellent, 
respectively. Using these criteria we have to concede that neither the 2D nor the 3D solution 
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showed a sufficient fit. Although the 4D space met this standard (S = .15), the improvement 
was only marginal compared to the 3D solution. These findings suggest two aspects. First, 
people based their group dissimilarity judgments primarily but not solely on A and B. Second, 
the dimensions they employed additionally are not consensually shared to the degree that they 
form more than one orthogonal dimension that explains a noteworthy increase in explained 
dissimilarity variance. 
To a certain degree, this was a consequence – and an advantage – of our design. Each 
participant judged the dissimilarity of only ~ 2.5% of all unique pairs of social groups, and thus 
each participant judged dissimilarity in a highly different context. This might have added 
additional noise to the data because dissimilarity (i.e., the way it is construed) varies as a 
function of context of judgment (Goldstone, Medin, & Halberstadt, 1997; Krumhansl, 1978; 
Tversky, 1977). The sequential, pairwise mode of dissimilarity judgment also could have 
encouraged people to switch between many circumstantial stereotype content dimensions rather 
than to stick with the essential ones. The advantage lies in that the context of judgment is so 
variable across participants that it could not have constrained the outcome of judgment to any 
dimension. The fact that we nevertheless obtained at least two meaningful dimensions speaks 
to the centrality of these.  
Another factor that might have contributed to the non-optimal scaling fit might lie in the 
repetitive nature of making 80 pairwise dissimilarity judgments sequentially. It is conceivable 
that the repetitive nature of the task tempted our online participants to pay increasingly less 
attention and thus added noise to the data. In our next study, we aimed to ameliorate these 
problems by employing a more stimulating research design in which participants judged the 
dissimilarities between large arrays of social groups simultaneously. Such an alternative to the 
classic pairwise method has recently been proposed as the spatial arrangement method (SpAM; 
Hout et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
Study 2 
 
Consistent with the geometric model of similarity (Carroll & Wish, 1974; Nosofsky, 
1992; Torgerson, 1965), the spatial arrangement method (SpAM; Hout et al., 2013; see also 
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Goldstone, 1994; Koch et al., 2016a; Kriegeskorte & Mur, 2012) rests on the assumption that 
people can reliably and validly sort attitude objects in a way that more dissimilar attitude objects 
are located further apart. To illustrate, Goldstone (1994) presented participants with multiple 
variants of the letter A (in different font styles) all at once and in random locations on the 
computer screen. Their task was to use the computer mouse to “move the letters around so that 
letters that are similar to each other are close. The more similar two letters are, the closer they 
should be” (Goldstone, 1994, p.382). The distances between the spatially arranged letters 
correlated strongly with sequential, pairwise dissimilarity judgments collected from a different 
sample of people (see also Hout et al., 2013; Koch et al., 2016a). Thus, sequential, pairwise 
judgment and SpAM seem to be equally effective ways to measure inter-stimulus dissimilarity. 
The advantage of SpAM is that it is a lot more efficient, because the dragging-and-dropping of 
a single attitude object simultaneously adjusts the distances between that attitude object and all 
other attitude objects on the dissimilarity map. In fact, with the help of SpAM, people are able 
to assess the entire pattern of dissimilarities between dozens of attitude objects in a quick, easy, 
and re-adjustable way, because all attitude objects can be moved to a different location on the 
dissimilarity map at all times during the task. Thus, SpAM is ideal to improve on the design of 
Study 1. Based on the results of Study 1, we hypothesized that people would spontaneously use 
the stereotype content dimensions A and B to spatially arrange the dissimilarities between the 
80 social groups. We expected C to – again – emerge as a function of centrality in the 
two-dimensional space spanned by the other two dimensions. Together, these findings would 
further support our 2D ABC model of stereotype content. 
Methods 
Participants and stimuli. We paid 131 MTurkers (67 women, 64 men; M = 34.74 years, 
SD = 11.84) $1 to “sort 40 social groups on the computer screen”. They received a random 
sample of 40 out of the 80 groups chosen as representative of U.S. society in Study 1. 
Procedure. On the first screen slide, participants read "Dear participant, your task is to 
sort 40 social groups based on how similar / dissimilar they are. The social groups will appear 
in the middle of the screen one at a time, and you can drag-and-drop them at any time to change 
their location on the screen. Please sort the social groups in such a way that more similar social 
groups are more close to each other, while more dissimilar social groups are more distant to 
each other. That is, please use the social groups to draw a map in which greater proximity means 
greater similarity, and in which greater distance means greater dissimilarity”. After clicking on 
an “I understand” button, the button disappeared, and a randomly selected group appeared in 
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the middle of the screen. Once that group was dragged to another location on the screen, the 
button reappeared as a “Next social group” button in the center of the screen bottom, and with 
a click on the button the next randomly selected group appeared in the middle of the screen, 
and the button disappeared again. This procedure was repeated until all 40 groups were 
positioned on the screen. After the 40th group was arranged on the dissimilarity map, the button 
changed to “I finished” (see Appendix K). Upon clicking this button, the dissimilarity distances 
between the groups were recorded as proportions of the greatest possible distance – the screen 
diagonal.  
Results 
First, we computed the mean distance – that is, the mean dissimilarity – for each of the 
3160 unique pairs of social groups across all people who had dragged-and-dropped that pair (M 
= 32.19, SD = 4.94). Next, we subjected the mean dissimilarities to MDS (with the same 
parameter values as in Study 1. The goodness of fit of the 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, and 6D scaling 
solutions are shown in Table 2. Balancing goodness of scaling and ease of interpretation, as in 
Study 1, we proceeded with the 1D, 2D, and 3D group spaces.  
To compare the suitability of the social groups’ stereotypic A, B, and C for interpreting 
the groups’ 1D, 2D, and 3D space, as in Study 1, we again carried out nine multiple linear 
regressions with the groups’ means on A, B, and C from Study 1 as the criterion and the groups’ 
coordinates in the 1D, 2D, and 3D space as predictors, respectively. The results are shown in 
Table 43. As in Study 1, A, R(2D axis) = .81, p < .001, and B, R(2D axis) = .81, p < .001, were 
the most and almost maximally suitable axial interpretations of the 2D space (see Figure 2), 
whereas C was not a suitable axial interpretation of the 2D space, R(2D axis) = .18, p = .30. 
Table 4 also shows the linear relations between the groups’ A, B, and C and the groups’ 
proximity to the origin of their 1D, 2D, and 3D space. As in Study 1, C was a suitable polar 
interpretation of the 2D space, r(2D pole) = .58, p < .001, whereas A and B were not. The same 
pattern of results was found for the groups’ 3D space.   
Figure 2 
                                       
3 The results of separate analyses for the 24 candidate stereotype dimensions are shown in 
Appendix B, and are consistent with Table 4. 
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Note. Study 2 (U.S. participants and target social groups): This 2D space of 80 representatively 
sampled social groups was computed based on spatially arranged dissimilarity distances, and 
can be interpreted by agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs. 
Communion emerges within these two dimensions. Groups that are average on A and B are 
perceived as more communal (the 40 most communal social groups are bold), whereas groups 
that are extreme on A and B are perceived as less communal (the 40 least communal social 
groups are not bold). 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
86 
 
In Study 2, participants spatially arranged sequentially appearing social groups on the 
two-dimensional screen (more dissimilar groups had to be positioned further apart). Our results 
show that given two dimensions to distinguish between the groups, people used A and B, but 
not C; as in Study 1, C again emerged as a function of centrality within the stereotype content 
space spanned by A and B (see Figure 2). Thus, our results provided further support for the 
2D ABC model identified in Study 1. First, the suitability of A and B as axial interpretations of 
the 2D group space was almost maximal, while C was not a suitable axial interpretation of the 
2D space. Second, the suitability of C as a polar interpretation of the 2D space was substantial 
and higher than in Study 1, while A and B were not suitable as polar interpretations of the 2D 
space. Third, the suitability of A and B as axial interpretations of the 2D space was higher than 
the suitability of C as a polar interpretation of the 2D space. And fourth, the scaling fit of the 
groups’ 2D coordinates was sufficient (S <= .15; see Table 2).  
As in Study 1, the scaling fit of the social groups’ 3D coordinates was better than the 
scaling fit of the social groups’ 2D coordinates, suggesting that the 2D ABC model missed a 
third independent stereotype content dimension (in the 2D ABC model, C is not an independent 
dimension, because it emerges as a function of centrality within the stereotype content space 
spanned by A and B). However, in contrast to Study 1, Study 2 showed no evidence that this 
third independent dimension might be described as C. Based on our data, we could not 
adequately interpret the third independent dimension (if there is any). Therefore, the more 
parsimonious 2D ABC model was the best available interpretation of the stereotype content 
dimensions that people spontaneously used to spatially arrange the dissimilarities between the 
80 representative U.S. groups. In other words, Study 2 confirmed that the two most fundamental 
dimensions of stereotype content can be described as A and B, and that C can be described to 
emerge from A and B, and not vice versa. Specifically, the more average a social group on A 
and B, the more communal it was stereotyped to be; in contrast, the more extreme a social group 
on A and B, the less communal it was stereotyped to be. 
Both Study 1 and 2 recruited Amazon.com Mechanical Turk workers as participants, 
because their demographics have repeatedly been shown to be relatively more population-
representative than the demographics of other convenience samples such as university students 
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & 
Hackett, 2013; Mason & Suri, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Nevertheless, one 
could argue that the results might be specific to our participant sample. Despite their greater 
representativeness in terms of age, education, and income, MTurkers might constitute a biased 
sample in terms of other variables like affinity with computers. Even more relevant, the 
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population of the U.S. is not representative of other nations. The strong topicality of the divide 
between two political camps in the U.S. (Brewer, 2005; Layman & Carsey, 2002; McCarty, 
Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006) might have increased the salience and accessibility of the 
conservative-progressive beliefs dimension. We thus sought to bolster the generalizability of 
our 2D ABC model by replicating it in a different culture. 
 
Study 3 
 
Study 3 replicated Study 2 with German rather than U.S. American participants. 
Methods and results 
Study 3a: Naming social groups in Germany. We collected data from 178 online 
participants contacted through an e-mail list of individuals interested in participating in studies 
at the University of Cologne (119 women, 53 men; M = 26.35 years, SD = 6.11). They were 
offered a chance to win one of five vouchers (€20) for a large online retailer. In the top half of 
the first screen slide, they read the same instructions (in German) as the people who named 
social groups in Study 1. In the bottom half, they entered 40 social groups into 40 text boxes. 
Table 5 shows all 76 social groups named by more than 10% of all people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
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Most Frequently Named Social Groups (Consensus  10%) in Germany in Study 3a 
1st - 20th  
most frequent 
21st - 40th  
most frequent 
41st - 60th  
most frequent 
61st - 76th  
most frequent 
Students (70%) Christians (27%) Adults (20%) Germans (14%) 
Children (58%) Foreigners (27%) Drug addicts (20%) Goths (13%) 
Employed (56%) Religious (27%) Catholics (19%) Alcoholics (13%) 
Unemployed (56%) Academics (26%) Conservatives (19%) Single parents (13%) 
Young (47%) Homosexuals (26%) Self-employed (18%) Rightists (12%) 
Pupils (46%) Musicians (26%) Welfare recipients 
(18%) (17%) 
Sick (12%) 
Pensioners (44%) Jews (24%) Criminals (18%) Nazis (12%) 
Muslims (38%) Trainees (24%) Lower class (16%) Blue collar (11%) 
Officials (37%) Parents (23%) Upper class (16%) Hip-Hopper (11%) 
Workers (36%) Vegans (22%) Leftists (16%) Emos (11%) 
Athletes (34%) Hipsters (22%) Rural (16%) Scientists (11%) 
Politicians (33%) Singles (22%) Economic-liberals 
(16%) 
Right-wing extremists 
(11%) Migrants (33%) Teachers (21%) Employers (16%) Rockers (11%) 
Artists (31%) Atheists (21%) Car drivers (15%) Managers (11%) 
Middle class (31%) Vegetarians (20%) Nerds (15%) Bicycle drivers (10%) 
Punks (30%) Poor (20%) Educated (15%) Soccer players (10%) 
Elderly (30%) Urban (20%) Buddhists (15%)  
Disabled (29%) Doctors (20%) Hippies(15%)  
Rich (29%) Heterosexuals (20%) Environmentalists 
(15%) 
 
Homeless (28%) Families (20%) Celebrities (14%)  
 
Note. Percentage in parentheses is proportion of participants who spontaneously named this 
group as a social group that is representative of the structure of German society. 
 
Study 3b: Dissimilarity arrangement of 76 groups. Another 69 students were 
recruited on the campus of the University of Cologne (47 women, 22 men; M = 23.37 years, 
SD = 4.53) to participate in a lab study for a small monetary compensation (€2). Their 
instructions were the same as in Study 2 (in German), namely to spatially arrange a random 
sample of 50 of the 76 social groups. More similar groups had to be placed more close to one 
another, and more dissimilar social groups had to be placed further apart from one another.  
As in the previous spatial arrangement study we subjected the mean distances for each 
of the 2850 unique pairs of social groups (average number of raters per pair M = 29.23, 
SD = 5.15) to MDS (same settings as in Studies 1 and 2). The goodness of fit of the 1D, 2D, 
3D, 4D, 5D and 6D scaling solutions are shown in Table 2. Balancing goodness of scaling fit 
and ease of interpretation, we extracted, analyzed, and interpreted only the 1D and 2D social 
group spaces, because the scree plots of S and 1-R² showed that extracting a third and higher 
dimensions did only to a slight degree improve S and R². Nevertheless, to better compare 
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Study 3 with Studies 1 and 2, we extracted and analyzed a third dimension, but refrained from 
interpreting the respective 3D group space.  
Study 3c: Disambiguating the dissimilarity arrangement. Finally, 60 other 
participants recruited on the campus of the University of Cologne (41 women, 19 men; 
M = 22.55 years, SD = 4.55) received a piece of candy to participate in a lab-study to rate the 
76 social groups on compound A, B, or C. Twenty participants rated all groups on a slider scale 
ranging from 1 (‘low power / low status / low dominance / low confidence’) to 100 (‘high power 
/ high status / high dominance / high confidence’), measuring stereotypic A, ICC(2, k) = .965, 
twenty different participants rated all social groups’ B on an identical scale with the anchors 
‘traditional / religious / conservative / conventional – modern / faithless / liberal / alternative’; 
ICC(2, k) = .912, and a third group rated all social groups’ C (‘low trustworthiness / low 
sincerity / low benevolence / low likability – high trustworthiness / high sincerity / high 
benevolence / high likability’), ICC(2, k) = .952. A and C were correlated, r = .32, p < .01; A 
and B were orthogonal, r = -.10, p = .41; and B and C were orthogonal, r = .08, p = .49. 
Employing the same property fitting strategy as in the previous studies suggested that 
A, R(2D axis) = .90, p < .001, and B, R(2D axis) = .86, p < .001, were far better axial 
interpretations of the 2D social group space than C, R(2D axis) = .38, p < .001 (see Table 4 and 
Figure 3). As in Study 2, C was a suitable polar interpretation of the 2D space, r(2D pole) = 
.75, p < .001, whereas A and B were not. The same pattern of results was found for the groups’ 
3D space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Note. Study 3 (German participants and target social groups): This 2D space of 
76 representatively sampled social groups was computed based on spatially arranged 
dissimilarity distances, and can be interpreted by agency / socio-economic success and 
conservative-progressive beliefs. Communion emerges within these two dimensions. Groups 
that are average on A and B are perceived as more communal (the 40 most communal social 
groups are bold), whereas social groups that are extreme on A and B are perceived as less 
communal (the 40 least communal social groups are not bold). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
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Study 3 was set in another national context (Germany), and we used another type of 
sample (mostly university students) and another research setting (Studies 3b and 3c were 
conducted in the lab rather than online). The scaling fit of the social groups’ 2D coordinates 
was again sufficient (S <= .15) and did not markedly improve with the addition of another 
dissimilarity dimension. Thus, modelling a third independent stereotype content dimension was 
nonessential. Overall, Study 3 supported the 2D ABC stereotype content model identified in 
Studies 1 and 2 (see Figure 3), and also refined it, potentially due to reduced noise in the data. 
Specifically, A was found to be more fundamental than B, as in the groups’ 1D space (already 
accounting for 75% of the original spatially arranged dissimilarity variance) A was a suitable 
axial interpretation, whereas B was not. B only accompanied A as a suitable axial interpretation 
in the 2D space. Because A and B were more suitable axial interpretations of the 2D space 
compared to the suitability of C as a polar interpretation of the 2D space, the primary and 
secondary fundamental stereotype content dimensions should be interpreted as A and B, 
respectively. Further, the suitability of C as a polar interpretation was already maximal in the 
1D space, which, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2, suggests that C is primarily a function of not 
being too high or too low on A (i.e., C can be inferred from A, but not from B; see blue and red 
social groups in Figure 3). 
Study 3 thus refined the conclusions drawn from Studies 1 and 2 and at the same time 
strengthened the empirical base of the proposed 2D ABC model of stereotype content. Our 
results became increasingly clear from Study 1 to Studies 2 and 3, speaking to the usefulness 
of employing the spatial arrangement method. In particular, if participants are confined to a 
two-dimensional space, they use A and B to organize the social groups, while C emerges as a 
non-linear function of A but not B. 
Verticality, horizontality, and centrality metaphors as possible alternative explanations 
Despite this, there may also be pitfalls in using this method. It is conceivable that 
semantic concepts are intrinsically associated with spatial locations. One example is that the 
concept of power is commonly found to be intuitively represented vertically with high power 
on the top and low power on the bottom (Schubert, 2005; see also Meier & Robinson, 2004; 
Slepian, Masicampo, & Ambady, 2015). Specifically, words representing high vs. low power 
(e.g., employer vs. employee) can be more rapidly identified as connoting high vs. low power 
when they are presented in the metaphorically corresponding area of a screen (top for high 
power, bottom for low power; Schubert, 2005). Likewise, people presented at the top of the 
screen are perceived to be more powerful (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 
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2007; Giessner & Schubert, 2007). Thus, the vertical nature of the spatial arrangement board 
could have primed people to construe the dissimilarities between the social groups with respect 
to their stereotypic agency / socio-economic success.  
A similar argument could be made for the belief dimension. Going back to the seating 
arrangement in legislative bodies during the French revolution era, progressives are often 
referred to as left-wing, whereas conservative beliefs are referred to as right-wing. Importantly, 
this is not only an abstract reference but horizontal positions on the left or the right are 
intuitively connected with the corresponding political attitudes (Farias, Garrido, & Semin, 
2013; Oppenheimer & Trail, 2010; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2010). The horizontal 
nature of the spatial arrangement board could thus have primed people to construe the 
dissimilarities between the social groups with respect to their conservative-progressive beliefs 
and sort the groups accordingly.  
Finally, even the position of high communal groups in the center and low communal 
groups near the margin of the screen could be construed as merely reflecting an instance of 
embodied semantics or metaphors. The center often stands for relevant ingroups, whereas 
outgroups are labelled as (in this case literally) peripheral. Moreover, motivated explanations 
are conceivable. Pushing unpleasant (i.e., unfriendly and cold) groups to the margin of the 
screen and keeping the friendly and warm groups in the center of frequent attention could be 
experienced as more pleasant than the opposite. Alternatively, being motivated to keep the most 
frequent, typical, and familiar groups in the center of frequent attention could explain why high 
and low communal groups were positioned in the center and at the margins, respectively, 
because “what is typical is good” (Sofer, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Todorov, 2015). 
To test whether these confounds are, at least in principal, a problem, we correlated the 
social groups’ spatially arranged average verticality (higher values: more upwards), 
horizontality (higher values: more rightwards), and centrality (higher values: more inwards) 
with the social groups’ A, B, and C ratings, respectively. In line with spatial metaphors, more 
agentic social groups were positioned further upwards, rStudy 2 = .74, p < .001, rStudy 3 = .60, 
p < .001; and, more communal social groups were positioned further inwards, rStudy 2 = .52, p < 
.001, rStudy 3 = .69, p < .001. Contradicting a spatial metaphor, more liberal (conservative) social 
groups were not positioned further leftwards (rightwards), rStudy 2 = .03, p = .78, rStudy 3 = -.23, p 
= .04.  
Although the social groups’ spatially arranged coordinates cannot explain our empirical 
support for the B dimension, and although the spatial A, B, and C metaphors account cannot 
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explain the highly convergent findings of Study 1 that did not use a spatial arrangement task, 
in Study 4 we sought to rule out spatial metaphors of A, B, and C and motivational forces as 
alternative explanations for the results obtained in Studies 2 and 3. 
Another caveat that we sought to address in Study 4 refers to how participants decided 
on the criterion to estimate the dissimilarities between the social groups. Participants relied on 
group differences that map well on the groups’ A and B. This can be interpreted as evidence 
that A and B are the two fundamental and thus most important stereotype content dimensions. 
It is also possible that the employed dimensions are not the most important but merely the most 
convenient, either because they are most accessible (which could be seen as an indirect indicator 
of importance), or because their metaphorical spatial representation conveniently maps on the 
spatial nature of the arrangement task. We sought to address this caveat by introducing a more 
explicit judgment of dimension importance. Specifically, in Study 4, we explicitly asked 
participants to label the first and second most fundamental stereotype content dimensions prior 
to the spatial arrangement task. This also helped addressing the issue of order of importance. 
 
Study 4 
 
Study 4 presented people with a sample of 40 groups, and asked them to specify the two 
person characteristics (i.e., stereotype content dimensions) that they thought best capture the 
dissimilarities between the social groups. Asking them to prioritize between the two allowed us 
to get an empirical hold on which dimension is seen as more primary than the other. Then, 
people judged the social groups precisely on the two dimensions that they had just selected as 
the most important ways to stereotypically compare the groups by spatially arranging them. 
Importantly, the first named dimension always had to be arranged on the horizontal dimension 
of the screen, thereby undermining spontaneous mapping on metaphorically corresponding 
dimensions (assuming that A would be most primary and thus mapped horizontally instead of 
vertically as in the previous studies). Based on the 2D ABC model, we expected people to 
specify stereotype content dimensions with a high relation to both A and B, and with a low 
relation to C.  
Method 
Participants and stimuli. We paid 66 MTurkers (31 women, 35 men; M = 32.86 years, 
SD = 10.81) $1 to “rate 40 social groups on 2 dimensions of your choice”. People spatially 
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arranged a random sample of 40 of the 80 social groups that are representative of the structure 
of the U.S. society (see Study 1). 
Procedure. In the middle of the first screen slide, people were presented with a table 
that showed 40 social groups in 10 rows and 4 columns. At the top, they read: “Dear participant, 
please name the person characteristic that best describes the differences and similarities 
between these 40 social groups. Ideally, you should be able to divide the 40 social groups into 
10+ low scorers, 10+ average scorers and 10+ high scorers on this characteristic. Please enter 
this characteristic in the text box below [this instruction]”. At the bottom, they read: “Now, 
please name another person characteristic that well describes the differences and similarities 
between these 40 social groups. Again, you should be able to divide the 40 social groups into 
10+ low scorers, 10+ average scorers and 10+ high scorers on this other characteristic. Please 
enter this other (= not the same as above!) characteristic in the text box below [this instruction]”. 
On the second screen slide, participants read: “Dear participant, your next task is to position the 
40 social groups on the computer screen. More specifically, on the next slide the 40 social 
groups will appear in the middle of the screen, and your task is to drag-and-drop each social 
group to a different position on the screen. Please make use of the entire screen and position 
the social groups as follows. For the first person characteristic that you specified ( [whatever 
they had typed in first]): position the low scorers on the left of the screen, position the average 
scorers in between the left and the right, and position the high scorers on the right of the screen. 
For the second person characteristic that you specified ( [whatever they had typed in 
second]): position the low scorers at the bottom of the screen, position the average scorers in 
between the bottom and the top, and position the high scorers at the top of the screen. In sum, 
your task is to plot the 40 groups according to how they differ on [whatever they had typed in 
first] and [whatever they had typed in second]. If you want to exchange these person 
characteristics, you may do so at any time during the positioning task by rephrasing the text 
boxes at the screen edges”. On the third slide the 40 groups appeared in 40 adjacent labels in 
the screen middle. The appearance of the labels and the full screen background was the same 
as in Studies 2 and 3, except for a horizontal axis labeled in accordance with the characteristic 
that the participant had specified first, and a vertical axis labeled in accordance with the 
characteristic that the participant had specified second (see Appendix L). The labeling of the 
axes (“low scorers on …” and “high scorers on …”) could be changed at any time during the 
rating phase. Once all groups were dragged-and-dropped to a different position on the screen, 
an “I finished” button appeared. Upon clicking this button, the computer program rescaled the 
groups’ positions to a quadratic 2D space, and then, as in Studies 2 and 3, the distances between 
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the groups were recorded as a proportion of the greatest possible distance – the diagonal of this 
2D space. 
Results 
We first computed the mean rating distance – that is, the mean dissimilarity – for each 
of the 3610 unique pairs of social groups across all people who had rated that pair (M = 16.02, 
SD = 3.83). These mean dissimilarities were subjected to MDS with the same settings as in 
Studies 1-3. The goodness of fit of the 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D, and 6D scaling solutions are shown 
in Table 2. As in Study 3, to ease comparing Study 4 to the other studies, we extracted and 
analyzed three dimensions, but interpreted only the 1D and 2D group spaces, as the scree plots 
of S and 1-R² showed that extracting a third or higher dimensions did only slightly improve S 
and R² (i.e., modelling a third independent stereotype content dimension was nonessential.). 
Extracting a second dimension did not substantially improve S, but substantially improved R², 
and thus we interpreted the 1D and 2D social group space.  
Identical property fitting analyses as in the previous studies were carried out and 
replicated the findings of Study 3 that A, R(2D axis) = .89, p < .001, and B, R(2D axis) = .85, 
p < .001 (see Table 44), were far better axial interpretations of the 2D social group space 
compared to C, R(2D axis) = .38, p = .003. Replicating Studies 1-3, C was a substantially 
suitable polar interpretation of this 2D space, r(2D pole) = .51, p < .001 – A and B were not. 
More importantly, we sought to address whether the spatial nature of our task might 
have prompted participants to employ metaphorically corresponding stereotype content 
dimensions (A for the vertical dimension, B for the horizontal dimension, C for centrality). As 
participants had to specify two stereotype content dimensions before learning about the spatial 
nature of the rating task, the task could only have influenced participants’ choice of dimensions 
if participants changed the two dimensions once realizing that they had to spatially arrange 
social groups. Tracking such changes in the self-selected dimension labels revealed that this 
happened for only very few cases (around 7%). 
To categorize the self-selected labels according to unambiguous fit with our combined 
candidate stereotype content dimensions, 40 additional MTurkers (18 women, 22 men; 
M = 33.10 years, SD = 8.45) were paid $0.5 to “assign 66 person characteristics” one after the 
other, and they read: “please select the category to which this person characteristic [e.g., 
wealthy] fits best. If this person characteristic does not fit well to any of the categories, check 
                                       
4 Separate property fitting analyses for the original 24 candidate stereotype dimensions show 
results that are highly consistent with Table 4, and that can be seen in Appendix C. 
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‘no match’”. The seven categories available for selection were ‘no match’ plus the polar 
opposites on A, B and C (A+: “powerful / dominating / high status / wealthy / confident / 
competitive”, A-: “powerless / dominated / low status / poor / unconfident / unassertive”, B+: 
“modern / science-oriented / alternative / liberal”, B-: “traditional / religious / conventional / 
conservative”, C+: “trustworthy / sincere / likable / benevolent / warm / altruistic”, and C-: 
“untrustworthy / dishonest / repellent / threatening / cold / egoistic”). 
Participants assigned either the 66 labels chosen by the original participants as the “best” 
description of the differences and similarities between the groups (i.e., the first dimension 
chosen, N = 22), or the 66 labels chosen by the original participants as their second dimension 
(N = 18). For each of the 132 labels, we averaged percentage of assignment to categories A±, 
B±, C±, and ‘no match’, a measure of the labels’ relatedness to A, B, C, and something else, 
respectively. Consistent with the property fitting analyses reported in Studies 1-4, the labels 
related to A (M = 28.35%, SD = 31.21) and B (M = 31.15%, SD = 30.83) to an equal extent, 
F(1, 131) = 0.37, p = .54, ηp2 = .00, 90% CI [.00, .04], related at least by trend more to A than 
to C (M = 21.03%, SD = 22.65), F(1, 131) = 3.69, p = .057, ηp2 = .03, 90% CI [.00, .09], and 
related more to B  than to C, F(1, 131) = 7.43, p < .01, ηp2 = .05, 90% CI [.01, .13]. 
Discussion 
In Study 4, people first named the two stereotype content dimensions that they thought 
best describe the similarities and differences between 40 randomly selected social groups from 
our full set of 80 groups from Study 1. A relatively large number of given dimensions did not 
fit either of our combined ABC candidate dimensions unambiguously. Yet, for those that did, 
agency / socio-economic success was consensually seen as the most fundamental dimension to 
describe similarities and differences between groups, and conservative-progressive beliefs was 
named as the second most important dimension. Subsequently, people spatially arranged the 
groups on a rating board with x- and y-axes labeled precisely according to the two stereotype 
content dimensions that they had just named. During this task, people were free to re-label one 
or both of the stereotype content dimensions that they had named before. The very low 
frequency of re-labeling showed that most participants stuck to the originally named 
dimensions, which thus cannot be prompted by the spatial nature of the sorting task. 
Nevertheless, the two most suitable axial interpretations of the 2D social group space were 
again A and B, suggesting that in Studies 2 and 3 spatial A, B, and C metaphors (verticality, 
horizontality, and centrality, respectively) do not provide a sufficient explanation for the 
empirical support for our 2D ABC model of stereotype content. Further, in Study 4, the 
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2D group space had a sufficient scaling fit (S <= .15), and the ProFit analyses clearly confirmed 
the more fine-grained results of Study 3 that A best described the primary stereotype content 
dimension, followed by B as the best description for the secondary dimension, and that C 
emerged as a non-linear function of A but not B.  
Study 4 also addressed another issue. The most noteworthy difference between our data-
driven stereotype content model and existing theory-driven models lies in the role of 
communion or, alternatively, warmth. Whereas dominant theories not only suggest that warmth 
is a central dimension on which social groups are compared and judged, but also postulate a 
primacy of this dimension (for an overview, see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014), we only found 
support for an emergent nature of C. More precisely, Studies 1-4 suggest people compare and 
judge groups on A and B, and that C is encoded by A, with average and extreme A implying 
high and low C, respectively. One explanation for this difference in conclusions might be that 
the current studies tap into spontaneously employed dimensions, whereas previous work 
explicitly instructed participants to judge the C or warmth of groups. Another explanation might 
be that in our studies participants refrained from employing C-related stereotypical information, 
because they saw it as relatively more socially undesirable to denigrate groups on stereotypic 
C (e.g., “lawyers are dishonest, homeless are repellent, military are threatening, and punks are 
untrustworthy”) compared to stereotypic A and B (“lawyers are overconfident, homeless are 
powerless, military are overly conservative, and punks are too alternative”). Such hesitancy 
would in all likelihood emerge most strongly if we explicitly encourage participants to label the 
dimensions they employ as we did in Study 4. An inspection of the results, however, suggests 
that the opposite was true: the suitability of C as a third axial interpretation of the 3D social 
group space was never high, but more pronounced in Study 4 than in any of the previous studies. 
This speaks against the idea that participants responded in a socially desirable way that 
prohibited the expression of perceived group differences in communion.  
In sum, the studies so far support a two-dimensional model of the mental organization 
of social groups. In marked contrast to previous theorizing about the nature of these dimensions, 
the data suggest that the primary and secondary mapping principles are agency / socio-
economic success (i.e., the groups’ perceived wealth, status, power, dominance, confidence and 
competitiveness) and conservative-progressive beliefs (i.e., the groups’ perceived position on a 
continuum ranging from liberal, alternative, science-oriented and modern to traditional, 
conventional, religious and conservative), respectively (see Figures 1-3). Communion (i.e., 
perceived trustworthiness, sincerity, warmth, benevolence, likeability and altruism) was not 
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used as a criterion for distinguishing between the representatively sampled social groups, but 
emerged for those social groups who are stereotyped as average on A but not so much B5.  
Despite the consistency of our findings so far, there remain some caveats that require 
further attention. Specifically, despite adherence to a data-driven strategy, every study required 
some decisions. Our decisions of a) how to sample social groups, b) how to instruct the 
arrangement of these groups, and c) which candidate dimensions to use for our property fitting 
analyses may have biased our results, leading to the observed 2D ABC model. For example, 
our instruction of how to sample groups might have favored groups defined by their socio-
political ideology, our arrangement instruction might have made similarity in socio-political 
opinion particularly salient and there might be further oblique candidate dimensions that are 
equally fitting candidates that we never collected ratings for. Study 5 sought to address these 
caveats in a comprehensive design. 
 
Study 5  
  
Study 5 sought to generalize the 2D ABC model of stereotype content beyond our previous 
approaches to sampling (see Studies 1a and 3a), comparing (see Studies 1b, 2, 3b and 4), and 
rating (see Studies 1c and 3c) social groups. This was done to rule out that the consistent results 
                                       
5 It is possible that the empirical support for the 2D ABC model obtained in Studies 1-4 hinges 
on our criterion for defining a social group as ‘representative of the U.S. / German society’. 
This criterion was that at least 10% of the participants named the group as ‘representative of 
the U.S. / German society’ in Study 1 / 3. The relatively large number of groups that reached 
this criterion (80 and 76 compared to less than 30 in other research; e.g., Fiske et al., 2002) 
necessarily introduces variance on several dimensions. Such variance is a prerequisite for 
people to place groups on simplifying stereotype content dimensions (Ford & Stangor, 1992; 
Nelson & Miller, 1995). This begs the question whether a more strict criterion of what 
constitutes a group leads to a less diverse sample, and thus to less and / or different stereotype 
content dimensions, if any at all. In another study, we sought empirical support for that our 2D 
ABC model of stereotype content is not an artefact of the relatively infrequently named groups. 
This additional study was identical to Study 4, except that participants spatially arranged only 
the 40  groups that people saw as most representative of U.S. society in Study 1 (i.e., Table 1’s 
left columns; in Studies 1-4 participants spatially arranged random samples of 40 out of the 80 
most frequently named groups). This study provided results highly consistent with Studies 1-4: 
the scaling fit of the 2D group space was satisfactory (S = .07). A, R(2D axis) = .88, p < .001, 
and B, R(2D axis) = .91, p < .001 (see Appendices D and E), were again far better axial 
interpretations of the 2D space compared to C, R(2D axis) = .53, p = .002, and C was a suitable 
polar interpretation of the 2D space, r(2D pole) = .33, p = .04, whereas A and B were not. These 
results ruled out that the consistently found 2D ABC model of stereotype content was an artefact 
of overly inclusive sampling of social groups. 
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we obtained in the first four studies were due to unduly influences of top-down decisions we 
made in pursuing our bottom-up, data-driven approach. Below, we outline four potential 
sources of bias in stimulus sampling, dissimilarity arrangement, and property fitting and how 
Study 5 addressed those. 
Stimulus Sampling 
First, the relatively abstract instructions according to which our participants named 
social groups (“name … groups that structure society”) might have primed social categories 
related to low-high agency / socio-economic success and / or conservative-progressive beliefs 
rather than different levels of communion and / or other stereotype content dimensions. 
Particularly our definition that social groups “… are based on how people behave or see the 
world …” might be interpreted as referring to religious and political ideology or lifestyle (e.g., 
Christians, Muslims, Republicans, Tea Party, conservatives, hippies, hipsters, goths, 
Democrats, liberals, independents etc.). This would artificially increase the salience of 
conservative-progressive beliefs over other stereotype content dimensions. Further, we forced 
participants to name 40 groups, which might be more than what is typically sufficient / 
necessary to mentally represent and organize society. Possibly, it is mainly this surplus of 
groups that relates to different levels of agency / socio-economic success and 
conservative-progressive beliefs. 
A truly data-driven approach might require instructions under which different types of 
groups, including social categories, task groups (e.g., clubs, committees) and primary groups 
(e.g., family, friends), are equally accessible in memory. To this end, in Study 5a we used a 
minimalist definition of groups and minimalist naming instructions that did not prime certain 
kinds of groups. Additionally, we allowed participants to name any number between 3 and 30 
social groups (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002). Consistent with Studies 1a and 3a, the selection that we 
used included all groups named by at least 10% of all participants.  
To further validate the sampled groups, we created another selection. First, we selected 
all groups that were named at least twice. Of those, we selected the groups that appeared most 
frequently in a multi-billion word text corpus that contains a vast variety of digitalized books 
published in recent years (e.g., Akpinar & Berger, 2015; Michel et al., 2011). Thus, the 
relevance of groups in our second, naturalistic selection was not determined by participants but 
based on frequency of appearance in cultural products like books. 
Dissimilarity Arrangement 
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Second, the dissimilarity rating, arrangement, and labeling tasks might have been too 
broad and abstract. That is to say, participants may have used information that goes well beyond 
typical stereotypic comparisons based on character traits and personal encounters (Fiske et al., 
2002; Koenig & Eagly, 2014). Specifically, it is conceivable that participants also based their 
dissimilarity ratings, arrangements, and labels on the degree to which members of the groups 
typically (dis)agree with each other in the social and political arena. In Study 5b, we tested 
whether the 2D ABC model of stereotype content is valid even if people are instructed to 
compare groups based on the characters of / personal encounters with typical group members. 
Property Fitting 
Third, perhaps our empirical support for the 2D ABC model of stereotype content is 
contingent on the instructions according to which participants rated the social groups on agency 
/ socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion. In particular, we 
asked participants for their personal belief about the groups’ A, B, and C rather than to ask for 
the groups’ A, B, and C “as viewed by society” (Fiske et al., 2002, p.884; Cuddy et al., 2007; 
Kervyn et al., 2013; Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt 2015). Society’s view of groups is closer to the 
definition of stereotypes as socially shared views (Fiske et al., 2002). Thus – to make sure that 
we measure A, B, and C stereotypes – in Study 5c we asked for A, B, C ratings “as viewed by 
society”. In addition, we employed a different measure of communion that has been reported 
to better capture its essence (Kervyn et al., 2015). 
And fourth, despite the good statistical fit of A and B as almost entirely orthogonal axes 
of the 2D social group spaces extracted in Studies 1-4, it is conceivable that there are other pairs 
of equally orthogonal and well-fitting stereotype dimensions that we overlooked. That is, our 
candidates possibly did not reflect the full range of stereotype dimensions that our participants 
used to mentally organize the social groups, and thus we cannot be sure that A and B is the best 
model of the two most important stereotype dimensions that people spontaneously use to 
distinguish between groups. To show that this is the case, in Study 5d we asked a new sample 
of participants to label nine rotated, equidistant axes that run through the origins of the 2D group 
spaces extracted in Study 5b, and we asked another sample of participants to categorize the 
generated axes labels as fitting well to either A, B, or C as defined in Study 1, or as “no match” 
if a label “does not fit well” to any of A, B, and C. If the 2D group spaces entail stereotype 
dimensions that we overlooked so far, we would expect sizable amounts of “no match” 
responses at the corresponding rotation angles. If, however, most spontaneously generated 
labels for virtually all rotation angles are categorized as fitting well to A or B (i.e., as being 
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synonyms of A and B), this provides strong support that no other, oblique two-dimensional 
space provides a better description of spontaneously activated stereotype content about groups. 
Our hypotheses for Studies 5a-5d were that the 2D ABC model of stereotype content 
holds true (1) for the new minimalist sampling instruction and the new naturalistic sample of 
social groups, (2) for similarity-, character- and personal encounter-based comparisons of social 
groups, (3) for social groups rated on the relevant dimensions “as viewed by society” rather 
than single persons, and that (4) there will be no evidence for overlooking an alternative model. 
Methods and results 
Study 5a. Creating a minimalist and a naturalistic sample of social groups. We paid 
100 MTurkers (39 women, 61 men; M = 32.21 years, SD = 10.89) $0.5 to “name up to 30 social 
groups”. Participants read these minimalist instructions: “off the top of your head, what various 
types of people do you think today’s society categorizes into groups?” These were the exact 
same instructions as in Fiske and colleagues (2002, p. 883; see also Kervyn et al., 2013; 2015), 
except that we dropped “(i.e., based on ethnicity, race, gender, occupation, ability, etc.)” to 
avoid priming groups defined by the ethnicity, race, gender, occupation and / or ability of their 
members. Participants had the possibility to list up to 30 groups, although a minimum of three 
was required. On average, participants named 14.61 groups (SD = 9.32).  
Table 6 shows all 42 groups named by more than 10% of all participants6. 40 of these 
42 groups had also been named by 10% of participants in Study 1a. Further, the frequency with 
which the 40 groups had been named in Study 1a substantially predicted the frequency with 
which they were named in Study5a, r = .83, p < .001. Thus, the minimalist social group sample 
in Study 5a was very similar to the social group sample in Study 1a. If anything, in the 
minimalist sample extreme scorers on A (‘poor’, ‘middle class’, ‘rich’) and B (‘Democrats’, 
‘Republicans’, ‘gays’, ‘Christians’, ‘liberals’, ‘conservatives’) were named more, not less, 
frequently. Thus, in hindsight the instructions employed in Study 1a do not seem to have biased 
the group sample in a way that social categories defined by their religious / political ideology / 
lifestyle were named disproportionally often. 
 
 
                                       
6 We added the frequency of naming for the synonymic social groups Blacks / 
African Americans, Church / Christians, rich / wealthy, Hispanics / Latinos, elderly / old / 
seniors, upper class / elites, athletes / sportsmen, and atheists / non-religious. 
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Table 6 
Most Frequently Named Social Groups in the U.S. (Consensus > 10%) in Study 5a. 
1st - 21th  
most frequent 
minimalist groups 
22st - 42th  
most frequent 
minimalist groups 
1st - 31th  
most frequent 
naturalistic groups 
 
 
32st - 61th  
most frequent   
naturalistic groups 
Blacks (50%) Athletes (15%) Children (13.12m) Professionals (0.94m) 
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Whites (41%) Parents (15%) Women (10.80m) Muslim / -s (0.93m) 
Poor (37%) Nerds (14%) Old (10.51m) Conservative / -s 
(0.88m) Middle class (34%) Hippies (14%) Family (10.43m) Scientists (0.87m) 
Rich (33%) Immigrants (14%) Men (9.05m) Tall (0.86m) 
Hispanics (31%) Atheists (13%) White / -s (7.91m) Republican / -s (0.84m) 
Asians (29%) Blue collar (13%) Black / -s (7.88m) Artists (0.84m) 
Democrats (29%) Religious (13%) Christians (7.58m) Lesbian / -s (0.70m) 
Republicans (29%) Men (12%) Students (7.49m) Actors (0.69m) 
Gays (27%) Teenagers (12%) Young (6.70m) Immigrants (0.60m) 
Christians (26%) White collar (12%) Short (4.68m) Hispanic / -s (0.60m) 
Liberals (26%) Politicians (12%) Parents (4.35m) Farmers (0.59m) 
Conservatives (26%) 
(26%) 
Jocks (11%) Poor (3.83m) Teenagers (0.52m) 
Working class (22%) Hipsters (11%) Jewish (3.47m) Educated (0.51m) 
Transgender (21%) Celebrities (11%) Friends (3.37m) Elites (0.50m) 
Elderly (20%) Drug addicts (11%) Military (3.36m) Democrat / -s (0.41m) 
Students (19%) Homosexuals (10%) Religious (3.08m) Clubs (0.38m) 
Lesbians (17%) Homeless (10%) Americans (2.43m) Homosexual / -s 
(0.38m) Women (16%) Jews (10%) Rich (2.30m) Politicians (0.38m) 
Upper class (15%) Goths (10%) Gay / -s (2.21m) Musicians (0.36m) 
Muslims (15%) Lower class (10%) Europeans (2.19m) Activists (0.30m) 
  Chinese (2.05m) Minorities (0.28m) 
  Indian / -s (1.89m) Law enforcement 
(0.26m)   Straight (1.83m) Alcoholics Anonymous 
(0.26m)   Adults (1.80m) Entrepreneurs (0.24m) 
  Athletes (1.43m) Catholics (0.24m) 
  Writers (1.26m) Homeless (0.24m) 
  Ethnic (1.21m) Mexicans (0.20m) 
  Asian / -s (1.15m) Rebels (0.18m) 
  Employed (1.04m) Middle class (0.17m) 
  Liberal / -s (0.94m)  
 
Note. Left sample: percentage in parentheses is proportion of participants who spontaneously 
named this group as part of today’s U.S. society. Right sample: number in parentheses is 
millions of occurrences in contemporary (i.e., 2000-2009) American English literature (i.e., ~27 
billion words) according to the Google Books Corpus (Davies, 2011).   
To create the naturalistic sample, we recorded how often the 136 social groups7 that 
were named by at least two participants appear in the Google Books Corpus (Michel et al., 
2011), the world’s largest collection of digitized and searchable books (> 5 million containing 
> 500 billion words). To measure these groups’ frequency of occurrence in contemporary 
American English literature, we searched only within the 2000-2009 publication period of the 
                                       
7 We added the frequency of occurrence for the synonymic social groups children /  kids, old / 
elderly / seniors, Blacks / African Americans, Church / Christians, military / veterans, rich / 
wealthy, Indians / Native Americans, athletes / sports, Hispanics / Latinos, elites / upper class, 
entrepreneurs / business owners, atheists / non-religious, and boy / girl scouts. 
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American English section of the Google Books Corpus (= 26.9 billion words) provided by 
Davies (2011; see http://googlebooks.byu.edu/). Taking the average between the Study 1a 
sample (N = 80) and the minimalist sample (N = 42), the naturalistic sample included the 61 
groups that we found to be most prevalent in this collection of texts (see Table 6). 46 of these 
61 groups had also been named by 10% of participants in Study 1a. However, the frequency 
with which the 46 groups had been named in Study 1a did not predict their frequency of 
occurrence in contemporary American English literature, r = .17, p = .25. Noteworthy, the most 
frequently occurring groups in the naturalistic sample did not score either high or low on either 
A or B, but rather reflected differences in race, sex and age (‘children’, ‘women’, ‘old’, ‘men’, 
‘Whites’, ‘Blacks’).  
Study 5b. Character- / personal encounter-based arrangement of 42 / 61 groups. 
We paid 378 MTurkers (148 women, 230 men; M = 33.94 years, SD = 10.74) $0.75 to “sort 42 
social groups on the computer screen”. They arranged either the 42 minimalist groups, or a 
random selection of 42 of the 61 naturalistic groups. The arrangement task was the same as in 
Studies 2 and 3 – with two exceptions. First, to give participants an overview of the groups, 
they appeared all at once in a random order of four columns and eleven rows in the middle of 
the screen. More importantly, there were three different arrangement instructions. In the 
similarity (control) condition, participants read: “… social groups whose typical members are 
similar should be placed closer together, while social groups whose typical members are 
different should be placed further apart”. In the character condition, they read: “… social groups 
whose typical members have similar characters should be placed closer together, while social 
groups whose typical members have different characters should be placed further apart”. And 
in the personal encounter condition, they read: “… social groups for which personal encounters 
with their typical members are similar should be placed closer together, while social groups for 
which personal encounters with their typical members are different should be placed further 
apart”8 (for the minimalist sample, there were between 49 and 51 participants per condition; for 
the naturalistic sample there were between 74 and 77 participants per condition). As in Studies 
2-4, the arranged distances between the groups were recorded as proportions of the screen 
diagonal. 
                                       
8 To ensure that participants follow these different instructions, we presented them not only 
before, but also during the spatial arrangement phase, namely in abbreviated from (e.g., “similar 
character -> closer together; different character -> further apart”) left to a “Continue” button at 
the bottom of the screen. 
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Study 5c: Testing the validity of the 2D ABC model of stereotype content. Next, 201 
MTurkers (70 women, 131 men; M = 33.03 years, SD = 11.07) were paid $0.6 to “rate about 
50 social groups on a stereotype dimension”. They rated the 42 minimalist groups or the 
61 naturalistic groups on either A, B, or one of two versions of C. Each of the eight 
corresponding 0-10 slider scale items was anchored with a meaning cloud (for an example, see 
Appendix M; meaning clouds accurately measure groups’ A, B, and C, see Footnote 1) of all 
sub-dimensions of either A, B, C (see Table 3), or C2. Based on recommendations in the 
literature (Kervyn et al., 2015), the second version of communion was anchored with “Not at 
all …-Extremely friendly / sincere / sociable / well-intentioned”. Above the slider scale items, 
participants read: “As viewed by society, how … [e.g., friendly, sincere, sociable, and 
well-intentioned] are members of these groups?” There were between 22 and 28 raters per 
stereotype dimension, and as in the previous studies, raters’ agreement about the groups was 
very high, all ICC(2,k)s >= .85, (McGraw & Wong, 1996). While the expected correlations 
between the two versions of communion in the minimalistic sample (r = .87), and in the 
naturalistic sample (r = .86) were large, ps < .001, there was another moderate but statistically 
significant correlation between agency / socio-economic success and progressive beliefs in the 
minimalistic sample, r = .34, p < .05, all other |r|s < .24, ps > .059. 
Next, we computed the mean distance between each pair of spatially arranged groups, 
separately for the minimalist and the naturalistic sample, and separately for the similarity-, 
character- and personal encounter-based instructions. For the minimalist sample, these mean 
distances correlated highly across the three different spatial arrangement instructions, mean r = 
.90, SD = .06, and the same was true for the naturalistic sample, mean r = .80, SD = .06. Thus, 
we collapsed mean intergroup distance across the three different spatial arrangement 
instructions, separately for the minimalist and the naturalistic sample of groups10.  
                                       
9 The main difference between the group rating instructions in Studies 1 and 5 was that in Study 
5 participants rated the groups “as viewed by society” rather than the self. If participants 
perceived mainstream society as relatively conservative, then, assuming that society trusts and 
likes society, participants would have rated conservative groups as scoring higher on C than 
progressive groups. If so, then this effect should be less pronounced in Study 1, where 
participants rated the groups as viewed by the self rather than society. However, the groups’ B 
and C correlate r = -.01 in Study 1 and r = .04 (minimalist sample) and r = .05 (naturalistic 
sample) in Study 5, suggesting that participants in Study 5 perceived mainstream society as 
neither conservative nor progressive. 
 
10 Separate property fitting analyses for the 1D-3D spaces extracted from the similarity-, 
character- and personal encounter-based mean inter-group distances yielded almost identical 
results to the property fitting analyses for the 1D-3D spaces extracted from the mean inter-group 
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The mean distances between the groups were subjected to MDS (separately for the 
minimalist and the naturalistic sample) with the same settings as in the previous studies. As in 
Studies 3 / 4, based on the goodness of fit of the 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D and 6D scaling solutions 
(Table 2), we extracted and analyzed three dimensions, but proceeded with interpreting only 
the 1D and 2D space of the minimalist and the naturalistic groups. Property fitting analyses 
confirmed the validity of the 2D ABC model of stereotype content. Agency / socio-economic 
success, R(2D axis) = .93, p < .001, and conservative-progressive beliefs, R(2D axis) = .94, p < 
.001, were far better axial interpretations of the minimalist groups’ 2D space than communion, 
R(2D axis) = .13, p = .72, and the second version of communion, R(2D axis) = .20, p = .47. The 
same was true for the 2D space of the naturalistic groups; A: R(2D axis) = .81, p < .001; B: 
R(2D axis) = .86, p < .001; C: R(2D axis) = .12, p = .67, and C2: R(2D axis) = .15, p = .52 (see 
Table 7; see also Figures 4 and 5). Further, as in the previous studies C and C2 were suitable 
polar interpretations of the minimalist groups’ 2D space, r(2D pole) = .60, p < .001 and r(2D 
pole) = .50, p < .001, respectively, and the naturalistic groups’ 2D space, r(2D pole) = .61, p < 
.001 and r(2D pole) = .74, p < .001, respectively. In contrast, A and B were not suitable as polar 
interpretations of these spaces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
distances collapsed across the these three spatial arrangement instructions, as shown in 
Appendix F (minimalistic groups) and Appendix G (naturalistic groups). 
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Table 7 
 
      
Property Fitting Results for Studies 5 and 6 
 Group  
sample 
Stereotype  
content 
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Study 
5 
42 minimalist Agency (A) .777 .929 .909 -.188 -.093 -.097 
 U.S. groups Beliefs (B) .783 .937 .935 .136 .143 .159 
  Communion (C) .050 .129 .247 .551 .595 .590 
  Communion (C2) .149 .196 .272 .521 .502 .545 
         
Study 
5 
61 
naturalistic 
Agency (A) .765 .806 .803 .072 .086 .116 
 U.S. groups Beliefs (B) .354 .863 .890 .487 .195 .261 
  Communion (C) .097 .118 .526 .432 .607 .540 
  Communion (C2) .113 .150 .569 .640 .737 .665 
         
Study 
6 
42 minimalist Agency (A) .826 .917 .923 -.184 -.100 -.078 
 U.S. groups Beliefs (B) .708 .936 .945 .186 .222 .218 
  Communion (C) .058 .055 .084 .640 .642 .668 
  Communion (C2) .181 .194 .327 .567 .567 .625 
         
Study 
6 
61 
naturalistic 
Agency (A) .691 .741 .906 -.064 .136 .094 
 U.S. groups Beliefs (B) .657 .901 .945 .391 .339 .328 
  Communion (C) .015 .102 .381 .480 .518 .507 
  Communion (C2) .054 .236 .447 .619 .613 .604 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 42 / 61 minimalist / 
naturalistic U.S. social groups’ agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive 
beliefs, and communion (standard and alternative operationalization) ratings and their 
projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 1D, 2D, and 3D space; r(1D-3D pol) 
indicate correlations between the social groups’ A, B, and C (standard and alternative 
operationalization) ratings and their proximity to the origin of these three spaces. 
Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Figure 4 
 
Note. Study 5: The left side illustrates that the minimalist groups’ 2D stereotype space is made 
up of the axes agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs and the 
centrally located pole communion (21 most / least communal groups = bold / not bold). The 
right side plots the most frequent labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of this space, and the 
percentage of labels for these axes that were assigned to A, B, C, and ‘no match’. All axes 
mainly reflect A or B at the angle where these two run through the space (see property fitting 
results on the left side).  
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Figure 5 
 
Note. Study 5: The left side illustrates that the naturalistic groups’ 2D stereotype space is made 
up of the axes agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs and the 
centrally located pole communion (most / least communal groups = bold / not bold). The right 
side plots the most frequent labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of this space, and the 
percentage of labels for these axes that were assigned to A, B, C, and ‘no match’. All axes 
mainly reflect A or B at the angle where these two run through the space (see property fitting 
results on the left side). 
 
Study 5d: Ruling out alternative 2D models of stereotype content. 180 additional 
MTurkers (82 women, 98 men; M = 31.65 years, SD = 9.38) were paid $0.75 to “identify 9 
person characteristics”. We rotated the 2D coordinates of the 42 minimalist groups clockwise 
around the origin of their space. We rotated in 18 steps of 20° (= a full rotation of 360°). At 
each rotation step, we formed a 1D ranking based on the groups’ current x-coordinates (i.e., 
after nine rotation steps – a half rotation of 180°– each of these 18 rankings was reversed). We 
presented participants with the group rankings of nine consecutive rotation steps, one at a time 
and in random order. These nine rankings represented nine axes that run through (the origin of) 
the minimalist groups’ 2D space in such a way that any so far overlooked stereotype dimension 
would have a maximal distance of 10° from one of these nine axes. A rotation angle of 10° 
corresponds to a correlation of r > .98, and thus the nine axes included all fundamental 
stereotype dimensions that we have overlooked in our previous analyses – if there are any. If 
agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs are the only two 
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stereotype dimensions encoded in the minimalist groups’ 2D space, then the collection of labels 
for all pairs of reversed axes (i.e., two axes between which the rotation angle is 180°) should 
reflect A or B and not C or something else.  
To understand the task, participants were first presented with an example in which the 
animal characteristic based on which “giraffe, elephant, horse, deer, dog, mouse, and bee” were 
ranked one atop the other was labeled as “tall” and / or “big”. Then, before labeling each of the 
nine target axes, participants were presented with the minimalist groups one atop the other in 
the order of their x-coordinates on the corresponding axis, and they read: “Your task is to 
identify X. X is the person characteristic based on which the social groups are ranked. As 
viewed by society, groups at the top of the ranking are extremely X. …groups above the center 
of the ranking are above-averagely X. …groups at the center of the ranking are averagely X. … 
groups below the center of the ranking are below-averagely X. … groups at the bottom of the 
ranking are not at all X. Please enter the person characteristic X (an adjective) in the textbox 
below. If you have no idea about X, enter “I don’t know”” (for an example, see Appendix N). 
Participants generated a total of 521 labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of the minimalist 
groups’ 2D space (due to redundancy 274 unique labels; “I don’t know” = 38.27% of all cases). 
We repeated this axes labeling procedure for the 61 naturalistic groups’ 2D space. Other 
participants generated a total of 516 labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of the naturalistic 
groups’ 2D space (265 unique labels; “I don’t know” = 33.33% of all cases). 
108 additional MTurkers (47 women, 61 men; M = 30.47 years, SD = 9.05) were paid 
$0.5 to “assign 100 person characteristics” one after the other, and they read: “please select the 
category to which this person characteristic [e.g., wealthy] fits best. If this person characteristic 
does not fit well to any of the categories, check ‘no match’”. The seven categories available for 
selection were ‘no match’ plus the polar opposites on A, B and C (A+: “powerful / dominating 
/ high status / wealthy / confident / competitive”, A-: “powerless / dominated / low status / poor 
/ unconfident / unassertive”, B+: “modern / science-oriented / alternative / liberal”, B-: 
“traditional / religious / conventional / conservative”, C+: “trustworthy / sincere / likable / 
benevolent / warm / altruistic”, and C-: “untrustworthy / dishonest / repellent / threatening / 
cold / egoistic”) – the candidate stereotype dimensions examined in Studies 1-5. Participants 
assigned either 100 random of the 274 different labels generated for the (9 pairs of reversed 
axes =) 18 axes of the minimalist groups’ 2D space, or 100 random of the 265 different labels 
generated for the 18 axes of the naturalistic groups’ 2D space. On average, each label generated 
for an axis of minimalist and naturalistic groups’ 2D space was assigned by 21.10 (SD = 3.68) 
and 18.86 (SD = 3.41) participants, respectively. For each of the 512 and 516 labels generated 
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for one of the axes of the minimalist and naturalistic groups’ 2D space, respectively, we 
recorded the percentage of assignments to categories A±, B±, C± and ‘no match’, a measure of 
the labels’ relatedness to A, B, C, and something else (rel:A, rel:B, rel:C, and rel:Else), 
respectively. Finally, for each of the nine pairs of reversed axes of the minimalist and 
naturalistic groups’ 2D space, we averaged rel:A, rel:B, rel:C, and rel:Else across all labels 
generated for that pair of axes. 
Table 8 shows mean relatedness of the participant-generated labels to A, B, C, and 
something else (rel:A, rel:B, rel:C, and rel:Else), separately for the nine pairs of reversed axes 
of the minimalist groups’ 2D space and the naturalistic groups’ 2D space. All pairs of axes in 
both 2D group spaces predominantly related to agency / socio-economic success or 
conservative-progressive beliefs rather than communion or something else. Therefore, 
according to participants in the label generation and assignment studies, the 2D space of both 
the minimalist and the naturalistic groups does not encode a fundamental, spontaneously 
employed stereotype dimension other than A and B. 
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Table 8    
Label Assignment Results for Studies 5 and 6    
Relatedness to  
stereotype content  
 
Axes 
0/ 
180° 
 
Axes 
20/ 
200° 
Axes 
40/ 
220° 
Axes 
60/ 
240° 
Axes 
80/ 
260° 
Axes 
100/ 
280° 
Axes 
120/ 
300°  
Axes 
140/ 
320° 
Axes 
160/ 
340° 
Study 5          
   Minimalist 2D space          
      Agency (A) 59 52 45 23 17 12 22 57 65 
      Beliefs (B) 18 18 30 52 60 63 49 18 12 
      Communion (C) 17 21 16 16 14 16 19 20 17 
      Something else  7 9 9 9 9 10 10 6 6 
   Naturalistic 2D space          
      Agency (A) 53 63 44 14 12 13 18 39 54 
      Beliefs (B) 18 14 22 48 62 61 44 31 20 
      Communion (C) 20 13 19 22 15 16 26 20 14 
      Something else 9 9 15 16 11 9 12 10 11 
Study 6          
   Minimalist 2D space          
      Agency (A) 58 53 49 23 19 12 11 44 58 
      Beliefs (B) 7 16 17 47 46 53 53 14 14 
      Communion (C) 27 21 26 24 26 27 30 36 20 
      Something else  8 9 8 6 9 8 7 6 7 
   Naturalistic 2D space          
      Agency (A) 50 43 36 21 11 19 19 24 35 
      Beliefs (B) 18 19 19 35 57 55 52 49 34 
      Communion (C) 21 22 25 29 21 17 20 18 20 
      Something else 12 15 20 15 11 8 9 8 10 
 
Note. Axes 0°/180°-160°/340° indicate the mean percentage of participants who assigned the 
labels generated for the respective pair of reversed axes of the respective 2D group space to the 
categories agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, communion and 
something else. Participants saw all nine pairs of reversed axes of both 2D group spaces as 
related to A or B rather than communion or something else. Because the nine pairs of reversed 
axes include all stereotype dimensions encoded in the respective 2D group space, these results 
add to the corresponding property fitting results that A and B are the only suitable axial 
interpretations of both 2D group spaces. Bold numbers indicate paired t-tests of the highest 
against the second highest percentage that are significant at p =< .001. 
 
Figures 4 (minimalist groups) and 5 (naturalistic groups) illustrate this. The left side of 
these figures shows the groups’ coordinates in their 2D space plus the two axes that best 
represent A and B, which together form the best available explanation of the variance contained 
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in this space (see the property fitting results in Study 5). The right side shows the same space 
(aligned in the same direction) plus the 18 axes for which we collected labels and label 
assignments to the stereotype dimensions A, B, C, and something else (= ‘no match’). For each 
of these 18 axes, the far end shows the label most often generated for that axis. All these most 
consensual axes labels are relatable to A or B. More importantly, for each of the 18 axes, the 
stretch from the spaces’ origin to the far end of that axis indicates the percentage of participants 
who assigned the labels generated for that axis to A, B, C, and something else that “does not fit 
well” to A, B, and C. As is immediately evident, all nine pairs of reversed axes reflect A or B 
rather than C or something else, and the axes that reflect A and B are orthogonal to one another 
and run through the space more or less exactly at the angles that best represent A and B (see the 
left side of the figures) according to the property fitting analyses in Study 5. That is, in Study 5 
we took a data-driven approach not just to scaling the groups’ 2D space, but also to interpreting 
this space, and results showed that A and B is the one and only pair of orthogonal stereotype 
dimensions that underlies this space. 
Discussion  
 To rule out that the 2D ABC model of stereotype content is limited to the detailed and 
thus possibly biased instructions under which participants in Studies 1 and 3 named groups, in 
Study 5 participants received the minimalist naming instructions used by Fiske and colleagues 
(2002, p. 883; see also Kervyn et al., 2013; 2015), except that we dropped “(i.e., based on 
ethnicity, race, gender, occupation, ability, etc.)” to avoid priming groups defined by the 
ethnicity, race, gender, occupation and / or ability of their members. Moreover, to omit groups 
that are not essential to participants’ view of society, participants were free to name any desired 
number between 3 and 30 groups (see Kervyn et al., 2013; 2015). Both the groups in this 
‘minimalist’ sample and their frequency of naming were highly similar to the Study 1 sample 
of groups, and Study 5 shows that the 2D ABC model generalizes well from the Study 1 sample 
to the minimalist sample of groups. 
 To generalize the model to a naturalistic sample of groups, we recorded the frequency 
with which all groups that were named at least twice in Study 5 appear in a large text corpus 
that is arguably representative of contemporary American English literature (Davies, 2011; 
Michel et al., 2011; for another example of such a linguistic approach to personality and social 
psychology research, see Akpinar and Berger, 2015). The groups mentioned most often 
between 2000 and 2009 formed our ‘naturalistic’ sample, which is somewhat different from the 
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Study 1’s sample of groups. The results of Study 5 showed that the 2D ABC model generalizes 
to this naturalistic sample as well. 
 To rule out that the 2D ABC model is limited to the instructions under which participants 
in Studies 1-4 compared groups, in Study 5 we instructed participants to spatially arrange the 
minimalist or the naturalistic groups either based on the global dissimilarity of their typical 
members (see Studies 1-4), based on the dissimilarity of the character of their typical members, 
or based on the dissimilarity of personal encounters with their typical members. The latter two 
types of instructions may better reflect the essence of stereotypic social group comparisons 
(Fiske et al., 2002; Koenig & Eagly, 2014). However, the three types of instructions yielded 
almost identical group comparisons for both the minimalist and the naturalistic sample, and 
thus the validity of the 2D ABC model of stereotype content generalizes from unspecified to 
character- and personal encounter-based group comparisons (see also online supplementary 
material, Tables osm.6 / osm.7). 
 To rule out that the 2D ABC model is limited to the instructions under which participants 
in Studies 1-4 rated groups, in Study 5 participants rated the minimalist and the naturalistic 
groups’ stereotypic agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs and 
communion as viewed by society (Fiske et al., 2002, Cuddy et al., 2007; Kervyn, Fiske, & 
Yzerbyt, 2013; 2015) rather than themselves. Rating groups from the perspective of society 
rather than the self is arguably closer to the definition of stereotypes as socially shared views, 
and additionally circumvents single individuals’ tendency to respond in a socially desirable way 
that eliminates meaningful variance on valence-related stereotype dimensions such as 
communion (Fiske et al., 2002). Further, in Study 5 participants also rated both the minimalist 
and the naturalistic groups on another set of communion subscales that has been reported to 
better reflect its essence, namely ‘friendly / sincere / sociable / well-intentioned’. Results 
showed that this alternative our version of communion are almost identical in meaning (rs >= 
.86), and that the ABC model generalizes from groups’ A, B, and C as viewed by the self to 
their A, B, and C / C2 “as viewed by society” (Fiske et al., 2002, p.884)11. 
                                       
11 40 minimalist and 46 naturalistic groups are also part of the Study 1 sample, which allows 
correlating these groups’ stereotypic A, B, and C “as viewed by society” (measured in Study 5) 
with their A, B, and C as viewed by single persons (measured in Study 1). For the minimalist 
groups, these A, B, and C correlations are r = .98, .97, and .92, respectively. For the naturalistic 
groups, the correlations are r = .98, .97, and .88, respectively. Thus, it does not make a 
difference whether group stereotypes are measured as viewed by society or by single persons. 
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Furthermore, we aimed to rule out that there are other models of stereotype content that 
we might have overlooked when selecting candidate stereotype dimensions based on a visual 
inspection of the 2D group space computed in Study 1. To that end, we asked new participants 
to label the stereotype dimensions that underlie different group rankings that together reflect all 
axes (i.e., stereotype dimensions) that run through the origin of the groups’ 2D space. Yet other 
participants then assigned the generated stereotype dimension labels to our candidates A, B, or 
C as defined in Study 1, and they were instructed to select ‘no match’ if a label “does not fit 
well” to A, B, or C. For each axis / stereotype dimension of the groups’ 2D space, our results 
showed that participants predominantly assigned the labels generated for that axis / stereotype 
dimension to A or B rather than C or something else (= ‘no match’), a pattern that was found 
for both the 2D space of the minimalist and the naturalistic groups (see Table 8 and Figures 4 
and 5). Thus, participants spontaneously used A and B (not C or something else) to 
stereotypically compare the groups.  
 
Study 6 
  
Study 6 addresses another caveat. The 2D ABC model of stereotype content may only 
apply to distinguishing between the entirety of groups that together form society. In Studies 1-5, 
participants always compared either all groups in the respective sample, or a randomly drawn 
set of groups that is more or less representative of all groups in the respective sample. Thus, for 
their comparisons participants had to spontaneously select stereotype dimensions on which all 
groups in the respective sample can be meaningfully placed. However, in real life people likely 
compare self-selected rather than representative or complete sets of groups, maybe because they 
want to compare some groups on a stereotype dimension on which only those and not all groups 
can be placed well, for example because they have no idea about the other groups’ position or 
construe them as highly heterogeneous regarding this dimension. In principle it may be that 
participants predominantly process communion/warmth information when stereotyping groups 
but forcing them to rate a large number of groups for which they have no clear stereotype about 
their communion undermines spontaneously employing this dimension. Thus, by omitting a 
phase in which participants self-select groups to be stereotypically compared, in Studies 1-5 we 
might have artificially limited the range of stereotype dimensions that participants could 
spontaneously select to only those dimensions that can be meaningfully applied to all social 
groups. 
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Study 6 therefore added a phase in which participants could freely choose the groups 
that they would subsequently compare. If participants decide to compare different groups on 
different stereotype dimensions, the scaling of 1D-3D group spaces to be interpreted will entail 
a poor statistical fit, and these group spaces will not entail meaningful stereotype dimensions 
that can be interpreted based on candidate stereotype dimensions (see property fitting analyses 
in Studies 1-5). If, however, participants decide to compare different groups on more or less the 
same few stereotype dimensions, we will be able to reveal the nature of these fundamental 
stereotype dimensions if they are among our candidates A, B, and C. We hypothesized that 
participants decide to compare different groups on A and B rather than C and / or something 
else.    
Methods and results 
We paid 751 MTurkers (240 women, 411 men; M = 32.30 years, SD = 10.45) $0.75 to 
“select and sort 21 social groups on the computer screen”. Participants were presented with 
either the 42 minimalist groups or 42 random naturalistic groups (out of 61), and were instructed 
to select at least 21 of these groups to spatially arrange them based on either the global 
dissimilarity of their typical members, the dissimilarity of the character of their typical 
members, or the dissimilarity of personal encounters with their typical members. We set a 
minimum of 21 groups, because selecting half of the available groups holds a balance between 
increasing the number of stereotype dimensions on which the groups can be placed (i.e., 
compared) and decreasing the number of participants required to obtain reliable dissimilarity 
estimates for all possible pairs of groups (861 and 1830 in the minimalist and naturalistic 
sample, respectively), a necessity for an accurate scaling of the 1D-3D group spaces to be 
interpreted (Borg & Groenen, 2005). On average, participants selected 21.80 minimalistic and 
21.58 naturalistic groups (for frequency of selection of all minimalist and naturalistic groups 
averaged across the three spatial arrangement instruction conditions, see Appendix H). For the 
minimalist groups, frequency of selection correlated with frequency of naming in Study 5, r = 
.40, p < .01; for the naturalistic groups, frequency of selection correlated with frequency of 
appearance in contemporary (2000-2009) American English literature according to the Google 
Books Corpus (Davies, 2011), r = .42, p = .001. Apparently, in both the minimalist and the 
naturalistic condition participants most often selected groups defined by the race, sex and age 
of their members, and groups perceived as either high or low on either A or B. 
Next, participants spatially arranged the self-selected groups (the instructions and 
procedure were the same as in Study 5; between 97 and 100 participants per condition for the 
117 
 
minimalist sample and between 151 and 154 participants per condition for the naturalistic 
sample). As in Studies 2-5, the spatially arranged distances between the groups were recorded 
as proportions of the screen diagonal. 
Next, we computed the mean distance between each pair of spatially arranged groups, 
separately for the minimalist and the naturalistic sample, and separately for the similarity-, 
character- and personal encounter-based instructions. As in Study 5, these mean distances 
correlated highly across the three different spatial arrangement instructions (mean r = .82, SD = 
.09 for the minimalist groups, and mean r = .62, SD = .03 for the naturalistic groups), and thus 
we collapsed mean intergroup distance across the three different spatial arrangement 
instructions, separately for the minimalist and the naturalistic sample of groups12.  
The mean distances between the groups were subjected to MDS (separately for the 
minimalist and the naturalistic groups) with the same settings as in the previous studies (Table 
2 shows the goodness of fit of the 1D, 2D, 3D, 4D, 5D and 6D scaling solutions). Property 
fitting analyses confirmed the validity of the 2D ABC model of stereotype content. A, 
R(2D axis) = .92, p < .001, and B, R(2D axis) = .94, p < .001, were far better axial 
interpretations of the minimalist groups’ 2D space than C, R(2D axis) = .06, p = .94, and the 
second version of C, R(2D axis) = .19, p = .47. The same was true for the 2D space of the 
naturalistic groups; A: R(2D axis) =.74, p < .001; B: R(2D axis) = .90, p < .001; C: R(2D axis) = 
.10, p = .74, and C2, R(2D axis) = .24, p = .19 (see Table 7, see also Figures 6 and 7). Further, 
as in the previous studies, C and C2 were suitable polar interpretations of the minimalist groups’ 
2D space, r(2D pole) = .64, p < .001 and r(2D pole) = .57, p < .001, respectively, and the 
naturalistic groups’ 2D space, r(2D pole) = .52, p < .001 and r(2D pole) = .61, p < .001, 
respectively. In contrast, A and B were not suitable as polar interpretations of these spaces. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
                                       
12 Separate property fitting analyses for the 1D-3D spaces extracted from the similarity-, 
character- and personal encounter-based mean inter-group distances yielded almost identical 
results to the property fitting analyses for the 1D-3D spaces extracted from the mean inter-group 
distances collapsed across these three spatial arrangement instructions, as shown in Appendix 
I (minimalistic groups) and Appendix J (naturalistic groups). 
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Note. Study 6: The left side illustrates that the minimalist groups’ 2D stereotype space is made 
up of the axes agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs and the 
centrally located pole communion (21 most / least communal groups = bold / not bold). The 
right side plots the most frequent labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of this space, and the 
percentage of labels for these axes that were assigned to A, B, C, and ‘no match’. All axes 
mainly reflect A or B at the angle where these two run through the space (see property fitting 
results on the left side). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
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Note. Study 6: The left side illustrates that the naturalistic groups’ 2D stereotype space is 
made up of the axes agency / socio-economic success and conservative-progressive beliefs 
and the centrally located pole communion (most / least communal groups = bold / not bold). 
The right side plots the most frequent labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of this space, 
and the percentage of labels for these axes that were assigned to A, B, C, and ‘no match’. All 
axes mainly reflect A or B at the angle where these two run through the space (see property 
fitting results on the left side). 
 
219 additional MTurkers (88 women, 131 men; M = 31.35 years, SD = 9.51) were paid 
$0.75 to “identify 9 person characteristics”. As in Study 5, to find out if our candidates A, B, 
and C do not include one or more fundamental stereotype dimensions encoded in the groups’ 
2D space, we asked participants to label nine pairs of reversed group rankings that represent 
nine axes that run through (the origin of) this space in such a way that one of them correlates at 
least r = .98 with any stereotype dimension not included in A, B, and C. If, as predicted, A and 
B are the only two stereotype dimensions encoded in the groups’ 2D space, then the collections 
of labels for all nine axes should predominantly reflect A and B.  
Participants generated a total of 758 labels for the nine axes of the minimalist groups’ 
2D space (due to redundancy 347 unique labels; “I don’t know” = 22.25% of all cases), and 
other participants generated a total of 730 labels for the nine axes of the naturalistic groups’ 2D 
space (332 unique labels; “I don’t know” = 33.16% of all cases). 
120 additional participants (54 women, 66 men; M = 33.02 years, SD = 10.82) were paid 
$0.5 to “assign 100 person characteristics” to A, B, C, or ‘no match’ (see Studies 4 / 5). 
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Participants assigned either 100 random of the 347 different labels generated for the nine axes 
of the minimalist groups’ 2D space, or 100 random of the 332 different labels generated for the 
nine axes of the naturalistic groups’ 2D space. On average, each label generated for an axis of 
minimalist and naturalistic groups’ 2D space was assigned by 16.92 (SD = 3.39) and 18.36 (SD 
= 3.41) participants, respectively. For each of the 758 and 730 labels generated for one of the 
axes of the minimalist and naturalistic groups’ 2D space, respectively, we recorded the 
percentage of assignments to categories A, B, C and ‘no match’, a measure of the labels’ 
relatedness to A, B, C and something else, respectively. Finally, for each of the nine axes of the 
minimalist and naturalistic groups’ 2D space, we averaged relatedness to A, B, C and something 
else across all labels generated for that axis. 
Table 8 shows mean relatedness of the participant-generated labels to A, B, C and 
something else, separately for the nine axes of the minimalist groups’ 2D space and the 
naturalistic groups’ 2D space. As in Study 5, all axes in both 2D group spaces predominantly 
relate to agency / socio-economic success or conservative-progressive beliefs rather than 
communion or something else (see Figures 6 and 7). Thus, according to the participants in the 
label generation and assignment studies, the two 2D spaces do not encode a fundamental 
stereotype dimension other than A and B. 
Discussion 
Study 6 examined if the 2D ABC model generalizes from comparing all or 
representative samples of groups to individually tailored samples of groups.  In real life people 
stereotypically compare self-selected rather than representative or complete samples of groups. 
In doing so, they may compare different group samples on different stereotype dimensions. If 
this had been the case, then the MDS algorithm (Young, Takane, & Lewyckyj, 1978; see also 
Borg & Groenen, 2005) applied throughout this paper would have resulted in a statistically 
poor-fitting and thus uninterpretable 2D group space.  
Quite to the contrary, the results of Study 6 showed that people stereotypically compare 
different selections of groups on the same dimensions, namely agency / socio-economic success 
and conservative-progressive beliefs, and that communion again emerges as centrality in the 
well-fitting and thus interpretable 2D stereotype space spanned by A and B. Moreover, Study 
6 fully replicated Study 5, providing further empirical support for our conclusions that the 
2D ABC model is valid across different approaches to sampling groups (from memory vs. text 
corpora), comparing groups (globally vs. character- vs. personal encounter-based), and rating 
groups (as viewed by society vs. single persons). Finally, as in Study 5, we applied a data-
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driven approach to scaling the groups’ 2D space (see left side of Figures 6 and 7), and to 
interpreting this space. Results show that there is no other 2D model of stereotype content that 
we have overlooked (see Table 8 and the right side of Figures 6 and 7; see also the Discussion 
of Study 5).      
Before we will elaborate on these results in detail, we put the model to a test that goes 
beyond the description of a similarity structure and shows that the groups’ positions on the two 
fundamental stereotype content dimensions A and B have downstream consequences. 
 
Study 7 
 
Stereotypes about groups are an effective and efficient tool to plan social interactions 
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Hamilton, Sherman & Ruvolo, 1990; Pattyn et al., 2013; Sherman, 
Lee, Bessenoff, & Frost, 1998; Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). If the 2D ABC model of 
stereotype content is valid, then people should rely predominantly on A and B to make 
predictions about the states and dynamics of their social environment. In Study 7, we explored 
how people make predictions about the likelihood of members of different social groups being 
in the same place at the same time (judgments of time-space proximity), and about the 
likelihood of members of different groups being friends with one another (judgments of 
interpersonal liking). Particularly the latter constitutes a critical test of the relatively greater 
weight of A and B compared to C. Interpersonal liking is clearly a judgment about a communal 
aspect of interpersonal behavior, allowing the assumptions that it is particularly likeable people 
who like each other. If, however, interpersonal liking is seen as a function of A and / or B this 
would translate into participants’ estimation that people like each other when they share power, 
status, and dominance, and / or conservative or progressive beliefs. 
Method 
Participants and stimuli. We paid 214 MTurkers (84 women, 130 men; M = 34.72 
years, SD = 11.55) $0.6 to “sort 40 social groups into 5 categories of social groups”. As in 
Studies 2 and 4, people were presented with a random sample of 40 of the 80 social groups that 
had been named by at least 10% of all people who had named U.S.-representative social groups 
in Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, 
participants sorted groups according to their time-space proximity, while in the other condition, 
participants sorted social groups according to their interpersonal liking. 
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Procedure. On the first screen slide, people read: “… please drag-and-drop each of 
these 40 social groups into one of the category boxes presented below.” Thereafter, in the time-
space proximity condition, 112 participants read on: “Members of social groups that are likely 
to be in the same place at the same time should be placed into the same category box. Members 
of social groups that are unlikely to be in the same place at the same time should be placed into 
different category boxes.” In the interpersonal liking condition, 102 participants read on: 
“Members of social groups that like one another should be placed into the same category box. 
Members of social groups that do not like one another should be placed into different category 
boxes.” Below, on the left side of the screen were 40 groups below one another in random order. 
On the rights side were five unlabeled category boxes below one another. To finish the task, 
participants were instructed to sort all 40 groups into any number between two and all five 
category boxes.  
Results 
First, we calculated the likelihood of being sorted into the same category separately for 
each unique pair of social groups (n = 3160) across all participants who had sorted that pair, 
and separately for the 112 and 102 people who had categorized the groups based on space-time 
proximity (M = 27.64 participants per pair, SD = 3.89) and interpersonal liking (M = 25.15 
participants per pair, SD = 3.69), respectively. Second, based on the data from Study 1c, we 
calculated the absolute A, B, and C difference for all unique pairs of groups (e.g., the agency 
of students and scientists is 41.62 and 67.75 on a 0-100 scale, respectively, and thus their 
absolute agency difference is 26.13). And third, to test whether people sorted groups with 
similar and different A, B, and C ratings into the same and different time-space proximity and 
interpersonal liking categories, respectively, we ran two multiple linear regressions with the 
3160 group pairs’ likelihood of being sorted into the same time-space proximity and 
interpersonal liking category as criterion and with the group pairs’ absolute A, B, and C 
differences as predictors.  
The results displayed in Table 9 (all regression weights were highly significant due to 
the high number of degrees of freedom) showed that similarity in both A and B was used as an 
indicator of a high likelihood of time-space proximity in real life. Thus, participants estimated 
that groups that share a position on either of the two dimensions are also particularly likely to 
meet in real life. Importantly, both effects were additive in that they explained unique variance. 
C did have a comparably small impact on whether groups were seen as particularly likely to be 
in the same place at the same time. Results for the second criterion, the likelihood that persons 
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from the 80 groups were judged to like one another, mirrored the results for time-space 
proximity: similarity in A and B strongly and independently influenced whether group members 
were judged to like one another (i.e., the more similar two social groups are on these two 
dimension, the more likely their members are judged to like one another). Similarity in C again 
had a much smaller influence on judgments of interpersonal liking. 
 
Table 9 
Study 7: Pairwise Time-Space Proximity and Interpersonal Liking Simultaneously Predicted by 
Pairwise Absolute Rating Distance on Agency / Socio-Economic Success, 
Conservative-Progressive Beliefs, and Communion   
 
Predictors ß t p <= r pr² sp² 
Criterion: time-space 
proximity 
      
   Distance on Agency (A) -.431 -28.74 .001 -.421 -.456 -.426 
   Distance on Beliefs (B) -.361 -24.34 .001 -.341 -.398 -.360 
   Distance on Communion (C) -.038 -2.56 .01 -.105 -.046 -.038 
Criterion: interpersonal liking       
   Distance on Agency (A) -.365 -23.39 .001 -.359 -.384 -.361 
   Distance on Beliefs (B) -.344 -22.30 .001 -.327 -.369 -.344 
   Distance on Communion (C) -.059 -3.78 .001 -.116 -.067 -.058 
 
Note. 3160 unique U.S. social group pairs’ likelihood of being sorted into the same time-space 
proximity or interpersonal liking category simultaneously predicted by the group pairs’ absolute 
rating distance on A, B, and C, our candidate stereotype content dimensions; r, pr², and sp² 
denote zero order, partial, and semi-partial correlation. 
 
Discussion 
As predicted, participants predominantly relied on stereotypic A and B, and 
substantially less on C to predict the time-space proximity and interpersonal liking of members 
of 80 representatively sampled social groups. More precisely, participants thought that 
members of different groups can likely be found in the same place at the same time if the groups 
are similar in A and B. Further, they thought that members of different groups are likely to like 
one another depending on the groups’ similarity regarding A and B as well. 
This is consistent with the similarity breeds liking literature, which shows that similarity 
in values and attitudes (i.e., B) is particularly relevant for interpersonal liking (e.g., Byrne, 
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1971; Collisson & Howell, 2014). Likewise, assortative mating (i.e., a mating pattern in which 
similar partners mate more frequently with one another that would be expected by chance) has 
been shown to occur not only along dimensions of physical traits (e.g., attractiveness, height), 
but also along socio-economic status, intelligence, religious beliefs, and political ideology (Kail 
& Cavanaugh, 2010). 
In sum, Study 7 provided further support for A and B as fundamental dimensions that 
people spontaneously employ to distinguish between social groups. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Previous research shows that people are able to employ estimates of warmth and 
competence to distinguish between social groups (e.g., Bergsieker et al., 2012; Cuddy et al., 
2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Kervyn et al., 2013; 2015), and that a group’s position on these two 
stereotype dimensions matters, because it has consequences for people’s emotional and 
behavioral reactions and responses to that group (Becker & Asbrock, 2012; Cikara & Fiske, 
2012; Cuddy et al., 2007). However, regardless of their undisputed importance, there is no 
evidence that warmth and competence are fundamental in the sense that people spontaneously 
use these two and not other stereotype dimensions to distinguish between groups. To test this, 
people need to be free to use any stereotype dimensions that they want to use. This paper 
presents such a data-driven approach to the assessment of the dimensionality and content of 
spontaneous stereotypes about groups.  
Complying with Brunswik’s (1956) call for representative designs, in our studies 
participants freely selected not only stereotype dimensions, but also groups, because stimulus 
samples selected by researchers are often biased towards their theories (Fiedler, 2011). To 
implement this research design, we asked participants to name a fixed or self-chosen amount 
of types of people that today’s U.S. / German society categorizes into groups (Fiske et al., 
2002). In 6 Studies, other participants spatially arranged either the most frequently named 
groups, or the groups that appear most often in contemporary American English literature on 
stereotype dimensions of their free choice. According to our multidimensional scaling analyses, 
the spatially arranged mean distances between these groups could best be described by a 
two-dimensional space. According to our property fitting analyses as well as several studies in 
which other participants generated and categorized labels for virtually all axes that run through 
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the origin of this space, the single best pair of more or less orthogonal stereotype axes that 
underlie the space was agency / socio-economic success (A; powerless-powerful, dominated-
dominant, low status-high status, poor-wealthy, unconfident-confident, and unassertive-
competitive) and conservative-progressive beliefs (B; traditional-modern, religious-science-
oriented, conventional-alternative, and conservative-liberal). In other words, variation in 
spontaneous stereotype content about groups could best be described by A and B. We obtained 
evidence for this two-dimensional model from U.S. online and German lab samples and from 
various data-driven approaches to measure spontaneous representations of groups: sequential 
similarity judgment, simultaneous spatial arrangement with respect to global, character-, and 
personal encounter-based similarity, as well as spatial arrangement with prior labeling of two 
similarity axes. Moreover, our data suggests that of the two fundamental dimensions A is 
primary, and B is secondary. Across studies, agency / socio-economic success was regularly 
the best interpretation of a one-dimensional group distances scaling solution (i.e., a one-
dimensional stereotype space), and was most often named as most important for distinguishing 
between the groups. 
 
Speculating why people compare groups in terms of their stereotypic A and B, 
not C 
 
Why agency / socio-economic success? Social hierarchies are millions of years old and 
even today ubiquitous, not just in adults, but also in children and species other than humans. 
Social hierarchies satisfy people’s need for structure, stability, identity, and safety (Jost & van 
der Toorn, 2012), and satisfy people’s need to maintain a shared reality that coordinates social 
interaction for the common good (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Specifically, keeping track of 
social rank is instructive about who needs to be concerned with whose perspective and feelings 
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006), 
about who is constrained and who is free to do and speak their mind (Berdahl & Martorana, 
2006), about who speaks and who listens (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998), and about who tells 
whom what to do.  
Perhaps more importantly, people keep track of social rank, because doing so is critical 
for their individual good. Social groups that are higher in rank hold the key to what people need 
and want – be it health (e.g., doctors), wealth (e.g., managers), entitlement (e.g., lawyers), 
insight (e.g., teachers), or voice (e.g., politicians). Thus, to reach their goals, people must keep 
track of and connect well with groups of higher rank. Also, people want to rise in social rank 
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to have greater access to what they need and want, and to increase their influence on other 
groups. In a nutshell, distinguishing between groups based on their A might be essential for 
feeling secure, for managing cooperation, for reaching goals, and for climbing up the social 
ladder by approaching, attaching to, and blending in with groups of higher rank (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008).  
Previous research on fundamental dimensions of social perception has come to similar 
conclusions: A or competence (which is correlated with A, but distinct) is an integral part of 
virtually any such model, be it under these labels or under labels like instrumentality (Parsons 
& Bales, 1955), intellectual desirability (Rosenthal et al., 1968), self-profitability (Peeters, 
1992), or self-enhancement (Schwartz, 1994). Ultimately, A is considered to be functional both 
evolutionarily and culturally (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, 
Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Fiske et al., 2007).  
Why conservative-progressive beliefs? Less consistent with previous research is our 
finding that the second fundamental dimension on which people spontaneously distinguish 
social groups is whether they are engines of change or preservers of the status quo – that is, 
their position on the dimension of progressive-conservative beliefs. We speculate that knowing 
whether the ideological beliefs of a group are conservative or progressive comes with a lot of 
valuable insights about the ways in which that group intends to use the influence that it has on 
other groups, and about the ways in which members of that group think, feel and behave. In 
line with the idea that humans are intention detectors and often prioritize intentions over 
outcomes (e.g., Ames & Fiske, 2013, 2015), B may inform individuals about the general 
intentions of groups at a societal level. Generally speaking, conservative groups (e.g., 
Christians, Republicans, elderly and the military) want things to be uniform and stay the way 
they are, and thus they emphasize religion, traditions, conventions, and conformity. Interacting 
with conservatives provides people with feelings of stability, predictability, control, safety, 
comfort and belonging (for a review, see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987; 1990). In contrast, progressive groups (e.g., techies, actors, hipsters, and homosexuals) 
want things to change and diversify, and thus they emphasize freedom, autonomy, creativity, 
innovation, (technological, economic, legal etc.), modern subculture (art, music, literature etc.) 
and media, and alternative views and lifestyles. Interacting with progressives provides people 
with feelings of curiosity, stimulation, expansion, entertainment, and distinctiveness 
(Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010; Schwartz, 1994). Thus, keeping track of the ideological 
beliefs of groups might serve at least two functions: it helps people to anticipate and handle the 
form and content of social interactions (e.g., politely agreeing with somebody versus dressing 
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up in an outrageous way), and it enables people to strike a balance between cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral exploitation (conservative groups) and exploration (progressive 
groups; Jost et al., 2009). 
Managing the trade-off between exploiting available resources of certain quality and 
quantity and exploring alternative resources of uncertain quality and quantity is fundamental to 
self-regulatory success (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2010; 
Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014) both culturally (i.e., in the last couple of millennia) and 
evolutionarily (i.e., since the beginning of life). That is, adults, children, other primates and 
many other beings have always had to choose between current and alternative habitats, shelters, 
occupations, foods, mates etc., and these choices have always been important to survive and 
thrive. Based on our results it could be argued that in today’s society it is the conservative and 
the progressive groups that provide access to current, certain and alternative, uncertain 
resources, respectively. Therefore, to successfully manage the ancient and ubiquitous 
exploitation-exploration trade-off, today’s citizens might mentally organize groups along the 
stereotype dimension of conservative-progressive beliefs. 
To further explore whether B is in fact a fundamental stereotype dimension that informs 
individuals about group-specific opportunities for exploitation and exploration, we asked 
additional participants to rate the groups that we examined in Studies 1-4 on seven stereotype 
dimensions that map onto exploitation-exploration13. With one exception (‘prevention-
promotion’), these stereotype dimensions (‘familiarity-novelty’, ‘safety-freedom’, 
‘comfort-stimulation’, ‘loyalty-autonomy’, ‘preservation-change’, and ‘uniformity-diversity’) 
correlated strongly with B14 (mean r = .68, all ps < .001) – in fact as strongly as the correlations 
between the four stereotype dimensions that form B (mean r = .70, all ps < .001).  
                                       
13 We paid 166 participants (67 females, 99 males; M = 42.80 years, SD = 7.91) $0.75 to rate 
the 80 Study 1-4 U.S. groups on one of seven stereotype dimensions that map onto exploitation-
exploration: ‘familiarity-novelty’, ‘safety-freedom’, ‘comfort-stimulation’, 
‘loyalty-autonomy’, ‘preservation-change’, ‘uniformity-diversity’, and ‘prevention 
promotion’. Participants read: “To what extent do these 80 groups stand for … [e.g., safety vs. 
freedom] We are not interested in your personal view, but in how you think these 80 groups are 
viewed by today’s society”. Then, as in all studies reported here, they used 0-100 slider scales 
to rate the groups one atop the other in random order. There were between 21 and 27 raters per 
stereotype dimension, and as in the previous studies, raters’ agreement about the groups was 
very high, all ICC(2,k)s >= .79, (McGraw & Wong, 1996). 
 
14 The exploitation-exploration stereotype dimensions ‘familiarity-novelty’, ‘safety-freedom’, 
‘comfort-stimulation’, ‘loyalty-autonomy’, ‘preservation-change’, and ‘uniformity-diversity’ 
correlated strongly with B (mean r = .68, all ps < .001), but not with A (mean r = .36, four out 
of six ps < .001) and C (mean r = .24, none of the ps < .001). 
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Further, we combined the four stereotype dimensions that form B with the six 
exploitation-exploration stereotype dimensions. Exploitation-exploration and B were equally 
suitable for disambiguating the U.S. groups’ 2D stereotype spaces reported in this paper, mean 
R(2D axis)s = .89 and .90 (SDs = .04 and .04), respectively, ps < .001. However, because the 
participant-generated labels for the horizontal and vertical axis of the 2D arrangement board in 
Study 4 and the participant-generated labels for the nine pairs of reversed axes of the 2D 
stereotype spaces scaled in Studies 5 and 6 mainly reflected B (‘religious’, ‘traditional’, 
‘conservative’, ‘non-religious’, ‘non-traditional’, and ‘liberal’, see Figures 4-7) and not 
exploitation-exploration, it seems that on the manifest level individuals spontaneously use B to 
distinguish between groups. However, striking a balance between exploitation and exploration 
might be the latent regulatory function that distinguishing between conservative and 
progressive groups tries to serve.  
Why not communion? Lastly, our data-driven model deviates from existing theoretical 
approaches in the role of communion or warmth. Classical models construe C as an orthogonal 
stereotype dimension (Fiske et al., 2002; 2006; Cuddy et al., 2007) that has processing priority 
over all other information (Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & 
Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Following the 
functional logic developed above, one could of course ask why individuals should pay attention 
to whether the intentions of a group are communal or not, if that group does not have the A to 
implement its intentions (e.g., children, homeless, drug users, and agnostics; for a previously 
posed similar question, see Fiske et al., 2002). Consistent with the order of priority suggested 
by this question, our data showed that C is an emergent quality that is not independent from 
other stereotype dimensions but follows from A. Groups that are seen as particularly unagentic 
(e.g., homeless, welfare recipients) or overly agentic (e.g., rich, managers) are also seen as least 
trustworthy, sincere, likeable, warm, benevolent, and altruistic. Perhaps those groups are seen 
as contributing too little to society and profiting too much from society, respectively. As 
communion emerges at the center of the A dimension, it can be reconciled with the 
2D AB model of stereotype content.  
Importantly, this finding is not an artefact of asking for spatially arranged dissimilarity 
judgments and ratings on two self-labeled stereotype dimensions. Even if we completely ignore 
the multidimensionally scaled and property fitted dissimilarity data presented in Studies 1-6, 
and consider only on the ratings of A and C, it becomes apparent that these dimensions are not 
independent. Groups’ C is the higher the more average their A is: r = .40, p < .001 (U.S. groups 
in Studies 1-4), r = .44, p < .001 (German groups in Study 3), r = .51, p < .001 (minimalist 
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U.S. groups in Studies 5 and 6; r = .35, p < .01 (naturalistic U.S. groups in Studies 5 / 6)15. This 
new look on communion as average agency is entirely consistent with the abundant literature 
that people trust and like typical, average faces and trait scores more than atypical, extreme 
faces and trait scores (Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Peabody, 1967; Potter, Corneille, Ruys, & 
Rhodes, 2007; Rhodes, Halberstadt, & Brajkovich, 2001; Sofer et al., 2015).  
 
Theoretical implications of the ABC model of stereotypes about groups 
 
The 2D ABC model allows for a new perspective on the well-established effects of 
compensation between warmth and competence (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009; 
Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008). Although warmth and competence are conceptualized as 
orthogonal dimensions in Fiske and colleagues’ (2002) stereotype content model, individuals 
who are described as particularly competent are systematically inferred to be relatively cold 
(Kervyn, Bergsieker, & Fiske, 2012). Although none of the dimensions in the 2D ABC model 
was best described as competence, we observed a similar relation between C (high overlap with 
warmth) and A (related to competence) with one important qualification. In the 2D ABC model, 
the compensation between A and C should only hold for the upper half of the A dimension: 
moderately agentic groups are more communal than highly agentic groups because C is inferred 
from centrality on the A dimension. Importantly, our model makes further predictions that are 
in contradiction to general compensation effects. Groups less agentic than average will also be 
less communal. Starting from a very low position on A (e.g., drug users, homeless), an increase 
in a group’s A towards the average will also lead to more favorable C impressions.  
Given that stereotypic C (but not so much A and B) can be taken as a proxy for 
stereotypic valence16, this new perspective on stereotypic C also allows further delineations. If 
                                       
15 Consistent with our finding that C emerges from A but not B, the social groups’ C is not the 
higher the more average their B is, r = -.17, p = .13 (U.S. groups in Studies 1-4), r = .06, p = .60 
(German groups in Study 3), r = -.10, p = .55 (minimalist U.S. groups in Studies 5 / 6), and 
r = -.28, and p < .05 (naturalistic U.S. groups in Studies 5 / 6; this correlation is the only 
exception, and it is rather weak). 
 
16 We paid 25 MTurkers (16 females, 9 males; M = 42.80 years, SD = 7.91) $1 to rate the 
valence (‘worse-better’) of the 80 U.S. groups examined in Studies 1-4. Valence correlated with 
C, r = .78, p < .001, but neither with A, r = -.01, p = .90, nor with B, r = .07, p = .55. Note that 
this does not contradict the linear relation between valence and A as found by Abele and 
Wojciszke (2007) or Suitner and Maas (2008). These and other studies lack extremely agentic 
stimuli (e.g., ‘aggressive’, ‘reckless’, and ‘conceited’ rather than just ‘assertive’, ‘brave’, and 
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C emerges as average A, then after a certain point (i.e., being exactly average on A), social 
groups cannot be stereotyped as more communal, while they can always be stereotyped as less 
communal, because there is no limit to being more extreme in terms of A. This is consistent 
with the notion that negative stimuli are stronger (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001), more dominant / contagious (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), and more mobilizing 
(Taylor, 1991) than positive stimuli. Finally, maximal C and thus the highest positive valence 
at average agency is also consistent with the density hypothesis (Unkelbach, 2012; Unkelbach, 
Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008), that is, the notion that positive stimuli are more 
similar to one another than negative stimuli (see also Alves et al., 2015; Koch et al, 2016a; 
Koch et al., 2016b). More precisely, if increasingly communal groups are increasingly close to 
the center of the A dimension, then they must be increasingly similar to one another, just 
because by necessity they are also increasingly close to one another. If so, then the groups’ C 
should be related to their average similarity to all other social groups. This was indeed the case: 
r = .38, p < .001 (Study 1), r = .59, p < .001 (Study 2), r = .79, p < .001 (Study 3), r = .53, p < 
.001 (Study 4), r = .64 and r = .67, both ps < .001 (Study 5; minimalist and naturalistic groups, 
respectively), and r = .53 and r = .42, both ps < .001 (Study 5; minimalist and naturalistic 
groups, respectively. In Tolstoy’s (1873-1877/2001) terms: communal social groups are all 
alike (i.e., they are all average on A); but every non-communal social group is non-communal 
in its own way (being either higher or lower than average on A). 
Limitations and future directions 
 
The studies described here leave open whether there are spontaneous / fundamental 
stereotype content dimensions other than agency / socio-economic success and 
conservative-progressive beliefs. With the exception of Study 1, in all studies reported in this 
paper, the 2D spatial arrangement board (Hout et al., 2013) that people used prompted them to 
spontaneously select no more than two unrelated stereotype content dimensions. Thus, it is 
possible that there is consensus about a third, fourth, fifth etc. spontaneous / fundamental 
stereotype content dimension that our research designs did not reveal. The third dimension 
might actually be communion, as communion was (not highly, but) to some extent suitable as 
a third independent dimension in Studies 1, 4, and, in part, 5. Although the question of whether 
                                       
‘confident’), and thus they found a linear relation. In our stimulus sample, there are extremely 
agentic groups (e.g., ‘rich’; ‘celebrities’, ‘elites’, ‘upper class’, ‘managers’, ‘politicians’, 
‘lawyers’), and thus we find a quadratic relation between valence and A (more precisely, a 
linear relation between valence and averageness on A), r = .31, p < .01. 
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there are more than the two spontaneous / fundamental stereotype content dimensions is 
informative, insights about additional dimensions would not speak against our assertion that the 
two most spontaneous / fundamental ones are A and B. C as the third, fourth, fifth etc. 
fundamental stereotype content dimension would also be compatible with C as average A, as 
was found in Studies 1-6. 
Despite the highly consistent results, our studies speak to the relatively abstract question 
of how individuals distinguish between all societal groups. In motivating our research we have 
labeled this approach to stereotyping the “lay sociologist” perspective and related it to previous 
research that (at least at the core of its empirical contribution) has followed a similar aim (e.g., 
Fiske et al., 2002, Cuddy et al., 2007). Stereotypes might, however, not only guide how people 
distinguish between all societal groups, but may also serve as knowledge structures that 
individuals recruit in social interactions with members of proximal groups (the “relational” 
perspective; e.g., Cambon, Yzerbyt, & Yakimova, 2014). It may be that stereotypical 
knowledge about the communion/warmth of such proximal groups receives relatively greater 
processing priority in social interactions compared to people’s perception of more remote 
groups.  
More precisely, encountering members of proximal groups may elicit an affective, 
evaluative response that leads people to spontaneously construe these groups in terms of their 
perceived C rather than A and / or B. The results of Studies 5 and 6 speak against this idea, as 
participants spontaneously employed A and B rather than C to distinguish between encounters 
with members of all societal groups. However, maybe participants in Study 5 and 6 did not 
identify strongly and / or did not strongly oppose identifying with many of these groups, 
reducing the salience of C as a dimension. To test if C is most important for distinguishing 
between encounters with members of predominantly proximal groups, in future studies people 
should spatially arrange mostly proximal groups that they strongly identify with and / or 
strongly oppose identifying with. Nevertheless, we argue that distinguishing between all 
societal groups, and possibly also between proximal groups, in terms of their perceived A and 
B is functional and important, too. As stated above, groups’ A and B are informative about 
opportunities for reaching goals and climbing up the social ladder (A) and opportunities for 
exploitation versus exploration (B). 
Even without the relational aspect, individuals may think differently about individuals 
than about social groups. Future studies might thus consider prompting people to name 
representatives of groups (e.g., Natalie Portman for actors and Pope Francis for Catholics), and 
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to then spatially arrange these representatives rather than the groups they represent. 
Alternatively, people might spatially arrange individuals that do not markedly represent any 
particular group(s). Such individualized processing may bring communal information to the 
forefront so that participants spontaneously judge the group representatives / individuals 
primarily along the line of how trustworthy and friendly they perceive them to be. This would 
be one possibility to reconcile our group-based 2D ABC model with the finding that 
communion enjoys a privileged position in processing of information about individuals (e.g., 
Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). 
Given that data-driven approaches to modeling face perception show that dominance 
(or agency / socio-economic success), youthfulness versus agedness (one could argue that 
people with a youthful and aged face are likely to hold progressive and conservative beliefs, 
respectively), and trustworthiness (or communion) are fundamental dimensions (Oosterhof & 
Todorov, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2013), it seems promising to explore the extent to which the 
space of facial stereotypes also follows the 2D ABC pattern developed in this paper. There is 
already initial evidence that faces with more average features are perceived as more communal 
(Sofer et al., 2015; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). However, it is also 
conceivable that faces prompt a more individualized social information processing than abstract 
group labels, so that C is an independent dimension that is given more weight than A and B 
(Sutherland et al., 2013). In any case, the 2D ABC model suggested here based on a bottom-
up, data-driven approach must now be tested in a top-down, theory-driven research program. 
Our results consistently show very high overlap (up to R >= .90) between the axis rotated 
around the origin of the social groups’ 1D-3D spaces and the independently gathered ratings of 
the groups on candidate stereotype content dimensions. Although this overlap is almost 
suspiciously high (cf. Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009), it should be stressed that we 
correlated data on a very high level of aggregation. Specifically, we correlated dissimilarity 
averaged across individuals with stereotypic A, B, and C averaged across individuals, which 
removed all variance due to inter-individual differences in judging the dissimilarities between 
the social groups and their A, B, and C. Thus, our data reflect correlations of group-level 
averages (social groups as cases), and not averaged individual-level correlations (participants 
as cases). Thus, our group-level effect sizes do not allow conclusions about individual-level 
effect sizes (Brand & Bradley, 2012; Brand, Bradley, Best, & Stoica, 2011; Monin and 
Oppenheimer, 2005). This does not threaten the validity of our 2D ABC model of stereotype 
content about groups, as stereotypes are defined as group-level effects (i.e., groups “as viewed 
by society”; Fiske et al., 2002, p. 884). 
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Finally, just like the SCM (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002), the 2D ABC model does not address 
how people’s group identities influence stereotypes about groups (Smith, 1993; Mackie, Smith, 
& Ray, 2008). Obviously, in-group versus out-group memberships must influence stereotype 
content. That is, individual (or intergroup) differences in group stereotypes are lost in averaging 
across raters. The model therefore addresses stereotypes as shared knowledge structures. 
Nevertheless, Individual (or intergroup) differences in group stereotypes are a fascinating topic 
for future research. For example, it could be that communion remains a centrally located polar 
dimension also at the individual level (existing data suggest that this is so; Imhoff & Koch, 
2016). It may be that even raters who are extreme on A or B still see groups average on these 
dimensions as most trustworthy. Alternatively, it might be that for these raters C transforms 
into an axial dimension that is more or less identical with the axial dimension on which they 
are extreme, with high C being located where the raters’ groups are extreme. If the latter 
scenario holds true, then, for example, artists should perceive progressives and conservatives 
as high and low on C, whereas groups that differ in A should not differ in C for artists. These 
and other empirical questions are interesting and important avenues for future research on the 
2D ABC model of stereotype content about groups. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We presented a data- rather than theory-driven answer to the nature and order of the 
stereotype content dimensions that people spontaneously employ to distinguish between social 
groups. Our analyses indicate that people mentally organize groups primarily based on their 
stereotypic agency / socio-economic success (A), and secondarily based on their stereotypic 
conservative-progressive beliefs (B). Further, social groups that are thought to be average on A 
are inferred to be communal, whereas social groups that are thought to be extreme (high or low) 
on A are inferred to be as non-communal (C), resulting in a two-dimensional ABC model of 
stereotype content. 
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Appendix A 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for Study 1 
Candidate                 
stereotype content dimension  
M SD R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D  
pole) 
r(2D  
pole) 
r(3D  
pole) 
Conventional-Alternative  44.00 15.96 .745 .874 .914 -.356 -.332 -.294 
Traditional-Modern 53.91 17.03 .693 .886 .908 .002 .067 .086 
Conservative-Liberal  54.46 20.55 .702 .853 .903 -.178 -.084 -.058 
Poor-Wealthy 45.80 17.02 .625 .796 .885 .226 .271 .245 
Religious-Science-oriented  50.17 17.81 .301 .695 .848 .112 .118 .116 
Low status-High status 53.11 15.54 .627 .737 .820 .441 .538 .511 
Powerless-Powerful 46.95 17.56 .606 .718 .812 .414 .514 .502 
Dominated-Dominating 50.70 18.34 .555 .649 .796 .374 .420 .399 
Unintelligent-Smart 62.24 10.24 .485 .672 .780 .230 .353 .339 
Unconfident-Confident 59.95 14.22 .615 .660 .719 .364 .351 .320 
Unassertive-Competitive 57.35 14.48 .296 .369 .701 .483 .385 .334 
Intolerant-Tolerant 57.45 10.79 .246 .638 .686 .128 .295 .317 
Unable-Skillful 65.43 11.36 .454 .586 .656 .481 .498 .474 
Incompetent-Competent 66.17 12.16 .327 .503 .612 .461 .530 .511 
Masculine-Feminine 46.90 12.09 .096 .491 .602 -.214 .053 .042 
Egoistic-Altruistic 46.47 12.00 .019 .121 .593 .013 .054 .073 
Communal-Individualistic 48.66 11.09 .374 .435 .559 -.214 -.221 -.189 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy 55.10 12.26 .258 .308 .491 .388 .385 .381 
Dishonest-Sincere 59.65 11.48 .177 .243 .481 .263 .250 .252 
Threatening-Benevolent 61.98 11.20 .218 .369 .451 .368 .438 .429 
Typical (U.S.)-Unusual (U.S.) 53.05 14.19 .181 .321 .397 -.650 -.791 -.798 
Cold-Warm 57.75 11.84 .013 .146 .390 .384 .455 .480 
Repellent-Likable 61.50 14.16 .243 .255 .386 .493 .581 .594 
Unfriendly-Friendly 56.29 8.41 .173 .121 .327 .303 .341 .338 
 
Note. Study 1: the 80 U.S. social groups’ means (M) and standard deviations (SD) on the 24 candidate 
stereotype content dimensions. The higher R(1D axis), R(2D axis), R(3D axis), r(1D pole), r(2D pole), 
and r(3D pole), the more suitable the respective candidate stereotype content dimension for interpreting 
the social groups’ 1D, 2D and 3D dissimilarity configurations in an axial and polar way, respectively. 
Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix B 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for Study 2 
Candidate                                   
stereotype content dimension  
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D  
pole) 
r(2D  
pole) 
r(3D  
pole) 
Traditional-Modern .633 .765 .927 .046 .192 .142 
Conservative-Liberal  .807 .819 .916 .079 .100 .038 
Conventional-Alternative  .820 .849 .905 -.206 -.181 -.250 
Low status-High status .758 .803 .878 .164 .291 .366 
Powerless-Powerful .745 .786 .877 .067 .237 .298 
Poor-Wealthy .656 .709 .865 -.027 .036 .069 
Dominated-Dominating .748 .776 .833 -.026 .122 .178 
Unconfident-Confident .734 .750 .825 .168 .134 .160 
Religious-Science-oriented  .268 .618 .825 -.073 .131 .105 
Unable-Skillful .478 .507 .699 .352 .422 .472 
Unassertive-Competitive .508 .620 .655 .059 .188 .214 
Intolerant-Tolerant .343 .352 .643 .343 .441 .436 
Unintelligent-Smart .341 .397 .605 .318 .315 .348 
Communal-Individualistic  .331 .542 .533 -.395 -.252 -.248 
Incompetent-Competent .279 .297 .521 .356 .451 .477 
Masculine-Feminine .191 .195 .445 -.009 .037 .047 
Typical (U.S.)-Untypical (U.S.) .389 .354 .438 -.318 -.676 -.724 
Egoistic-Altruistic .158 .388 .373 .292 .284 .263 
Threatening-Benevolent .177 .169 .332 .499 .545 .556 
Dishonest-Sincere .070 .256 .310 .520 .453 .433 
Repellent-Likable .212 .224 .268 .574 .655 .694 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy .151 .200 .261 .584 .555 .553 
Unfriendly-Friendly .159 .246 .235 .407 .428 .423 
Cold-Warm .088 .184 .211 .563 .626 .618 
 
Note. Study 2: the higher R(1D axis), R(2D axis), R(3D axis), r(1D pole), r(2D pole), and r(3D pole), 
the more suitable the respective candidate stereotype content dimension for interpreting the 
80 U.S. social groups’ 1D, 2D and 3D dissimilarity configurations in an axial and polar way, 
respectively. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix C 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for Study 4 
Candidate                                   
stereotype content dimension  
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D  
pole) 
r(2D  
pole) 
r(3D  
pole) 
Low status-High status .887 .924 .935 .262 .263 .269 
Poor-Wealthy .882 .891 .914 .139 .090 .119 
Powerless-Powerful .847 .887 .889 .231 .230 .242 
Conservative-Liberal  .535 .841 .884 .095 .096 .074 
Traditional-Modern .257 .841 .876 .088 .092 .092 
Conventional-Alternative  .562 .811 .874 -.113 -.145 -.130 
Dominated-Dominating .751 .808 .811 .133 .127 .144 
Unable-Skillful .721 .804 .826 .314 .325 .337 
Unconfident-Confident .717 .772 .771 .263 .240 .241 
Religious-Science-oriented  .169 .734 .770 -.040 -.038 -.022 
Unintelligent-Smart .629 .727 .743 .317 .303 .296 
Incompetent-Competent .584 .720 .758 .335 .341 .339 
Intolerant-Tolerant .047 .676 .773 .367 .383 .369 
Unassertive-Competitive .549 .578 .579 .192 .201 .209 
Threatening-Benevolent .352 .534 .675 .509 .503 .473 
Repellent-Likable .346 .481 .716 .479 .525 .498 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy .304 .418 .590 .510 .529 .507 
Individualistic-Communal .117 .389 .523 -.421 -.423 -.373 
Dishonest-Sincere .208 .340 .541 .368 .387 .363 
Masculine-Feminine .004 .332 .375 .168 .126 .102 
Typical (U.S.)-Untypical (U.S.) .243 .313 .533 -.362 -.447 -.427 
Cold-Warm .016 .303 .609 .509 .547 .519 
Egoistic-Altruistic .107 .152 .395 .231 .241 .212 
Unfriendly-Friendly .004 .118 .573 .532 .546 .502 
 
Note. Study 4: the higher R(1D axis), R(2D axis), R(3D axis), r(1D pole), r(2D pole), and r(3D pole), 
the more suitable the respective candidate stereotype content dimension for interpreting the 
80 U.S. social groups’ 1D, 2D and 3D dissimilarity configurations in an axial and polar way, 
respectively. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix D 
Property Fitting Results for the Additional Study Mentioned in Footnote 5 
Candidate                          
stereotype content dimension  
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Agency .885 .877 .889 .151 .183 .189 
Beliefs .458 .910 .932 -.024 -.113 -.124 
Communion .125 .529 .600 .278 .328 .316 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 40 U.S. social groups’ agency, 
beliefs, and communion ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 1D, 
2D, and 3D dissimilarity spaces; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the social groups’ agency, 
beliefs, and communion ratings and their proximity to the origin of these three spaces. Bold correlation 
coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix E 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for the Additional Study Mentioned in Footnote 5 
Candidate                                   
stereotype content dimension  
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D  
pole) 
r(2D  
pole) 
r(3D  
pole) 
Traditional-Modern .456 .909 .931 .088 .092 .092 
Poor-Wealthy .880 .905 .909 .139 .090 .119 
Conservative-Liberal .627 .899 .918 .095 .096 .074 
Powerless-Powerful .853 .851 .866 .231 .230 .242 
Low status-High status .870 .847 .857 .262 .263 .269 
Dominated-Dominating .836 .843 .856 .133 .127 .144 
Unintelligent-Smart .480 .830 .855 .317 .303 .296 
Religious-Science-oriented .068 .822 .901 -.040 -.038 -.022 
Conventional-Alternative .639 .817 .846 -.113 -.145 -.130 
Intolerant-Tolerant .315 .806 .825 .367 .383 .369 
Unable-Skillful .646 .776 .791 .314 .325 .337 
Incompetent-Competent .412 .733 .755 .335 .341 .339 
Unconfident-Confident .671 .658 .697 .263 .240 .241 
Threatening-Benevolent .006 .616 .613 .509 .503 .473 
Unassertive-Competitive .547 .579 .668 .192 .201 .209 
Dishonest-Sincere .135 .535 .613 .368 .387 .363 
Cold-Warm .372 .513 .584 .509 .547 .519 
Untrustworthy-Trustworthy .045 .477 .521 .510 .529 .507 
Masculine-Feminine .244 .462 .486 .168 .126 .102 
Egoistic-Altruistic .206 .458 .618 .231 .241 .212 
Repellent-Likable .031 .423 .468 .479 .525 .498 
Unfriendly-Friendly .275 .339 .536 .532 .546 .502 
Communal-Individualistic .022 .254 .677 -.421 -.423 -.373 
Typical (U.S.)-Untypical (U.S.) .137 .190 .286 -.362 -.447 -.427 
 
Note. The higher R(1D axis), R(2D axis), R(3D axis), r(1D pole), r(2D pole), and r(3D pole), the more 
suitable the respective candidate stereotype content dimension for interpreting the 
40 U.S. social groups’ 1D, 2D and 3D dissimilarity configurations in an axial and polar way, 
respectively. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix F 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for the 42 Minimalist U.S. Groups in Study 5 
Candidate                          
stereotype content dimension  
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
global (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .827 .928 .938 -.095 -.076 -.073 
Beliefs (B) .721 .895 .922 .223 .187 .216 
Communion (C; standard) .021 .049 .291 .516 .576 .550 
Communion (C; alternative) .112 .182 .230 .439 .487 .503 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
character (dis)similarity  
      
Agency (A) .558 .794 .725 -.414 -.118 -.114 
Beliefs (B) .799 .889 .915 -.059 .035 .041 
Communion (C; standard) .038 .394 .477 .529 .564 .608 
Communion (C; alternative) .135 .474 .543 .523 .475 .545 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
personal encounter (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .742 .921 .894 -.093 -.115 -.135 
Beliefs (B) .786 .926 .930 .232 .178 .200 
Communion (C; standard) .053 .088 .297 .470 .563 .575 
Communion (C; alternative) .187 .208 .188 .452 .516 .560 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 42 minimalist social groups’ agency 
/ socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion (standard and alternative 
operationalization) ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 1D, 2D, 
and 3D space; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the 42 minimalist social groups’ A, B, and 
C (standard and alternative operationalization) ratings and their proximity to the origin of these three 
spaces. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix G 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for the 61 Naturalistic U.S. Groups in Study 5 
Candidate                          
stereotype content dimension  
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
global (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .665 .757 .800 -.024 .042 .078 
Beliefs (B) .334 .875 .888 .532 .183 .214 
Communion (C; standard) .195 .166 .234 .405 .588 .555 
Communion (C; alternative) .203 .167 .236 .594 .705 .654 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
character (dis)similarity  
      
Agency (A) .653 .763 .762 -.061 .041 .024 
Beliefs (B) .294 .794 .789 .398 .126 .199 
Communion (C; standard) .126 .115 .411 .405 .553 .483 
Communion (C; alternative) .133 .170 .529 .567 .665 .586 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
personal encounter (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .816 .849 .867 .162 .180 .217 
Beliefs (B) .372 .889 .858 .580 .240 .272 
Communion (C; standard) .001 .095 .612 .353 .517 .404 
Communion (C; alternative) .019 .201 .629 .557 .634 .527 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 61 naturalistic social groups’ 
agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion (standard and 
alternative operationalization) ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 
1D, 2D, and 3D space; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the 61 naturalistic social groups’ A, 
B, and C (standard and alternative operationalization) ratings and their proximity to the origin of these 
three spaces. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix H 
Study 6: Minimalist and Naturalistic U.S. Groups Most Frequently Selected for Spatial Arrangement 
 
1st - 21th  
most frequently 
SELECTED 
minimalist groups 
22st - 42th  
most frequently 
SELECTED 
minimalist groups 
1st - 31th  
most frequently 
SELECTED 
naturalistic groups 
 
 
32st - 61th  
Most frequently 
SELECTED   
naturalistic groups 
 
Working class (70%) Blue collar (51%) Women (54%) Hispanics (35%) 
Women (69%) Religious (51%) Middle class (50%) Asians (34%) 
Middle class (67%) Elderly (50%) Educated (49%) Politicians (34%) 
Rich (66%) Gays (49%) Whites (48%) Military (34%) 
Men (65%) Lesbians (49%) Men (48%) Lesbians (34%) 
Poor (64%) Parents (48%) Students (46%) Homeless (34%) 
Democrats (64%) White collar (48%) Rich (46%) Musicians (34%) 
Whites (64%) Homosexuals (47%) Americans (45%) Mexicans (33%) 
Students (63%) Asians (47%) Democrats (45%) Artists (32%) 
Upper class (63%) Hipsters (46%) Religious (45%) Catholics (32%) 
Liberals (62%) Hippies (44%) Christians (44%) Athletes (32%) 
Lower class (60%) Athletes (43%) Young (43%) Immigrants (32%) 
Republicans (56%) Politicians (43%) Liberals (42%) Elites (31%) 
Teenagers (56%) Immigrants (40%) Poor (42%) Entrepreneurs (30%) 
Nerds (56%) Drug addicts (40%) Adults (41%) Actors (30%) 
Blacks (53%) Hispanics (40%) Blacks (41%) Europeans (29%) 
Christians (53%) Transgender (40%) Old (41%) Activists (29%) 
Conservatives (53%) Muslims (38%) Republicans (40%) Farmers (28%) 
Celebrities (52%) Goths (36%) Straight (40%) Writers (27%) 
Homeless (52%) Jews (35%) Conservatives (39%) Muslims (27%) 
Atheists (52%) Jocks (33%) Homosexuals (39%) Law enforcement (27%) 
  Employed (39%) Jewish (26%) 
  Children (39%) Chinese (25%) 
  Professionals (39%) Ethnic (24%) 
  Scientists (38%) Rebels (23%) 
  Minorities (38%) Tall (23%) 
  Friends (37%) Short (23%) 
  Family (37%) Indians (22%) 
  Teens (37%) Clubs (14%) 
  Parents (37%) Alcoholics Anonymous 
(50%)   Gays (37%)  
 
Note. Percentage in parentheses is proportion of participants who spontaneously selected this group for 
either global, character-, or personal encounter-based (dis)similarity arrangement.   
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Appendix I 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for the 42 Minimalist U.S. Groups in Study 6 
Candidate                          
stereotype content dimension  
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
global (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .867 .864 .893 -.131 -.017 -.004 
Beliefs (B) .587 .805 .880 .224 .211 .231 
Communion (C; standard) .043 .165 .414 .580 .659 .631 
Communion (C; alternative) .189 .246 .454 .564 .610 .615 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
character (dis)similarity  
      
Agency (A) .819 .915 .930 -.139 -.084 -.049 
Beliefs (B) .720 .944 .961 .230 .185 .158 
Communion (C; standard) .026 .043 .054 .602 .575 .593 
Communion (C; alternative) .148 .170 .264 .520 .522 .575 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
personal encounter (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .784 .864 .904 -.236 -.168 -.177 
Beliefs (B) .762 .897 .922 .132 .230 .253 
Communion (C; standard) .074 .076 .325 .600 .652 .639 
Communion (C; alternative) .189 .237 .296 .536 .566 .557 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 42 minimalist social groups’ agency 
/ socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion (standard and alternative 
operationalization) ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 1D, 2D, 
and 3D space; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the 42 minimalist social groups’ A, B, and 
C (standard and alternative operationalization) ratings and their proximity to the origin of these three 
spaces. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix J 
Detailed Property Fitting Results for the 61 Naturalistic U.S. Groups in Study 6 
Candidate                          
stereotype content dimension  
 
R(1D 
axis) 
R(2D 
axis) 
R(3D 
axis) 
r(1D 
pole) 
r(2D 
pole) 
r(3D 
pole) 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
global (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .713 .733 .873 -.002 .141 .146 
Beliefs (B) .546 .864 .920 .376 .220 .193 
Communion (C; standard) .030 .094 .264 .422 .510 .451 
Communion (C; alternative) .058 .221 .333 .534 .585 .526 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
character (dis)similarity  
      
Agency (A) .654 .700 .841 -.046 .152 .100 
Beliefs (B) .617 .877 .923 .405 .343 .313 
Communion (C; standard) .045 .074 .335 .393 .445 .444 
Communion (C; alternative) .094 .258 .412 .552 .516 .532 
Spatial  arrangement based on 
personal encounter (dis)similarity 
      
Agency (A) .664 .754 .854 -.069 -.036 -.013 
Beliefs (B) .658 .699 .908 .393 .365 .329 
Communion (C; standard) .074 .461 .419 .414 .358 .362 
Communion (C; alternative) .002 .455 .470 .580 .447 .454 
 
Note. R(1D-3D axis) indicate the maximal correlations between the 61 naturalistic social groups’ 
agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion (standard and 
alternative operationalization) ratings and their projections on an axis rotated around the origin of their 
1D, 2D, and 3D space; r(1D-3D pol) indicate correlations between the 61 naturalistic social groups’ A, 
B, and C (standard and alternative operationalization) ratings and their proximity to the origin of these 
three spaces. Bold correlation coefficients are significant at p =< .001. 
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Appendix K 
 
 
 
Note. One out of many ways to spatially arrange these 40 representative social groups (first 1, then 2, 
3 … 10 … 20 … 30 … 40). Colors are inverted.   
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Appendix L 
 
 
 
Note. In Studies 4 and 5, if a participant came to think that ‘influence’ and ‘integrity’ best describe the 
similarities and differences between these 40 representative social groups, then this is one of many 
possible setups to begin with the 2D rating task. Colors are inverted. 
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Appendix M 
 
 
 
Note. An example of the meaning clouds that participants in Studies 5 and 6 used to rate the groups’ 
agency / socio-economic success, conservative-progressive beliefs, and communion. This particular 
meaning cloud was used to measure the groups’ agency / socio-economic success. 
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Appendix N 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. An example of the social group rankings that participants labeled in Study 5. The label most 
often generated for this ranking was “conservative”. 
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Chapter 4 – Discussion 
 
 In Chapter 1 I argued that valence asymmetry in stimulus similarity can be taken as a 
novel, independent, powerful, appealing, robust, and general explanation of 
valence asymmetry in cognitive processing. Chapter 2 and 3 elaborated on the empirical 
robustness and generality of the theoretically predicted higher similarity of positive 
compared to negative stimuli, showing the effect for thousands of words and pictures (Chapter 
2), and for hundreds of groups (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 I argue that our explanation of valence 
asymmetry in stimulus similarity – that is, the homeostatic distribution (i.e., too little-adequate-
too much, see Chapter 1) of quantities on evaluatively relevant dimensions – predicts a social 
group stereotypes model that is different from, and possibly more complex than, the classical 
model developed by Fiske and colleagues (2002). 
 
Groups’ stereotypic communion and agency are not orthogonal, but related in a 
curvilinear manner such that communion peaks at average agency 
  
Two dimensions have so often been postulated as the two most important dimensions of 
content in social perception and cognition that they have become known as the Big Two. These 
Big Two are communion and agency, and there are many synonyms such as femininity and 
masculinity, expressiveness and instrumentality, morality and competence, trustworthiness and 
autonomy etc. (for a review, see Abele & Wojciszke, 2014). Fiske and colleagues (2002) 
labeled the Big Two in the group perception and cognition literature, namely as 
warmth (tolerant, warm, good-natured, sincere) and competence (competent, confident, 
independent, competitive, intelligent). According to their model, it is crucial for to survive and 
thrive (i.e., overcoming challenges and taking chances) that people get a speedy and accurate 
impression of whether another person’s intentions towards them are benign or malicious. Once 
another person’s intentions are known, the next most important thing to know is whether that 
person is able or unable to achieve what he / she intends to do to the self. Fiske and colleagues 
(2002) argue that a person’s group membership is to a great extent informative about his / her 
intentions towards the self, and about his / her ability to achieve what he / she intends to do to 
the self. Thus people stereotype groups on the Big Two. As groups with benign or malicious 
intentions (high vs. low warmth) can in principle be able or unable to achieve what they intend 
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to do to the self (high vs. low competence), Fiske and colleagues (2002) claimed that warmth 
and competence are orthogonal dimensions of group stereotypes. There is some evidence in 
support of this claim (Cuddy et al., 2009; Kervyn, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2013), but the authors of 
the respective studies did not investigate whether groups’ warmth / communion and 
competence / agency are related in a curvilinear manner. 
 Consistent with the homeostatic valence model developed in Chapter 1 I propose that 
groups’ stereotypic warmth / communion and competence / agency are not orthogonal, but 
related in a curvilinear manner such that communion peaks at average agency. Specifically, 
the homeostatic valence model distinguishes between evaluatively relevant dimensions and 
evaluation as a dimension that follows from one or more evaluatively relevant dimensions; 
positive and negative evaluations follow from intermediate (i.e., adequate) and extreme 
(i.e., insufficient and excessive) quantities on evaluatively relevant dimensions. I propose that 
groups’ warmth / communion is identical to their evaluation. The extraordinarily high 
correlation between groups’ warmth / communion and their evaluation observed in Study 1 
in Chapter 3 (see Footnote 16 in the General Discussion in Chapter 3) supports this claim. 
Further, I propose that groups’ competence / agency is not identical to their evaluation, but 
rather an evaluatively relevant dimension in the sense of the homeostatic valence model. If this 
is correct, then the correlations between groups’ competence / agency and their evaluation, and 
between groups’ competence / agency and their warmth / communion (i.e., the linear relation 
between groups’ competence / agency and warmth / communion) should be low or zero, 
whereas the correlations between groups’ squared centered competence / agency and their 
evaluation, and between groups’ squared centered competence / agency and their warmth / 
communion (i.e., the inverted u-shaped relation between groups’ competence / agency and 
warmth / communion) should be higher than low or zero. We found this pattern of correlations 
for the groups examined in Studies 1, 3, and 5 in Chapter 3, suggesting that groups’ warmth / 
communion and competence / agency are indeed related in a curvilinear manner such that 
communion peaks at average agency.  
Testing the robustness and generality of this curvilinear relation, we analyzed some 
more data that are not reported in Chapter 3. Specifically, we (Imhoff & Koch, 2016) compared 
the correlation between agency and communion with the correlation between squared centered 
agency and communion for groups generated by a large participant sample that is age- and 
gender-representative of the German population, for groups generated by 30+ large participant 
samples from 20+ countries (Durante et al., 2013), and for groups rated on agency and 
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communion by single individuals rather than several participants (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). For 
all these samples of groups, the linear relation between agency and communion was low to 
zero, whereas the inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between the Big Two was higher than 
low to zero. These results suggest that our finding in Chapter 3 that groups’ stereotypic agency 
and communion are related in a curvilinear manner (i.e., communion peaks at average agency) 
is robust and general. This conclusion speaks against the group stereotype model developed by 
Fiske and colleagues (2002; see also Cuddy et al., 2007) in which agency and communion are 
orthogonal dimensions, and at the same time speaks for the validity of the homeostatic valence 
model developed in Chapter 1. Further empirical support for the validity of the homeostatic 
valence model is provided by inverted u-shaped curvilinear relations between a variety of 
evaluatively relevant dimensions and evaluation, and by a lack of u-shaped curvilinear relations 
between evaluatively relevant dimensions and evaluation (see Chapter 1 or Grant & Schwartz, 
2011). 
If groups’ stereotypic communion peaks at average agency, how come that the 
correlation between entities’ agency and communion has been observed to be negative (e.g., 
Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Kervyn, Bergsieker, & Fiske, 2012; 
Wojciszke, 1994), null (Abele, 2003; Cislak & Wojciszke, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009; Kervyn, 
Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2013), and positive (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Suitner & Maas, 2008; 
Wojciszke & Abele, 2008; Durante et al., 2013)? Can the homeostatic valence model explain 
this inconsistent pattern of results? I propose that yes, but only yes if one additional assumption 
is correct, namely the assumption that previous studies on the nature of the relationship between 
entities’ agency and communion have examined constrained samples of entities that are not 
representative of the entire agency spectrum.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, given the inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between 
agency and communion predicted by the homeostatic valence model (see Chapter 1), a positive 
(Figure 1, panel 1), null (panel 2), and negative (panel 3) linear relation is observed for entities 
low, average, and high on agency, respectively. In other words, if the relation between the Big 
Two is actually curvilinear in the sense of the homeostatic valence model, constrained stimulus 
sampling (Fiedler, 2000; 2011; 2014) obscures this curvilinear relation and might explain 
contradictory findings regarding the linear relation between entities’ agency and communion.  
 
Figure 1 
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Note. Exemplary inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between agency and communion. 
 
 Finally, overlooking the inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between entities’ 
agency and communion predicted by the homeostatic valence model might happen even 
in studies that examine samples of entities that are representative of the entire agency spectrum. 
If authors of such studies fail to test for an inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation, they cannot 
find evidence in support of it. In fact, apart from our own studies to my knowledge there is no 
study that tested for an inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between groups’ 
agency and communion. 
The ABC model of group stereotypes developed in Chapter 3 differs from the classical 
model by Fiske and colleagues (2002) in two ways. First, as discussed in the previous section, 
in the ABC model groups’ stereotypic communion (C) and agency (A) are related in a 
curvilinear manner (see Figure 1) rather than orthogonal, a phenomenon that necessarily 
follows from the homeostatic valence model developed in Chapter 1. And second, a 
phenomenon that is well in line with the homeostatic valence model in which the evaluation of 
a class of stimuli can depend on more than just one evaluatively relevant dimension, the ABC 
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model contains an additional dimension, namely groups’ stereotypic conservative-progressive 
beliefs (B). How come that the classical model misses B? I propose that the reason is the same 
reason why it misses the curvilinear relation between C and A, namely the constrained 
sampling strategy (Fiedler, 2000; 2011; 2014) of its proponents. Specifically, the curvilinear 
relation between groups’ C and A has been overlooked by proponents of the classical model 
because they did not test for an inverted u-shaped curvilinear relation between groups’ 
agency and communion. Likewise, B has been overlooked because participants in the 
respective studies never rated groups on dimensions other than those relating to agency and 
communion. That is, as groups were never rated on B, surely B could not become part of the 
classical model of group stereotypes.  
In the studies that reported in Chapter 3, participants could freely choose both 
the groups they wanted to stereotype, and the dimensions on which they wanted to 
stereotype the groups. Specifically, participants provided similarity ratings for 
freely chosen groups, which allowed them to freely choose stereotype dimensions. 
For example, the similarity of politicians and prostitutes can be rated on the stereotype 
dimensions A (politicians > prostitutes), C (politicians ~ prostitutes), attractiveness (prostitutes 
> politicians) etc. – it is totally up to participants which dimensions they spontaneously use. 
Multidimensional scaling, principal components, and property fitting, and axis labeling / 
categorization analyses (see Studies 1-6 in Chapter 3) revealed that participants consistently 
used not only A, but also B. Why do people stereotype groups based on their conservative-
progressive beliefs?      
 
Groups’ are stereotyped based on their conservative-progressive beliefs to 
manage trade-offs between social exploitation and exploration 
 
Managing the fundamental trade-off between exploiting known resources and exploring 
novel resources that are potentially better but risky is key to self-regulation 
(Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014). Adults, children, other primates and many other 
beings have always had to choose between available and alternative habitats, shelters, 
occupations, foods, mates, and these choices have always been crucial to survive and thrive. 
The ABC model argues that in today’s society it is the conservative and progressive groups 
that provide access to known, available and novel, alternative resources, respectively. 
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Therefore, to successfully manage exploitation versus exploration trade-offs, today’s citizens 
mentally represent groups along the stereotype dimension conservative-progressive beliefs. 
Chapter 3 provides indirect correlational evidence for this claim. As reported in the 
General Discussion of Chapter 3, additional participants rated the extent to which the groups 
examined in Studies 1-4 stand for six exploitation versus exploration values, namely 
familiarity-novelty, safety-freedom, comfort-stimulation, loyalty-autonomy, 
preservation-change, and uniformity-diversity. If people stereotype groups on B to manage 
exploitation versus exploration trade-offs, these six exploitation versus exploration values 
should correlate with the groups’ conservative-progressive beliefs, but not with their A or C. 
This was the case. In fact, the average correlation between the six 
exploitation versus exploration values and groups’ B was as strong as the average correlation 
between the four facets of groups’ B (traditional-modern, religious-science-oriented, 
conventional-alternative, and conservative-liberal, see Table 3 in Study 1 in Chapter 3).  
A set of four unreported studies provides direct experimental evidence that people 
stereotype groups on B to manage exploitation versus exploration trade-offs. If so, then people 
should choose to cooperate with conservatives (progressives) in economic games in which they 
learn that exploitation (exploration) is the strategy that pays off best. We tested this prediction 
using two economic exploitation versus exploration games, namely the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), and a modified version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; 
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994).  
Playing the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), participants earned a point for each inflation 
of a digital balloon. Participants were told that the balloon can in principle be inflated up to 30 
times. However, they were also told that the balloon bursts at a certain inflation step, and if it 
bursts, all points earned so far are lost. After each successful inflation, participants could decide 
to end the game and walk away with the points earned so far (i.e., exploiting resources), or to 
inflate some more (i.e., exploring potentially better but risky resources). There were 
two conditions. For half of the participants, the balloon burst early (inflation 11-13), and thus 
they learned that exploitation pays of better. For the other half, the balloon burst late 
(inflation 23-25), and thus they learned that exploration pays off better. Next, participants were 
presented with 8 groups high on A (e.g., rich people), 8 groups low on A (e.g., alcoholics), 8 
conservative groups (e.g., religious people), and 8 progressive groups (e.g., environmentalists), 
and their task was to first rate the extent to which members of these groups would inflate the 
balloon, and to then indicate the extent to which they would be willing to delegate playing the 
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BART in their stead to members of the target groups. As predicted, participants indicated that 
members of conservative groups would inflate the balloon less than members of 
progressive groups. More importantly, as predicted, participants who learned that inflating 
the balloon less (i.e., exploitation) pays off better because the balloon bursts early preferred to 
delegate playing the BART to members of conservative groups, whereas participants 
who learned that inflating the balloon more (i.e., exploration) pays off better because 
the balloon bursts late preferred to delegate to members of progressive groups. The size of this 
interaction effect was large. We reasoned that its size was large because we forced participants 
to ponder about the extent to which members of the target groups would inflate the balloon, a 
thought process that they normally may not engage in. We repeated the experiment without the 
phase in which participants rated the extent to which members of the target groups would 
inflate the balloon, but the interaction effect remained significant and large (not as large as 
before, but still large). In sum, these two experiments suggest that people stereotype groups 
based on their conservative-progressive beliefs to manage exploitation versus exploration 
trade-offs. 
Playing the modified version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994), participants first drew 
ten cards from a standard deck, and then drew 40 more cards from decks of their free choice, 
namely the standard deck or decks option 1-4. The cards in these decks were either wins 
or blanks. The five decks had different winning probability. In the exploitation condition, the 
standard deck had the highest winning probability (p = .8; the winning probabilities of 
decks option 1-4 were p = .5, .5, .2, and .2). Thus, as participants’ task was to draw as many 
wins as possible, they learned that sticking with the standard deck (i.e., exploiting resources) 
pays of best. In the exploration condition, one of decks option 1-4 had the 
highest winning probability (p = .8; the winning probability of the standard deck was p = .5, 
and the winning probabilities of the remaining option decks were p = .5, .2, and .2). Therefore, 
participants learned that trying out decks option 1-4 (i.e., exploring potentially better but 
risky resources) pays off best. Next, participants rated the extent to which members of the 
same 32 target groups as in the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) studies outlined above would stick 
with the standard deck versus try out decks option 1-4, and to then indicate the extent to which 
they would be willing to delegate playing the IGT in their stead to members of the target groups. 
As predicted, participants indicated that conservatives would stick with the standard deck more 
than progressives. More importantly, mirroring the main result of the two BART studies, in the 
exploitation condition in which sticking with the standard deck paid off better participants 
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preferred to delegate to conservatives, whereas in the exploration condition in which trying out 
decks option 1-4 paid of better participants preferred to delegate to progressives. The size of 
this interaction effect was again large, and smaller but still medium when leaving out the phase 
in which participants rated the extent to which members of the 32 target groups would stick 
with the standard deck versus try out decks option 1-4. In sum, these two experiments increased 
our confidence that people stereotype groups based on their conservative-progressive beliefs 
to manage exploitation versus exploration trade-offs. 
Additional experiments that we are about to conduct will deal with the research question 
whether there are actual differences in exploitation-exploration behavior between members of 
conservative and progressive groups – that is, is there a kernel of truth to people’s stereotype 
that conservatives and progressives tend to exploit and explore, respectively? Also, we will try 
to replicate preference for conservatives and progressives in economic games that call for 
exploitation and exploration, respectively, when the stakes are high – that is, when people’s 
delegation decisions earn them less or more real money.    
I summarize Chapter 4 as follows: The homeostatic valence model developed in 
Chapter 1 predicts a group stereotype model that differs from the classical model developed by 
Fiske and colleagues (2002). According to the homeostatic valence model, the relation between 
the stereotype dimensions agency (A) and communion (C) should not be orthogonal 
as in the classical model, but inverted u-shaped curvilinear such that communion peaks 
at average agency. In the ABC model of group stereotypes developed in Chapter 3, 
agency and communion are related in this curvilinear manner supported by a variety of studies 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Also consistent with the homeostatic valence model, the ABC 
model contains a new stereotype dimensions that does not appear in the classical model, 
namely groups’ conservative-progressive beliefs (B). I proposed that the classical model misses 
both B and the curvilinear relation between A and C because of the constrained sampling 
strategy (Fiedler, 2000; 2011; 2014) of its proponents. Chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence for 
this explanation. Finally, I proposed and presented both correlational and experimental 
evidence suggesting that people stereotype groups on B to manage trade-offs between 
exploiting known resources and exploring potentially better but risky novel resources.    
Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
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 In my thesis, I made the following points. Valence asymmetry in similarity – that is, 
higher similarity of positive compared to negative objects, people, and events (i.e., stimuli) – 
is an explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing that is novel and independent 
of the classical explanation in terms of valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential. 
Further, valence asymmetry in similarity is an ecological, more distal and thus more powerful 
explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing than the intrapsychic phenomenon 
valence asymmetry in affective-motivational potential. Also, valence asymmetry in similarity 
is a general explanation of valence asymmetry in cognitive processing, as higher similarity of 
positive compared to negative stimuli holds true for a variety of emotions, faces, persons, 
groups, and, more generally, words and pictures. Valence asymmetry in similarity follows from 
what I refer to as the homeostatic valence model. The basic idea of this model is that on most 
if not all evaluatively relevant dimensions, positive, adequate quantities are flanked by two 
ranges of negative quantities, namely too little and too much. Given that social groups’ agency 
and communion can be taken as an evaluatively relevant dimension and evaluation per se, 
respectively, this central property of the homeostatic valence model predicts a group 
stereotypes model in which agency (A) and communion (C) are not orthogonal, as postulated 
in the classical group stereotypes model, but related in an inverted u-shaped curvilinear 
manner. Correcting for sampling biases in the studies that support the classical group 
stereotypes model, we developed an updated ABC model in which A and C are related in this 
curvilinear model. Consistent with the homeostatic valence model, the ABC model contains a 
stereotype dimensions that does not appear in the classical model, namely groups’ 
conservative-progressive beliefs (B). People might stereotype groups on B to manage 
trade-offs between exploiting known resources and exploring potentially better but risky novel 
resources. 
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